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ABSTRACT 
Energy intensity in the U.S. from 1780 to 2010 shows a declining trend when traditional 
energy is included, in contrast to the “inverted U-curve” seen when only commercial 
energy is considered.  The analysis quantifies use of human and animal muscle power, 
wind and water power, biomass, harvested ice, fossil fuels, and nuclear power.  Historical 
prices are provided for many energy resources.  The analysis reaffirms the importance of 
innovation in conversion technologies in energy transitions.  An increase in energy 
intensity in the early 20
th
 century is explained by diminishing returns to pre-electric 
manufacturing systems, which produced a transformation in manufacturing.  In 
comparison to similar studies for other countries, the U.S. has generally higher energy 
intensity.   
A population-weighted series of heating degree days and cooling degree days partially 
explains differences in energy intensity.  Series are developed for 231 countries and 
territories with multiple reference temperatures, with a “wet-bulb” series accounting for 
the effects of humidity.  Other variables considered include energy prices, income per 
capita, and governance indices.  A panel regression of thirty-two countries from 1995 to 
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2010 establishes GDP per capita and share of primary energy as determinants of energy 
intensity, but fails to establish statistical significance of the climate variables.  A group 
mean regression finds average heating and cooling degree days to be significant 
predictors of average energy intensity over the study period, increasing energy intensity 
by roughly 1.5 kJ per 2005 international dollar for each annual degree day.  Group mean 
regression results explain differences in countries’ average energy intensity, but not 
changes within a country over time. 
Energy Return on Investment (EROI) influences the economic competitiveness and 
environmental impacts of an energy resource and is one driver of energy transitions.  The 
EROI of U.S. petroleum production has declined since 1972, with a partial rebound in the 
1980s and 1990s.  External Energy Return (EER), which excludes the consumption of 
energy from within the resource, falls by two-thirds from 1972 to 2007.  A literature 
review finds the projected EROI of oil shale to be much lower than the EROI of U.S. 
petroleum production. 
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Glossary 
Cointegration: A relationship existing between two or more non-stationary variables 
when a linear combination of these variables is stationary. 
Embodied Energy: The energy required to produce a material good. 
Energy Return on Investment: The ratio of energy output obtained from a resource to the 
energy input required for extraction.   
Energy Transition: A particularly significant set of changes to the patterns of energy use 
in a society.  
External Energy Return: The energy return on investment calculated using only the 
energy diverted from the economy for the extraction of an energy resource. 
Fixed Effects: A panel data analysis technique in which different individuals have 
different intercepts but common coefficients. 
Gross Domestic Product: The economic value of all goods and services produced within 
a country’s borders. 
Heat Rate: The energy content of a fuel used to generate a kilowatt-hour of electricity. 
Mechanical Work: The application of kinetic energy to objects or materials to change 
their position, velocity, or physical structure. 
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Net Energy Return: The energy return on investment calculated using the total energy 
used in extraction, including energy from within the resource being developed. 
Panel Data: A set of data consisting of observations of multiple individuals or entities 
over a period of time. 
Pooled OLS: A panel data analysis technique in which all individuals have the same 
intercepts and coefficients. 
Primary Energy: Energy as it first enters the economy from the capture or extraction of 
natural energy flows, the biosphere and natural reserves of fossil fuels. 
Random Coefficients: A panel data analysis technique in which all individuals have 
different intercepts and coefficients. 
Raster: In Geographic Information Systems, a matrix of cells in rows and columns. 
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1.  Introduction 
Future patterns of global energy use will change, driven by technological advance and 
environmental pressures.  Economic, political, and cultural factors will also play 
significant roles.  This change is already underway in the United States, with renewable 
energy rising rapidly, natural gas replacing coal for electricity generation, and petroleum 
consumption declining.  Understanding historical patterns of energy consumption can 
provide clues to the impact of future changes.  An energy transition is a set of particularly 
significant changes in patterns of energy consumption in a society.  The remainder of 
Section 1 discusses the context for this analysis.  It discusses the ongoing energy 
transition to low-carbon fuels, views about policy action to support this transition, and 
what lessons can be drawn from history.  Section 2 quantifies energy consumption in the 
United States throughout its history including as many energy resources as possible, 
describes the energy transitions, and to characterizes the forces causing these transitions.  
Section 3 examines how these forces and others drive differences in energy consumption 
between major economies.  Section 4 provides an in-depth look at energy return on 
investment (EROI), which affects energy consumption through the price mechanism. 
1.1.  The Need for an Energy Transition 
The ongoing energy transition is primarily driven by the risks of climate change.  To 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate, some known fossil fuel 
reserves will have to be left in the ground.  This requires abandoning a resource that is 
convenient, valuable, and reliable.  This action is only required because the potential 
2 
 
damages from climate change are so large.  Fossil fuels will remain viable if carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) is rapidly proven and deployed at a global scale.  The 
other alternative is a global shift to low-carbon energy resources, such as renewable 
energy or nuclear power.  Costs of some forms of renewable energy are competitive with 
fossil fuels, as shown below, with the cost premium diminishing or reversing when 
externalities are priced.  The experience of the United States shows that a transition to 
low-carbon energy will be possible and not economically ruinous even if these options 
carry higher economic costs under the current regulatory system.  As has been repeatedly 
seen in history, advances in energy end-use technologies can offer improvements in 
efficiency and performance that can more than make up for an increased cost of energy 
inputs.   
If energy transitions happened purely through the free market, this analysis would be of 
interest only to inventors and investors.  Policymakers could watch the next transition 
unfold and all talk of “encouraging” or “advancing” a transition would be irrelevant.  But 
pollutant emissions are a negative externality, a market imperfection that is suitably 
addressed by policy action.  As will be seen, previous energy transitions in the United 
States occurred through a combination of public and private action.  Early energy 
transitions in U.S. history, such as the shift from wood to coal in the 19
th
 century, 
benefited from government investments in transportation infrastructure, such as canals 
and railroads.  These investments were made to advance economic development, and the 
infrastructure both consumed energy and conveyed energy resources to market.  
Governments also provided technical assistance such as geological surveys (Mather 
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1838) [1], developed safety standards, and as end-users supported the emerging energy 
technology of the locomotive through postal contracts.  Later government efforts were 
initiated with the explicit goal of changing patterns of energy use, such as the rural 
electrification programs of the 1920s and 1930s.  The oil price shocks of the 1970s 
spurred even greater government interest in influencing patterns of energy use, with 
every President since Nixon aiming to reduce U.S. dependence on imported oil (Bryce 
2008) [2].  Also in the 1970s, government action on energy-related externalities 
increased, altering patterns of energy consumption.  These actions are, just as with road-
building or rural electrification programs, aimed at improving the general welfare.   
Actors in the ongoing energy transition include industries, governments, and the public.  
Economic factors within energy industries drive near-term changes, with the private 
sector providing the vast majority of investment in new energy systems and new energy 
end-use equipment.  Anandon et al. (2011) [3], in outlining recommendations for 
increased Federal support of development of low-carbon energy technologies, note, “The 
private sector will clearly play a central role in developing and deploying the new energy 
technologies the world needs.”  They note a number of opportunities for public-private 
partnerships or other government support, but do not suggest that government direct 
investment should overtake private investment.  Government actions on energy policy in 
the past few decades have increasingly favored market-based policies, such as those that 
monetize externalities.  The public has also gained awareness of externalities, so that 
there is now a cultural and social value associated with products that cause less 
environmental damage—a value that businesses can quantify and take into account in 
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their decision-making.  Other political and social pressures such as “energy 
independence” also exist, but are unlikely to be as significant as environmental or 
economic pressures (see Section 1.1.4).   
1.1.1.  Climate Change 
The value of a scientific theory is determined by its ability to make testable predictions.  
In 1896, Svante Arrhenius predicted that burning fossil fuels would increase atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 and thereby warm the planet (Weart 2008) [4].  This prediction 
was borne out by reality.  In its Fourth Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (Hegerl et al. 2007, 60) [5] states, “It is very likely [>90% probability] 
that anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases caused most of the observed increase in 
global average temperatures since the mid-20
th
 century.”  To prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate, some economically viable fossil fuels will have to be left in 
the ground.  Combustion of known fossil fuel reserves would result in additional 
emissions of approximately 2800 billion metric tons of CO2 (Leaton, 2013) [6], or 780 
billion tons of carbon.  This would increase atmospheric CO2 concentrations to roughly 
765 ppm, representing an increase of 173% from pre-industrial levels.  Using the IPCC 
value of 3.2°C for climate sensitivity (IPCC 2007), such an increase would raise average 
global temperatures by around 4.6°C (8.3°F).  Stern (2006, 169) [7] notes, “The stocks of 
hydrocarbons that are profitable to extract (under current policies) are more than enough 
to take the world to levels of CO2 concentrations well beyond 750ppm, with very 
dangerous consequences for climate-change impacts.”  Known reserves do not include 
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future discoveries, nor technology advances that change currently uneconomic resources 
into reserves, and so it is likely that burning all economical fossil fuels would lead to CO2 
concentrations of 1000 ppm or higher.  That constraints on carbon emissions will be 
necessary to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system is a 
conclusion supported by Klein et al. (2007) [8], the G8+5 National Academies of Science 
(2009) [9], the American Association for the Advancement of Science (2009) [10], and 
many other sources.  To leave an economically viable resource unused is rare.  To leave 
this much of a resource unused will be unprecedented.  McKibben (2012) [11] estimates 
the unburnable reserves to have a market value of around $20 trillion.  The strongest 
argument to support limiting carbon emissions is that they cause damages that are not 
included in their price, as discussed in Section 1.1.1.  Negative externalities represent a 
market imperfection; the economic benefits of using fossil fuels are privatized (they 
accrue to the consumer), while the negative impacts are socialized (they accrue to the 
community).  Environmental externalities have influenced patterns of energy use in the 
past, but for impacts that were closer in time and space to the consumption of energy.  
The impacts of CO2 emissions are not as proximate to the point of energy consumption as 
are, for example, the impacts of coarse particulate matter. 
The economies of the world require energy inputs, and immediate abandonment of fossil 
fuels with no alternatives would be catastrophic.  Fortunately, there are alternatives to 
fossil fuels, such as renewable energy and nuclear power, as well as energy efficiency 
options that greatly reduce the energy inputs required for a given level of energy services.  
The most common argument against a transition to low-carbon energy is that such 
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resources seem more expensive than fossil fuels.  By reducing the external damages 
caused, low-carbon resources may in fact carry a lower cost than fossil fuels.  Even 
ignoring the avoided damages, improved energy efficiency can allow higher-cost energy 
resources to provide some energy services at a lower end-use cost than is currently the 
case.   
Some of the more vehement arguments against constraints on carbon emissions are 
politically motivated hyperbole.  The Kyoto Protocol imposed modest emission limits on 
signatories.  Andrei Illarionov, formerly the major economic advisor to Vladimir Putin, 
stated, “Restrictions on CO2 are incompatible with economic growth” (Powell, 2004) 
[12] and referred to the Kyoto Protocol as “an international Auschwitz” (Miles, 2004) 
[13].  Similar statements are made by political organizations, including many that claim 
to be non-partisan “think tanks.”  Nordhaus (2012) [14] responds, “The claim that cap-
and-trade legislation or carbon taxes would be ruinous or disastrous to our societies does 
not stand up to serious economic analysis.” 
A more reasoned concern on the cost of renewables is expressed by Jacoby et al. (1997, 
6) [15]: “It may well prove impossible to slow warming appreciably without condemning 
much of the world to poverty unless carbon-free energy sources become roughly 
competitive with conventional fossil sources.”  The context for this quote is a discussion 
of the need for long-term investment in research and development to reduce the cost of 
renewable energy technologies.  It is not an argument against acting on climate change, 
as the rest of the paper makes clear.  It does not require renewables to be the cheapest of 
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all possible options: “roughly competitive” is all that is required.  Still, even this more 
qualified language misses two crucial points: 1) the external damages caused by pollution 
(whether CO2, particulates, NOx, or other emissions) represent an additional cost of the 
polluting fuels, and 2) improvements in energy technologies mean that provision of 
energy services in the future can be less expensive than at present even if less-polluting 
inputs carry a cost premium.  The latter point is extensively demonstrated by the history 
of energy technologies offering tremendous improvements in efficiency, often 
accompanied by improvements in quality of energy service.  By comparison, the energy 
resources used as inputs are less important.  The use of kerosene in oil lamps, a new and 
cheaper fuel in an old technology, did not transform lighting.  A new technology, electric 
light, did.  Electricity in 1907 sold for about 2.7 per kWh, or about $7.50 per GJ (U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, 1975) [16].  The retail price of kerosene was about 15 cents per 
gallon (Woodward and Fleming, 1907) [17], or $1 per GJ.  The advanced technology of 
the incandescent bulb was more than able to compensate for the higher cost of its energy.  
Electricity service expanded from 8% of homes in 1907 to 63% of homes in 1927 without 
any reduction in the price in nominal dollars. 
The costs of stabilizing CO2 concentrations are generally estimated to be a few percent of 
GDP.  Stern (2006) estimates that about 1% of GDP by 2050 is required to stabilize 
below a doubling of pre-industrial CO2.  This is relative to a modeled business-as-usual 
case in which the economic output of developing nations increases by 400% and that of 
developed nations by 200%.  Baseline cases assume rapid economic growth, and carbon-
constrained scenarios have only slightly slower growth.  The costs of mitigating climate 
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change sound daunting when expressed in absolute terms, but the world economy is 
simply immense: about $85 trillion in 2012 (World Bank, 2012) [18].  Nordhaus (2010) 
[19] estimates that limiting the temperature increase to 2°C can be achieved at a gain of 
about $4 trillion in net present value, relative to a case in which carbon is not constrained.  
Costs of compliance in an “optimal” case (a peak 3°C rise and a net welfare gain of $8 
trillion) are about 1% of GDP for most regions, and zero or negative for Africa and 
Russia.  The net welfare gain includes the cost of compliance and the benefit of avoided 
damages.   
The cost difference between renewables and fossil fuels gives an illustration of the costs 
to eliminate carbon emissions from one sector, that of electricity generation.  Global 
electricity consumption in 2010 was approximately 18.5 billion MWh (EIA, 2013a) [20].  
If carbon-free energy were to cost an additional $30/MWh over fossil energy, converting 
the entire system would cost $555 billion per year, or about 0.65% of world GDP.  This 
would eliminate about a quarter of global CO2 emissions.  Anderson (2006) [21] provides 
the basis for the estimates in Stern (2006).  Anderson estimates wind electricity to be 
about 2.1p/kWh more expensive than non-CCS gas or coal from 2011 to 2016, which is a 
premium of roughly $30/MWh.  Anderson’s long-term estimate for wind places it by 
2026 as only about $10/MWh more expensive than non-CCS gas or coal.  Solar PV is 
seen to be a viable option in the long term, at only about $15/MWh more than retail grid 
power by 2026.  Anderson (2006, 9) emphasizes that these are rough estimates: “The 
uncertainties are too large for the estimates to be used to identify the least cost options—
and the same applies, I believe, to other studies.” 
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The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates the levelized cost of various 
power options (EIA, 2013b) [22].  Its forecasts for plants entering U.S. operation in 2018 
places the cost of new wind power in between that of new gas and new coal.  Onshore 
wind is on average 32% more expensive than the lowest-cost new gas plants ($23/MWh 
more) and 13% less expensive than new coal.  Wind is the lowest-cost carbon-free 
resource, beating all forms of CCS power plants as well as nuclear power.  Solar 
photovoltaic (PV) power is considerably more expensive, at about 120% more expensive 
than gas (without CCS) and 44% more expensive than coal.  Solar PV often competes 
“behind the meter” against retail power prices, which may render it more feasible than 
the cost premium would suggest.  These prices exclude subsidies.  If the Production Tax 
Credit (PTC) for wind is extended, wind is equal in cost to natural gas, since the PTC is 
currently $23/MWh.  The reduced damages from climate change make a compelling case 
for extending the PTC, since unpriced externalities are an implicit subsidy for fossil fuels.   
Climate change has already begun to drive significant changes in the energy industry.  It 
has spurred extensive support for research, development, and deployment of renewable 
energy technologies and nuclear power, as well as conversion technologies such as fuel 
cells and LED lights.  The result of these efforts is seen in a rapid lowering of costs and 
increasing use of renewable energy.  Photovoltaic power is increasingly competitive in 
areas with high solar insolation and high electricity prices.  And, as shown in Section 
2.1.3, the per-capita use of wind power in the U.S. in 2010 was six times its earlier peak, 
reached in the mid-19
th
 century during the Golden Age of Sail.   
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1.1.2.  Other Environmental Impacts 
Climate change is not the only environmental impact associated with energy use.  
Emissions of other pollutants such as NOx, SO2, particulate matter, and mercury 
adversely impact human societies and natural ecosystems.  Water supplies are vulnerable 
to impacts at several stages of energy consumption.  Extraction can lead to water 
contamination by hydraulic fracturing fluid or mine tailings; combustion may require 
local withdrawals of water for cooling; and pollutant deposition can cause acidification of 
lakes.  No energy resource is entirely free of environmental externalities, although the 
type and magnitude of impacts vary.  Numerous analyses attempt to quantify these 
externalities in economic terms, based on the damages caused, allowing comparison 
between energy options.  The valuation of damages varies by methodologies used and by 
the area impacted.  Any attempt to monetize externalities will necessarily require 
abstractions, simplifications, and compromise.  The alternative to an imperfect valuation 
of externalities is to implicitly assign them a value of zero.  
Epstein et al. (2011) [23] find a “best estimate” of the externalities associated with coal 
power in the U.S. to be 17.84¢/kWh, of which climate change accounts for 3.15¢ and 
criteria pollutants (such as NOx, SO2, and particulate matter) account for 9.31¢ (using 
2008 US$).  Epstein et al. use a value of $30 per ton of CO2 as the damage function, 
which would place the cost of CO2 from natural gas combustion near 1.4¢/kWh, since the 
U.S. emissions rate for CO2 from natural gas plants in 2009 was about 44% of the 
emissions rate from coal plants (U.S. EPA, 2012) [24].  Methane emissions from the 
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natural gas production and distribution would increase the climate damages somewhat, 
although natural gas has few of the other damages associated with coal extraction and 
combustion.   
The ExternE project (2005) [25] finds fossil fuel electricity to carry externalities of about 
5-25€/MWh for natural gas, 10-70€/MWh for coal, and under 10€/MWh for wind, 
hydropower, nuclear power, and solar photovoltaic power.  These are at a cost of 19€ per 
ton of CO2, with higher external costs for fossil fuels in an alternative case with CO2 at 
50€ per ton.  Muller et al. (2011) [26] find externalities of 2.8¢/kWh for coal and 
0.085¢/kWh for natural gas excluding climate change.  The values increase to 3.59¢/kWh 
for coal and 0.56¢/kWh for gas when including the effects of climate change (both cases 
using 2000 US$).  This analysis uses a social cost of $27 per ton of carbon, which is 
equal to $7.36 per ton of CO2, and is lower than the cost used by Epstein et al. (2011) or 
ExternE (2005).  IPCC (2006) [27] cite the findings of Krewitt and Schlomann (2006) 
[28] that, for conditions similar to Central Europe, coal power has a damage function of 
7-10¢/kWh, natural gas around 3.6¢/kWh, and renewables 1¢/kWh or less.   
Taken together, these studies show that there are unpriced externalities associated with 
coal power.  Natural gas has lesser impacts, and may remain competitive with renewable 
energy even after accounting for its externalities, as long as the social cost of carbon 
emissions remains fairly low.  Alvarez et al. (2012) [29] notes that high rates of methane 
leakage from natural gas production, transport, and distribution can negate some of the 
carbon reductions gained by switching fuels from coal to natural gas.  Minimizing 
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leakage is crucial if natural gas is to play a role as a “bridge fuel” to a low-carbon future.  
Renewable energy resources do have environmental externalities of their own, but they 
are generally less than those of fossil fuels.  Nuclear power has a very low level of 
externalities in most studies considered, although these include large-magnitude low-
probability events for which economic costs are hard to ascertain.  If the damage 
functions for nuclear power were known, the private insurance market would be able to 
cover U.S. facilities. 
1.1.3.  Peak Oil 
Peak oil is a consequence of geology, economics, and technology.  For any finite 
resource, there are easily-accessible deposits and those more difficult to develop.  The 
technology to locate and develop the resource improves over time, but there comes a 
point at which the increasing cost of extraction outpaces the cost reductions from 
technological advances.  At this point the price of the resource tends to rise.  As low-cost 
supplies are depleted, research and development of alternatives increases.  Once an 
alternative becomes competitive with the first resource, it gains market share.  If the first 
resource becomes less competitive, its production will decline.  Although this substitution 
is often seen when the first resource is increasing in absolute price, it is only necessary 
that it increase in price relative to its alternatives.  The timing and economic impact of 
peak oil depend on the geological distribution of petroleum resources, the rate of 
improvement in extraction technology, the development of alternatives, and the demand 
elasticity of oil.  
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In the U.S., domestic petroleum production peaked and declined as production grew more 
expensive, because the country could substitute cheaper imported oil.  The use of wood in 
steam engines peaked and declined in the mid-19
th
 century because railroads could 
substitute coal.  Numerous analyses suggest that global conventional oil production will 
peak in the first half of the 21
st
 century.  More pessimistic estimates, such as those of 
Campbell and Laherrère (1998) [30] suggest the decade 2001-2010.  More optimistic 
estimates such as Wood et al. (2004) [31] anticipate a peak in the decade 2031-2040.   
Peak oil does not mean total physical exhaustion of the planet’s petroleum resources, nor 
does it imply the sudden collapse of industrial societies.  The peak might be caused by 
the declining prices and improving performance of alternatives, in which case a peak 
could occur amidst an expanding market.  This would be similar to the late 19
th
 century 
transition from wood to coal in railroads, or from whale oil to kerosene in the lamp fuel 
market.  It is also possible that oil production will peak due to saturation of demand for 
the energy services it provides (transportation), combined with high prices and improved 
efficiency allowing those services to be provided with fewer inputs.  These are the factors 
behind the observed peak in per-capita oil consumption for OECD countries.  
Campbell and Laherrère (1998) projected that conventional oil production would peak 
before 2010, and that this would be accompanied by steep price increases.  They did not 
ignore unconventional oil, but considered the environmental drawbacks likely to limit the 
expansion of this resource.  Other analyses, such as Jaffe et al. (2011) [32] are much 
more optimistic about unconventional oil.  The price of oil has increased greatly over the 
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past fifteen years, as seen in Figure 1, which has slowed the growth of global oil.  
Consumption increased 20% from 1994 to 2004, but only 7.6% from 2004 to 2012. 
Consumption for North America and Europe in 2012 was below the 1999 level, but these 
reductions have been more than offset by increases elsewhere, particularly in Asia.     
 
Figure 1: World Oil Production and Prices, 1994-2013 
Sources: EIA (2013a) and EIA (2013c) [33] 
These high prices have, as predicted, stimulated development of alternatives.  Production 
now includes a greater share of unconventional resources such as oil sands and tight oil.  
It is extremely unlikely that depletion of conventional oil supplies will limit carbon 
emissions, since it will simply be replaced by unconventional oil.  Better news for the 
climate comes from the downstream side, where the success of hybrid vehicles has 
greatly improved vehicle efficiency.  Advanced versions of these vehicles can allow 
electricity to partially replace petroleum.  
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Campbell and Laherrère noted the “end of cheap oil” in 1998, and the past fifteen years 
have not disproved that claim.  The fundamental geological factor behind peak oil, the 
depletion of the lowest-cost oil resources, has led to higher oil prices.  This has increased 
research, development, and deployment of supply-side alternatives and demand-side 
efficiency, ranging from tight shale oil production to plug-in hybrids.  Whether the future 
transportation system is based on kerogen-derived synthetic crude, algae-based biofuels, 
electric vehicles, or some other option, petroleum will eventually peak and decline.  This 
statistical peak will be a consequence of energy transitions, not a cause of it.  
1.1.4.  Other Factors 
As the history of the U.S. shows, energy transitions are complex events relying on dozens 
of interconnected pressures.  This is well illustrated by the analyses of Frank Geels, as 
discussed in Section 1.3.  Economic factors, including the price of energy, the price of 
energy-using technologies, and the demand for energy-intensive goods will all influence 
energy transitions.  Other relevant pressures might be technological, political, or cultural.   
Technology can offer new or radically changed energy end services, and its impact is 
hard to predict.  The U.S. ice harvest of the 19
th
 century (see Section 2.1.7) was itself a 
technology, including the tools and knowledge needed to collect, preserve, and market 
ice for artificial cooling.  This introduced a new energy service to the U.S., which in turn 
spurred extensive innovation, created and transformed entire industries, and altered 
population distribution.  The telegraph introduced information processing and 
communication as an energy service, to be followed by the telephone, phonograph, radio, 
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television, and computer.  Air travel created an entirely new application for motive 
power.  The incandescent bulb and the steam engine expanded the provision of lighting 
and motive power by orders of magnitude.  It is possible that a new invention will arise to 
greatly expand the supply of a particular energy service.  The smartphone has expanded 
the provision of communication and information processing, at minimal energy cost.  The 
Segway did not transform personal transportation, but it is possible that another 
innovation could do so.   
The political goal of “energy independence” is invoked in the U.S. to support certain 
kinds of energy transitions.  In its prior incarnations, it meant weaning the U.S. off of all 
foreign oil.  President Obama has altered the term to allow oil imports from Canada and 
Mexico.  Energy independence is a myopic goal that flies in the face of economics and 
international relations.  First, oil is a global commodity.  Should the U.S. only import oil 
from Canada and Mexico, supply disruptions in the Middle East will still cause a price 
spike, as European nations unable to obtain that oil instead increase their bids for North 
American oil.  Second, trade lowers prices, by allowing specialization and capitalizing on 
comparative advantage.  To actively choose to be self-sufficient in a good is to forego 
comparative advantage.  Third, trade appears to foster ties between countries, reducing 
the risk of war.  Nations engaged in international trade have an incentive to avoid 
disrupting that trade.  Nations that might sponsor terrorism can be deterred by the threat 
of sanctions.  For additional discussion, see Cleveland (2008) [34].   
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Demand for energy services is not fixed in the human heart.  It reflects cultural values, 
which are shaped by many forces, including marketing and advertising.  The United 
States’ “love affair with the car” is an iconic example that partially explains difference in 
energy use between the U.S. and Europe.  Demand for lighting was high in the U.S. due 
to widespread literacy, making this country a hotbed of lighting innovation.  The ice 
harvest enabled year-round production of lager beers, which became the overwhelming 
market leader; refrigeration transformed eating habits by enabling preservation and 
transport of dairy, produce, and meat.  Changing cultural values spurred demographic 
shifts to the suburbs in the post-WWII period and back to revitalized cities at the end of 
the 20
th
 century, with attendant impacts on energy consumption.  Cultural preference for 
products with lower environmental impact has increased in recent decades, leading to 
changes in industries such as food and consumer products.  
1.2.  The Role of Historical Analysis 
Our understanding of these historical patterns is limited by the available data.  Studies on 
historical energy consumption in societies most often focus on commercial energy 
resources such as fossil fuels, nuclear power, and hydroelectricity.  Systematic annual 
records for these resources begin in 1949 in the United States.  When only these are 
considered, energy intensity (energy consumption per dollar of Gross Domestic Product) 
increases during the transition from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, and 
decreases during the transition from an industrial economy to a service economy.   
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Recent studies from Europe have sought to expand analysis of energy consumption to 
include non-commercial energy resources such as firewood, draft animal labor, and the 
power harnessed by watermills and sailing vessels.  In the U.S., some quantities of energy 
consumed can be estimated on the basis of decadal surveys (such as the U.S. Census) or 
trade journals, as well as a number of seminal books and articles.  The European studies 
show that when firewood is considered, energy intensity is usually closer to a monotonic 
decline, rather than an increase followed by a decrease.  The U.S. likewise sees a decline 
in energy intensity over the past 220 years, as seen in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: U.S. Energy Intensity 1780-2010 
Sources: Section 2.1.1 through 2.1.12 
Reynolds and Pierson (1942) [35] is widely cited and finds very high levels of fuel wood 
consumption in early America.  The 1800-1809 level of 4.35 cords per capita results in 
energy consumption from wood alone of about 92 GJ per capita, equivalent to the total 
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per-capita energy consumption of Spain in 1996 (Kander et al., 2007) [36] and 
significantly greater than China in 2010 (EIA, 2013a).  On the basis of energy inputs, the 
Industrial Revolution is represented by a transition from wood to coal taking place over 
the period 1860 (when the shares are 73% and 14%, respectively) to 1900 (when the 
shares are 20% and 66%).  The inclusion of animal muscle, human muscle, and energy 
from windmills, sailing ships, and watermills does little to change this, as their shares of 
energy content are very small compared to firewood and coal. 
1.2.1.  The Importance of Mechanical Work in Energy Studies 
Dewhurst (1955, 1102) [37] notes the importance of work output (meaning mechanical 
energy) and derives time series for that quantity.  As he notes, “of special significance for 
the economy are the amounts and kinds of energy devoted to the performance of work 
and the amounts of work performed…It includes only those operations which have been 
or could be done (however inadequately) by the muscle power of animals and men” 
(italics in original).  Dewhurst excludes process heat, space heating, refrigeration, 
lighting, and chemical synthesis from this definition.  Turning a dynamo to generate 
electricity is an operation that can be done by muscle power, and most electrical 
generation from fossil fuels involves transforming thermal energy to mechanical energy 
at one stage.  Nonetheless, Dewhurst considers only electricity which is converted back 
to mechanical energy for end use (such as in electric motors for factories or streetcars).   
Dewhurst was writing in the 1950s, following on a century-long tradition of regarding 
energy inputs as surrogate workers.  In the 1850s, watermills and steam engines delivered 
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motive power, directly replacing human workers and draft animals at specific tasks.  The 
measurement of engines and waterwheels in horsepower arises from this perspective, and 
their performance as surrogate workers was easily translated into quantification of 
economic gains.  The emphasis on motive power is seen in Trowbridge (1888) [38], 
Daugherty (1928) [39], and many other sources.  By the time of Dewhurst’s analysis, 
energy was extensively used for many other purposes, which he excluded from his 
assessment.  The past sixty years have seen further changes.  Mechanical work output, as 
defined by Dewhurst, is an important end use of energy, but it is no longer the sole 
energy service of interest.  More recent studies do not give it special treatment or 
quantification.  The mechanical work output series are extended to 2010 in this analysis 
solely for reasons of historical continuity with previous studies.  They do not represent 
the total “useful work” delivered by energy resources. 
When considering work output, the Industrial Revolution is not a transition from wood to 
coal, but a transition from muscle power (largely animal) to coal-driven steam engines.  
Coal and the steam engine are not inseparably linked; wood was the dominant fuel in 
early steam engines, supplying half of all locomotive fuel as late as 1870 according to 
White (1979) [40].  But in 1870 steam engines were not yet the dominant prime mover, 
and wood was never comparable in work output to muscle power.  Coal-driven steam 
engines captured an absolute majority of all work output by the mid-1880s, even as draft 
animal populations continued to grow until the 1910s.  Section 2.2.4 discusses 
mechanical work output in greater detail. 
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1.3.  Studies of Energy Transitions 
This analysis of energy consumption in the United States builds on the work of Dewhurst 
(1955), extending the time series backwards to 1780 and forwards to 2010, while adding 
series for traditional energy resources.  In its scope it is similar to the work of the 
Environment, Growth, and Pollution (EGP) Network, such as Kander et al. (2007).  
Dewhurst (1955, 903) concluded from his data series that increased consumption of 
energy had led to tremendous growth in income, noting “Our high productivity and 
standard of living are in large part the fruits of a ‘high-energy civilization.’”  Dewhurst 
also notes that work output is a more significant measure of energy’s role in the economy 
than energy input, and remarks on the tremendous growth in energy efficiency associated 
with the shift to electrification. 
When only modern commercial energy resources are considered, energy intensity (energy 
consumption per dollar of GDP) follows an inverted U-shape, rising as a country 
industrializes and then decreasing.  Kander et al. (2007) shows that the inclusion of 
traditional energy resources changes this to a declining trend throughout the transition 
from agrarian to industrial to service economy.  This holds true for Italy, Spain, and 
Sweden, despite those countries’ variation in climate, economic development, and energy 
resources.  The Netherlands shows more stable energy intensity, although unlike the 
others it was dependent on fossil fuels (primarily peat) from the beginning of the era 
considered.  The major reason for the observed declines is technological improvement 
resulting in increasing energy efficiency.  Structural change from industrial to service 
22 
 
economies accounts for about 15% of the reduction in energy intensity in Kander et al. 
(2007).  Metcalf (2008) [41] reached a similar conclusion for the U.S., attributing 26% of 
the reduction in energy intensity in the U.S. from 1970 to 2003 to changes in economic 
structure.  Technological improvement has increased in importance in recent decades, 
and can allow future economic growth without significantly increasing energy 
consumption.  Stern (2006, 169) concurs, noting “…changes in energy technologies, the 
structure of economies and the pattern of demand have reduced the responsiveness of 
emissions to income growth…”  Section 2.3.1 compares my findings for the U.S. to those 
of the EGP Network for European countries.  
Grubler (2012) [42] provides an excellent review of the literature on energy transitions.  
From this, he derives three primary insights.  First, Grubler notes “the importance of 
energy end-use in driving energy transitions.”  As Lovins (1999) [43] states, people do 
not want energy; they want hot showers and cold beer.  An energy resource is worthless 
without technology to transform it into an energy service, and demand for that service.  
The experience of the U.S. supports this conclusion, as illustrated by the slow growth of 
petroleum between 1880 and 1900, as discussed in Section 2.1.9.  Despite the genius of 
Rockefeller, this abundant, low-cost, and flexible resource only doubled its domestic 
market in 20 years.  Petroleum then found exponential growth once a new energy end-use 
demanded it.  Grubler notes that energy end uses are sensitive to performance 
characteristics.  Novel energy technologies may succeed on quality even if they have a 
high cost.  This effect is seen in the early diffusion of electric lighting, as it could be used 
in flammable atmospheres such as mills, where gas lighting could not be used.  It is also 
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seen in the growth of the automobile.  Despite costing more per passenger-mile than a 
streetcar or a bicycle, the automobile offered superior flexibility, speed, and comfort.   
Grubler’s second observation is that “rates of change are slow, but not always.”  A global 
transition is the accumulation of many smaller transitions in individual markets and 
countries.  Because these markets are somewhat independent, the transition takes longer 
at the global level than it does in any one.  Larger and more complex systems take more 
time to change.  This inertia provides a strong argument against delaying action on 
climate change.  Sinking more money into fossil fuel infrastructure and technology will 
only make it more difficult to reduce emissions if science warns that a particular tipping 
point is near.  Success in niche markets can accelerate transitions, a factor also 
emphasized by Geels (2002) [44], discussed below.  A high level of comparative 
advantage in energy end-use technologies can accelerate an energy transition.  Grubler 
offers the intriguing finding that late adopters have the advantage of moving into and out 
of energy systems more quickly than early adopters.  The latecomers face lower expenses 
since some technological progress has been accomplished by the early adopters.  The 
pioneers have higher sunk costs and, in some cases, greater investment of human capital.  
The coal industry in the United Kingdom had been established for hundreds of years.  
This entrenchment sustained the industry and made transitioning away from coal a slower 
process.  Grubler shows that countries with a later transition to coal achieved this 
transition more rapidly, but also moved away from coal more rapidly.  The “leapfrog” 
scenario is the ultimate extension of this “last-in, first-out” observation, being “never-in.”  
In such a scenario, non-OECD countries lacking an extensive fossil fuel infrastructure 
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skip that step altogether and instead develop a low-carbon energy system.  One example 
that proponents hope to replicate is the way that some African countries went straight to 
cell phone networks without ever having land-lines (Sauter and Watson, 2008) [45]. 
Carbon-free energy may face a steeper climb, since Grubler also notes that end-use 
technologies have more rapid transitions than energy supply technologies.  
Grubler’s final observation is that energy transitions are driven by technological solutions 
that “start off initially as small, imperfect, and costly, but whose long-term growth leads 
to transitions at the macro-level.”  New technologies typically require decades of 
experimentation and learning at the small scale, with many different firms and designs.  
The new technologies first increase in unit scale, and then increase in industry scale.  
Industry scale-up tends to involve consolidation, with many companies failing and a few 
surviving.  The “learning curve” tempts policymakers to a mathematical folly.  If each 
doubling of cumulative production leads to a 20% reduction in the cost of solar panels, 
then the obvious step is to build a giant factory to create a sixteen-fold increase in the 
industry, thereby reducing prices by 60%.  It does not work that way.  The learning curve 
is the result of trial and error, observing what works and what doesn’t, developing best 
practices, training a workforce, and improving successive generations of manufacturing.  
Premature scale-up can lead to very expensive failures.  In the area of climate change, the 
Manhattan Project and the Apollo Program are invoked as engineering programs in which 
the government invested large amounts of money to solve technological problems in a 
very short time.  Grubler advises that space exploration and the military were “cost 
insensitive sectors” and that such a model is not suitable to the energy industry. 
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Grubler concludes with three recommendations.  First, support for energy transitions 
requires persistence and continuity.  This is most important for preserving knowledge 
capital.  As well, long time horizons allow for exploration of new directions in the basic 
sciences, which may take many years to turn into applied solutions.  Long-term clarity 
about research objectives and government support also enables the private sector to plan 
investments.  The wind power industry experiences boom-and-bust cycles due to the 
periodic near-expiration of the Production Tax Credit.  The second recommendation is 
alignment of policies.  It is counterproductive to subsidize fossil energy exploration while 
attempting to foster a shift to a low-carbon economy.  The third is recommendation is to 
rebalance R&D portfolios towards small-scale technologies and energy efficiency, and to 
place less emphasis on large-scale supply technologies such as nuclear power. 
Vaclav Smil is one of the world’s foremost researchers on energy transitions.  His books 
have assessed properties of energy transitions at national and global levels, bringing 
together analytical techniques from economics, sociology, and history.  Smil (2006, 23) 
[46] offers the following observation on a transition to low-carbon fuels: 
Three key factors drove the 19
th
 century transition to fossil fuels: declining resource availability 
(deforestation), higher quality (higher energy density, easier storage, greater flexibility) and lower 
cost of coals and hydrocarbons. On these three points at least, there is no urgency for an 
accelerated shift to a non-fossil world: fossil fuel supplies are adequate for generations to come, 
new energies are not qualitatively superior, and their production will not be substantially cheaper.   
 
Arguments for an accelerated transition to a non-fossil world are predicated almost entirely on 
concerns about climate change. Even then, because of the enormity of requisite technical and 
infrastructural requirements, many decades will be needed to capture substantial market shares on 
continental or global scales. A non-fossil world may be highly desirable, but getting there will 
demand great determination, cost and patience.  
Smil’s assertions have some truth to them, but the framing overstates the advantages of 
fossil fuels.  The first and third points are one and the same, discussing the relative cost 
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advantage of fossil fuels.  Many of the specific qualities mentioned in the second point 
are less relevant than in 1850 due to electrification.  If environmental benefits are 
excluded from costs, then they should be included with qualitative advantages.   
Section 2.2.5 examines the role of wood scarcity in the shift to coal for steam engines.   
Aside from the factors of scarcity and price, coal’s performance improved with enabling 
technologies, as engineers learned how to design fireboxes for it.  This is not unlike the 
present transition.  Renewable energy technologies and enabling technologies such as 
batteries have seen large cost reductions and performance improvements over the past 25 
years, and continue to do so.  Supplies of oil, while not nearing exhaustion, are tight 
enough for high prices to lead to greater efficiency and partial substitution of electricity.  
Supplies of coal are abundant, but real prices have doubled from 2000 to 2010, as shown 
in Section 2.4.2.  With low prices, low externalities, and abundant reserves, natural gas is 
likely to be the most viable competition to non-fossil energy in the coming decades.  
Smil’s second point warrants additional discussion on “qualitative superiority.”  Energy 
resources compete on qualities such as density in some cases.  The high energy density of 
petroleum fuels is vitally important for air travel, offering range and speed.  There are no 
near-term substitutes for fossil fuels in this regard.  It is reasonable to expect that airlines 
would pay a premium for a fuel with greater energy density.  For other demands, 
electrification and improved transportation infrastructure make such qualities less 
relevant.  Low energy density means that it costs more to transport biomass to a power 
plant than to transport coal, but this cost is accounted for in the cost of the biomass 
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power.  The low energy density of gas is no drawback for electricity generation, and the 
costs of wind power already include the costs of grid services needed to accommodate its 
intermittency.  To the end user, electricity is a commodity, with no difference in 
performance whether it power comes from coal, gas, biomass, or wind.   
Competition on performance characteristics is more common in energy end-use 
technologies.  Grubler (2012) writes about energy end-use, “Performance…initially 
dominates economics as a driver of technological change and diffusion.”  Automobiles 
offered speed and convenience over bicycles and streetcars, so consumers were willing to 
pay more per passenger-mile.  “Qualitative superiority” includes performance advantages 
such as speed, comfort, safety, convenience, and portability.  These are implicitly valued 
in consumers’ decisions but missed when comparing delivered energy services in terms 
of dollars per passenger-mile or dollars per lumen-hour.   
The performance advantages of “environmental benefits” were cited as a motivating 
factor in purchasing an electric vehicle (EV) by 72% of EV owners in recent California 
survey (California Center for Sustainable Energy, 2013) [47].  This technology enables 
electricity to displace petroleum, and increased penetration may mitigate the 
intermittency of wind and solar power (Kempton and Tomić, 2005) [48], thereby 
allowing even greater utilization of renewable electricity.  The willingness of some 
consumers to pay a premium for electric vehicles, and of others to support them with tax 
incentives, illustrates that environmental benefits make low-emission options 
“qualitatively superior.”  The tax incentives for electric vehicles, renewable energy, and 
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other low-emission options represent the monetizing of this advantage through the 
democratic process.  An energy transition to low-emission options differs from previous 
transitions in placing greater emphasis on this particular performance advantage, and in 
considering emissions that have impacts further from the point of use, but consideration 
of environmental impacts is not revolutionary. 
Reduced emissions explain the preference for anthracite over bituminous coals for home 
heating in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries.  Environmental externalities also affect 
evaluations of battery-motor systems against gasoline engines for systems below 
automotive size.  Compared to internal combustion engines, battery-powered appliances 
produce no fumes at the point of use, have no risk of fuel spills, and are quieter in their 
operation.  This makes them ideal for portable low-power operations.  The high energy 
density of petroleum gives internal combustion engines an advantage in high-power 
applications such as automobiles and motorcycles.  Improvements in battery technology 
now allow battery-motor systems to directly compete against gasoline engine systems in 
moderate-power applications such as lawnmowers, motorized bicycles, and yard tools.   
Smil advises that a transition to a low-carbon future will require patience and dedication.  
Rather than being discouraged by the scale of the effort required, it is worth noting that 
investment decisions and policy discussions are not about starting a new transition, but 
about sustaining an ongoing transition decades in the making.  Driven by the international 
events and social movements, the U.S. placed greater consideration on potential energy 
supply constraints and environmental externalities in the 1970s.  The 1970s can be seen 
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as the beginning of the present transition; the fact that U.S. energy consumption per 
capita peaked in that decade supports such a view. Concerns about climate change have a 
shorter history, at only two decades.  The U.S. ratified the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992.  Subsequent years saw increased 
research and development of energy technologies, as well as numerous Federal and state 
policies to encourage deployment of these technologies.   
This transition has been going on for decades, whether one sets 1973 or 1992 as the 
starting point.  It is tempting to look at the relatively unchanged fuel shares over the past 
40 years (see Section 2.2.2) and assume that progress has been slow.  To do so would be 
to ignore the vast improvements in efficiency and in addressing externalities.  Energy 
consumption per capita has declined by 11% from its 1979 peak even as real GDP per 
capita has increased by 64%, as shown in Section 2.2.1.  The Clean Air Act reduced 
pollution and produced welfare benefits of about $22.2 trillion from 1970 to 1990 (in 
1990 dollars) compared to compliance costs of $0.5 trillion (U.S. EPA, 1997) [49].  
Standards for fuel economy, appliance efficiency, and pollutant emissions represented a 
transformation in thinking about energy consumption.  With growing awareness of 
climate impacts since the 1980s, groundwork has been laid for further changes.  Wind 
power represented the largest source of capacity additions in the U.S. in 2012 (Wiser and 
Bolinger, 2012) [50], and increased from 0.3% of electricity generation in 2003 to 5% in 
May 2013 (EIA, 2013d) [51].  Solar power costs have come down and generation has 
increased at least eightfold since 2006 (EIA, 2013d).  Incredible work has been done in 
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technological development of non-fossil energy improving end-use efficiency, and 
transforming physical and institutional infrastructure.   
Major transitions effect changes within human organizations such as corporations or 
government agencies.  The Multi-Level Perspective developed by Frank Geels examines 
how these networks shape, and are shaped by, technological transitions.  Geels (2002) 
[44] notes, “In this perspective technology, of itself, has no power, does nothing.  Only in 
association with human agency, social structures, and organisations does technology 
fulfill functions.”  The three levels of organization are niches, regimes, and landscapes.  
Technology transitions are not simply the result of a new technology being “better”.  
They are the outcome of developments at multiple levels affecting actors through a 
network of linkages.  Regimes typically change through stepwise reconfiguration. 
Niches are particular applications or market segments where a new technology is first 
applied.  A niche may have unusual needs that the existing regime cannot meet, providing 
a space for radical innovation to occur.  The space program served as a niche for the 
initial development of solar power in the 1950s, as the dominant energy regime could not 
power satellites in orbit.  The accumulation of success in many specific niches may 
enable a new technology to advance into the mainstream.  Solar power in the 1970s and 
1980s found market niches such as consumer products or off-grid homes, building the 
knowledge base and connections needed to advance further.  The 1990s saw the spread of 
policy developments such as net metering that would enable new markets in the 2000s.  
This represented a change in the sociotechnical regime. 
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Niches are embedded in regimes, such as the broader energy sector.  A regime includes 
three categories of linked elements.  The first is a network of actors and social groups.  
The second is sets of rules, including policy, techno-scientific knowledge, user practices, 
guiding principles, and behavioral norms.  The third is the material elements of the 
regime, such as sector-specific infrastructure, machines, and materials (Geels, 2006) [52].  
Innovation within regimes is typically incremental and focused along existing lines of 
inquiry.  The regime itself is stable and slow to change due to linkages between its 
various elements.   
The regimes are embedded within sociotechnical landscapes, which are deep structural 
trends that provide the context for the actors within the regimes.  Landscapes include 
spatial arrangement of cities, transportation infrastructure, fundamental economic and 
political structures, cultural values, environmental pressures, and “technology-external 
factors.”  Geels (2002), notes, “The context of landscape is even harder to change than 
that of regimes. Landscapes do change, but more slowly than regimes.”  External factors 
from the landscape apply pressures on regimes.  These pressures create opening for niche 
innovations.  Some of those innovations will be employed by the regime to respond to the 
pressures, and the effects of this adoption will ripple throughout the entire system.  
Energy regimes in turn influence landscapes, including geopolitical conflicts over oil as 
well as shifting population towards the Sun Belt.  For the initial development of solar 
power, the landscape factor influencing the energy regime to seek innovative solutions 
was the space race between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
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The 60-year transition from sailing ships to steamships provides an illustration of the 
Multi-Level Perspective in Geels (2002).  Steamships emerged in niches where their 
performance characteristics gave them an advantage over sailing ships.  Niches included 
serving as tugboats in harbors or ferryboats on rivers.  This enabled “learning by doing,” 
improving range and performance so that steamships became competitive with sailing 
ships over longer distances.  Geels notes the wide range of interconnected social, 
economic, and technical changes at niche, regime, and landscape levels that influenced 
this transition.  These include the Napoleonic Wars, the emergence of insurance 
companies, the development of trade journals, the invention of the screw propeller, the 
relaxation of the Navigation Acts, the deepening of harbors, and the establishment of 
coaling stations.   
Geels (2006) uses the development of U.S. factories to illustrate the process of stepwise 
reconfiguration.  Regimes incorporate niche innovations piecemeal into existing systems, 
rather than immediately overhauling their entire structure.  In the steamship example, 
engines were mounted on sailing ships as an auxiliary power source or on small boats to 
tug ships around harbors.  In the factory example, numerous hybrid systems arose in the 
transition from steam-driven millwork to electric-driven motors.  Over time, niche 
innovations add to or replace regime elements.  Ford’s River Rouge factory incorporated 
innovations from a wide range of industries.  The firearms industry pioneered 
interchangeable parts in the 1830s and 1840s, driven by military demand for such a 
technology.  The meatpacking industry developed continuous movement of materials in 
the 1850s and 1860s.  The bicycle industry developed sheet-metal stamping of 
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interchangeable parts in the 1890s.  Streetcars in the 1890s proved the reliability of large 
electric motors.  These technological developments and dozens more, rather than any 
single breakthrough, comprised Henry Ford’s assembly line.  This case study also shows 
the “shake-out” stage that occurs as industries scale up.  Early attempts to improve power 
distribution included steam and hydraulic systems, which ultimately lost out to 
electricity.  Smaller engines for particular tasks were also an area of inquiry with 
numerous models considered, including internal combustion engines.  These engines did 
not revolutionize factories, but ultimately found another application.  Finally, Geels notes 
that size constraints can force a transition.  Factories distributing power through millwork 
could function at small scale, but the problems of power transmission grew increasingly 
difficult as factories became larger and manufacturing grew more complex.  Similarly, 
sailing ships could be built longer to increase speed but faced structural problems beyond 
a certain point.  Diminishing returns, either at the unit level or the industry level, can end 
the dominance of individual technologies. 
Turnheim and Geels (2012) [53] examine the decline of the British coal industry.  In the 
energy regime, the dominant actor first saw the alternatives as potentially supplementing 
it during shortages, much as sailing ships added auxiliary steam engines.  When faced 
with stiff competition from these upstarts, coal did manage to improve productivity and 
reduce pollution, but was unable to avert decline.  The coal case study adds other factors, 
such as the importance of social legitimacy.  The British coal industry declined in part 
due to this, as competitors positioned themselves as “clean” and “modern.”  Loss of 
social legitimacy meant loss not only of direct market share, but of political support.   
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Rifkin (2011) [54] characterizes the rise of the coal-powered steam engine and printing to 
constitute the First Industrial Revolution.  This altered the landscape by creating dense 
urban cores, tenements, and skyscrapers.  The rise of the internal-combustion engine with 
electrical communication constitutes the Second Industrial Revolution.  This altered the 
landscape by creating suburbs, industrial parks, and television.  Rifkin observes that the 
combination of new energy systems and new communication technologies can create 
economic revolutions.  The Third Industrial Revolution, then, is the combination of the 
Internet and renewable energy.   
Rifkin echoes Geels in noting that infrastructure represents evolving relationships, not 
simply a fixed physical foundation.  He observes how the relationship between 
communication and energy technology advanced each Industrial Revolution.  Steam-
powered printers lowered the cost of books and increased literacy, which, along with the 
steam-powered railroad, contributed to the rise of the modern corporation.  The railroads 
and printers enabled the mass wholesalers and retailers, with a national market emerging 
after the Civil War.  Rifkin also echoes Geels in noting the role that culture plays, 
emphasizing this aspect in his vision of the Third Industrial Revolution.  The “lateral 
power” that Rifkin speaks of encompasses the broad changes from centralized industries 
to more distributed ones.  The Internet has no barrier to entry for publishers, allowing 
blogs to compete with newspapers.  Crowdsourcing has proven a reliable means of 
improving the quality of information, enabling Wikipedia to compete with Encyclopedia 
Britannica.  The Internet enables peer-to-peer business models such as EBay, Kickstarter, 
Kiva, Airbnb, Etsy, and many more.  Rifkin sees the rise of peer-to-peer business models 
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as a cultural shift away from centralized corporations.  This would then be reflected in the 
rise of farmers markets and community-supported agriculture programs around the 
country, as people buy their food directly from the farmers who grew it.  Distributed 
renewable energy generation could be similarly democratic, turning away from a model 
of central-station power generation.   
When the most successful renewable energy technologies are large power stations 
(hydroelectric facilities and wind turbines), it is not reasonable to expect distributed 
generation to completely take over.  Buildings can add solar panels, but even with vastly 
improved efficiency it will be difficult for a high-rise apartment building to generate a 
significant fraction of its energy consumption.  Large renewable energy stations will 
remain an important component of the energy future, sometimes co-located with other 
uses, as with wind turbines on farms or ranches.  This does not have to be incompatible 
with a cultural shift toward democratized business.  Community-supported wind turbines 
are a viable business model, as seen in Denmark and Germany. 
The extant literature on energy transitions is broad and deep.  It offers numerous contexts 
in which to understand changes in energy consumption, and the sources cited here only 
scratch the surface of this field.  Observation from the history of United States reaffirm 
the key role of energy end-use technologies, the long timeframe for transitions in energy 
supply, and the complex interactions between the energy sector and other parts of society. 
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2.  Energy Consumption in the United States, 1780-2010 
Following the approach taken by Kander et al. (2007), this analysis examines the total 
energy consumption of the United States, including a range of traditional energy 
resources as well as modern commercial ones.  Output of mechanical power is also 
characterized, as are the 19
th
-century inputs of high-value energy resources used for 
lighting and cooling.  Section 2.1 provides the data of the specific energy resources and 
the methodology employed.  Section 2.2 provides results of total energy consumption and 
includes metrics such as energy intensity.  Section 2.3 compares these findings to the 
European studies of Kander et al. (2007), Lindmark (2007) [55], and Warde (2007) [56].  
Section 2.4 presents a series of energy prices.  Section 2.5 presents a concluding 
discussion. 
Numerous units are used to express energy quantities.  Dewhurst (1955) and others use 
horsepower-hours for physical work.  The nutritional Calorie, one thousand 
thermodynamic calories or a kilocalorie, is the main measure of food consumption.  The 
British Thermal Unit (BTU) is commonly used for measuring natural gas, as is the therm 
(which is 10
5
 BTU).  Other sources convert energy amounts to tonnes (metric tons) of 
coal equivalent or tonnes of oil equivalent.  Electricity is measured in kilowatt-hours.  
Table 1 shows the relationship between various energy units and SI standard units.  When 
discussing energy use at the level of a country, higher magnitudes are commonly used.  A 
quad, 10
15
 BTU, is nearly the same as an exajoule (EJ), 10
18
 J. 
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Table 1: Energy Units. 
Unit SI Unit 
Horsepower-hour 2.685 * 10
6
 J (2.685 MJ) 
Kilocalorie 4.187 * 10
3
 J (4.187 kJ) 
British Thermal Unit (BTU) 1.055 * 10
3
 J (1.055 kJ) 
Tonne of coal equivalent 2.931 *10
10
 J (29.31 GJ) 
Tonne of oil equivalent 4.187 *10
10
 J (41.87 GJ) 
Cord of wood ~2 * 10
10
 J (20.5-22.1 GJ) 
Kilowatt-hour 3.6 * 10
6
 J (3.6 MJ) 
Passive solar energy is not here discussed.  It was and is an absolutely indispensable 
component of human energy supply, but there is no assessment that quantifies the amount 
historically harnessed by the United States or any other country.  Clearly it is essential for 
food production.  Many elements of solar energy utilization, such as passive solar home 
design, daylighting, or use of clotheslines, are typically characterized as energy efficiency 
rather than energy consumption.  
2.1.  Energy Resources 
For each energy resource, I have identified the data sources, the raw numbers, the energy 
input, the mechanical work output (where applicable), and the key uncertainties.  Further 
discussion of the detailed calculations for each resource is included in the Appendices.   
2.1.1.  Human labor 
My calculations of human muscle power are based on Dewhurst (1955).  Of a population 
of 23.2 million in 1850, 7.4 million were workers (Dewhurst takes the Census figure of a 
labor force of 7.7 million and assumes 4% unemployment).  Taking into account hours 
worked in agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, the result is 26.8 billion man-hours 
worked, for a total work output of 1.34 billion horsepower-hours in that year (3.6 PJ).  
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This analysis extends Dewhurst’s 1850-1950 data series backwards to 1780 and forwards 
to 2010, relying on U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Springsteen and Epstein (1983) 
[57], and BEA (2013) [58].  Details are given in Appendix 1.  This approach does contain 
a shortcoming in its omission of, depending on the year, 40-70% of the population.  Some 
of those not in the work force would be doing work that is today done by commercial 
energy resources.  While it is likely that in 1850 a “worker” had a larger output of 
mechanical energy than a housewife or a ten-year-old child, there would still be some 
work done in washing clothes, churning butter, splitting wood, and helping with the 
harvest.  Likewise, human-powered transportation such as walking and cycling are 
substitutes for fossil-fueled modes of transportation, so their omission diminishes the 
relative importance of human muscle power.   
The calculation of food as an energy input can be approached in a few ways.  One 
approach is to calculate the incremental food needed to provide the energy for physical 
work.  Kander et al. (2007) estimates that human labor efficiency is 20%, and so the 
marginal food energy input for work would be about five times as great as the mechanical 
energy of human work output.  Another approach is to look at the total amount of food 
consumed as an energy input to society.  Kander (2002) [59] considers all of the food 
energy expended during work as inputs to production, and all of the remaining food 
energy as final energy consumption; she uses a value of 2600 to 2700 kcal/day (~11 
MJ/day) for Sweden.  The same calculation is used in Kander et al. (2005) [60].   
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For simplicity, and to enable comparisons with the other studies, I assume a value of 
2,700 kcal/day (11.3 MJ), although it is plausible that the actual value was higher. The 
United States was a fairly prosperous agricultural economy from its Colonial days, and 
numerous sources suggest food intake of at least that level for the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.  Appendix 1 provides greater discussion of this assumption.  I 
include the food consumed by the entire population, not simply the workers.  Annual 
food consumption as an energy input E is given by Equation (1): 
              ( ) 
Where P is the total population, F is the food consumption (2,700 kcal/person-day), and 
D is the number of days in the year. 
Ayres and Warr (2003) [61] ignore human muscle power, as it is already counted as an 
input to production in the form of labor, rather than energy.  For the purposes of 
economic production functions, this is accurate; however, when looking at the role that 
energy resources have played in societies, it is illuminating to see how their magnitude of 
motive power output compares to that of human muscle.  Ayres and Warr (2003) also 
note that human muscle power is no longer an important component of human labor.  
Dewhurst (1955) assumes that all worker-hours are the performance of physical work, 
and states that while this assumption is reasonable for an agricultural economy, it is less 
so for a service economy.  Dewhurst noted the assumption as anachronistic but 
considered the error inconsequential, since by 1950 all muscle power represented only 
1.5% of work output.  Extending the series further makes little difference in the totals of 
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work output.  The “Mechanical Work Output” column of Table 2 represents the 
mechanical work that could be done were the entire workforce engaged in physical labor 
at an output of 0.05 horsepower (37.3 W).  Some human muscle power does displace 
fossil fuels, as in walking or cycling, but this is unlikely to be equal to the entire work 
force having an output of 0.05 horsepower for 40 hours per week.  Annual human work 
output Q (in PJ) is derived by Equation (2): 
    (             )             ( ) 
Where N is the number of workers, H is the average hours worked per week, 3600 is the 
number of seconds in an hour, 52 is the number of weeks in a year (rounded down from 
52.1 or 52.3), W is the work output of 37.3 watts, and 10
15
 is the number of joules (watt-
seconds) in a petajoule.  
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Table 2: Potential Work Output of Human Labor in the United States, 1780-2010 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Springsteen and 
Epstein (1983) and BEA (2013) 
Year Population Workers 
Food Input 
(PJ) 
Mechanical Work 
Output (PJ) 
1780 2,780,369 800,000 11 0.40 
1790 3,929,214 1,130,000 16 0.56 
1800 5,308,483 1,520,000 22 0.75 
1810 7,239,881 2,080,000 30 1.02 
1820 9,638,453 2,760,000 40 1.36 
1830 12,860,702 3,770,000 53 1.85 
1840 17,063,353 5,200,000 70 2.54 
1850 23,191,876 7,400,000 96 3.60 
1860 31,443,321 10,100,000 130 4.79 
1870 38,558,371 12,400,000 159 5.66 
1880 50,155,783 16,700,000 207 7.46 
1890 62,947,714 21,900,000 260 9.46 
1900 75,994,575 26,700,000 313 11.22 
1910 91,972,266 34,000,000 379 13.08 
1920 106,461,000 39,700,000 439 13.77 
1930 123,076,741 45,800,000 507 14.67 
1940 132,122,446 47,900,000 545 14.71 
1950 152,271,417 60,378,300 628 16.86 
1960 180,671,158 73,804,716 745 19.88 
1970 205,052,174 91,277,600 845 23.64 
1980 227,224,681 113,983,200 937 30.63 
1990 249,622,814 138,330,900 1,029 38.04 
2000 282,194,308 165,370,800 1,164 45.82 
2010 308,745,538 173,752,400 1,273 46.33 
2.1.2.  Animal Power 
Draft animals represent the largest source of work output from the beginning of the U.S. 
until 1880, when surpassed by coal.  Numerous sources note that draft animals were less 
expensive in the U.S. than in England, while human labor was more expensive.  As a 
result, draft animals were used extensively.   
Due to their importance in the economy and in work output, I seek to ascertain the draft 
animal population as accurately as possible, but the data is sparse.  Anderson (2004, 303) 
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[62] advises, “While there is no way to estimate the population of livestock, animals 
certainly outnumbered colonists by 1670.”  A few more specific data points near the 
earliest days of the United States enable estimates of the animal population at that time.  
The calculations involve a number of assumptions and inferences, and are detailed in 
Appendix 2.  The results are shown in Table 3, below.  The state-level per-capita 
ownership rates for draft animals recorded for 1840 are used to derive animal populations 
from 1780 to 1839.  A number of records exist for the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, and 
an annual 9% decline is assumed after 1960 (reflecting the decline seen from 1945 to 
1960).  The values after 1960 are a rough estimate. 
Animal power is estimated at 0.6 horsepower (HP) for oxen (450 W), 1 HP for horses 
(750 W), and 0.8 HP for mules (600 W), based on Kinsman (1925) [63] and Smil (1991) 
[64].  The aggregate power capacity is shown in Figure 3, below.  Working hours are 
based on Dewhurst (1955, 1103), who assumes farm animals to work 500 hours per year, 
based on Kinsman (1925), and assumes nonfarm animals to work as much as human 
workers in nonagricultural applications (as much as 3500 hours per year in 1850, down to 
2500 hours in 1910).   
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Figure 3: Power Capacity of U.S. Draft Animals, 1780-1950 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Falconer and Bidwell (1925) [65], U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1854) [66], Daugherty (1928), Dewhurst (1955), Kinsman 
(1925), and Smil (1991) 
I calculate animal work output W based on the number N of each type of animal, the 
power P of each type of animal, and the hours H worked per animal per year.  Over all 
categories i of draft animals in year t, the work output is given by Equation (3): 
   ∑        
 
                 ( ) 
The food energy required to obtain mechanical work from draft animals is the entire 
amount of food supplied to all draft animals (whether working animals or not) at all 
times.  For this analysis, I estimate that a farm animal requires seven times the food of a 
person, based on Kander (2002), Smil (1991), and Lindmark (2007).  Kander (2002) 
adjusted values from Hansson (1928) [67] to account for the smaller size of horses and 
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oxen in early Sweden.  A daily feeding of 6.3 fodder units equals seven times the 
assumed human consumption, and roughly corresponds to, for example, a 500-kg horse 
having three days of subsistence feeding, three days of average work feeding, and one 
day of hard work feeding each week.  Smil (1991) provides estimates that, for 1910, 
equate to 21,632 calories per day (90.6 MJ per day, 3.31*10
10
 Joules per horse per year), 
or eight times my assumed human food consumption.  Smil elsewhere notes that the land 
required to support a horse could support six people.  Lindmark (2007) uses for Norway a 
value of 2.78*10
10
 Joules per horse per year in 1900.  My estimate for horse food 
consumption (seven times an assumed human average of 2700 calories per day) equals 
2.89*10
10
 Joules per horse per year 
In some cases, draft animals were left to support themselves on uncultivated land.  
Schlebecker (1975) [68] and Anderson (2004) both note that it was common practice to 
leave all livestock to graze in a semi-wild state, either year-round in the Chesapeake 
region or seasonally in New England.  When human labor, not land, is the limiting factor 
in food production, the use of uncultivated land to feed livestock is not as significant a 
cost.   
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Table 3: Draft Animals in the United States, 1780-2010 
Sources: as Figure 3 
Year Oxen
 a
 Mules Horses 
Power 
(HP) 
Feed Input 
(PJ) 
Mechanical Work 
Output (PJ) 
1780 212,511 64,353 529,226 708,215 23 1.05 
1790 304,195 93,689 774,140 1,031,608 34 1.66 
1800 414,289 136,051 1,127,990 1,485,404 48 2.55 
1810 570,724 199,178 1,656,066 2,157,843 70 3.89 
1820 756,255 281,034 2,343,302 3,021,882 98 5.70 
1830 1,017,749 387,999 3,238,773 4,159,822 134 8.00 
1840 1,411,857 537,458 4,494,353 5,771,434 186 11.39 
1850 1,700,694 659,000 5,386,719 6,934,335 224 16.23 
1860 2,161,200 1,271,000 7,435,000 9,748,520 314 19.81 
1870 1,284,700 1,385,000 9,180,000 11,058,820 342 23.04 
1880 1,006,300 2,038,000 12,903,000 15,137,180 460 29.93 
1890 1,101,300 2,497,000 18,232,000 20,890,380 630 38.46 
1900 928,000 3,321,000 20,729,000 23,942,600 721 43.44 
1910 613,000 4,508,000 23,108,000 27,082,200 815 47.23 
1920 302,500 5,995,000 21,726,000 26,703,500 809 41.10 
1930 - 19,454,000 
b
 15,563,200 562 24.89 
1940 - 14,778,000 11,822,400 427 18.20 
1950 - 7,981,000 6,384,800 230 10.46 
1960 - 3,208,747 2,566,998 93 4.51 
1970 - 1,900,000 
c
 1,520,000 55 2.69 
1980 - 1,200,000 960,000 35 1.62 
1990 - 700,000 560,000 20 0.97 
2000 - 400,000 320,000 12 0.58 
2010 - 200,000 160,000 6 0.30 
a
 Not significant after 1930 
b
 Recorded together after 1930 
c
 No data after 1960; assumed same rate of decline as 1945-1960 
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2.1.3.  Wind: Sailing Ships, Windmills, and Wind Turbines 
In the early U.S., wind was harnessed almost exclusively by sailing vessels.  Sailing 
vessels are measured in tonnage, which is a measure of the volume of enclosed spaces in 
the ship (essentially the cargo capacity).  Prior to 1865, one ton represented 95 cubic feet, 
while after that year, one ton represented 100 cubic feet.  By making various assumptions 
about sailing vessels, such as their time at sea, average speed, and efficiency, one can 
convert registered tonnage to approximate energy utilized and work performed.  U.S. 
sailing vessel tonnage is primarily from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).  Dewhurst 
(1955, 1104) provides a calculation for the horsepower-hour (HP-hr) equivalent of work 
output from sailing.  Sailing vessels are assumed to operate 40% of time (3500 hours per 
year) at an average of 6 miles per hour, thus 21,000 miles per year, at a power 
requirement of 1 HP-hr per 45 ton-miles. The annual work output is then 467 HP-hr 
(1,254 MJ) per ton of registered vessel.  Dewhurst estimates efficiency losses due to 
rigging (such as one sail interfering with the wind available to the next) at around 50%.  
This number is used in the analysis to determine the primary wind energy extracted.   
Sailing vessel tonnage is specifically that of U.S.-flagged ships, and only merchant ships 
are included.  Recreational yachts are not included, although virtually all sailing vessels 
in the present day fall under that classification.  Ideally they would be included, as 
statistics for fossil fuel consumption do include recreational use.  Military vessels are also 
not included, although that fleet was very small compared to the merchant fleet for which 
statistics do exist.  The six original frigates of the U.S. Navy had an aggregate tonnage of 
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10,000 tons, whereas the merchant fleet in 1800 was nearly one million tons.  The U.S. in 
its present form entered into existence in 1789, and so figures for tonnage begin there.  
Full figures for tonnage are presented in Appendix 3.  It is unlikely that Colonial vessels 
were carrying much cargo in 1780 due to the American Revolutionary War; Dolin (2007) 
[69] notes that the war brought Nantucket whaling to a halt.  The rapid decrease of sailing 
vessels after 1860 is due in part to a shift to steamships, as detailed in Geels (2002), but 
also in part due to an overall decline in the U.S. merchant fleet.  Additionally, some of 
the decrease is attributable to improved record-keeping; prior to 1870, many ships 
remained on the books that had long since been sold, dismantled, or lost at sea.  The late 
1860s saw clearance of many of these “ghost ships” from the records, as detailed in U.S. 
Census Bureau (1975) and reflected in Figure 4.  The conversion from sail to steam took 
place over about a 50-year period, from 1866, when the merchant fleet was 75% sail, 
until 1918, when it was 75% steam and motor.  The transition was fairly slow for much 
of this time because the merchant marine fleet had no net increase between 1860 and 
1900.  New U.S. steamships were only replacing retired or converted sailing vessels, not 
capturing a share of a fast-growing market. 
Sailing ships responded to the challenge of steamships by improving performance and 
speed, exemplified by the clipper ships of the late 1800s.  The incremental improvements 
of a mature technology proved unable to keep pace with the greater advances possible in 
a revolutionary new technology.  This is noted by Foster and Kaplan (2001) [70], Cutler 
(1984) [71], and others.  More than speed, the reliability of steamships proved to be a 
crucial advantage.  Sails continue to be used for recreational boating.  Skysails GmbH, a 
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German company, has developed tethered sails to tow freighters, supplementing the 
engines and reducing fuel consumption.  
 
Figure 4: U.S. Maritime Fleets, 1790-1901 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1975) 
A number of windmills existed in the Colonial era on Cape Cod, Long Island, 
Williamsburg, and other areas without sufficient waterpower for grist mills.  However, 
these references are too sparse to allow any comprehensive estimate, and so the first 
windmills included in this analysis are those noted by Dewhurst (1955), beginning in 
1850.  These were primarily used in the Great Plains and American West for pumping 
water, and the numbers were based on a letter from the USDA’s Division of Farm 
Machinery, combined with estimates for earlier years.   
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Even in the countries where it was most prevalent, traditional wind power did not provide 
a very large share of energy inputs.  This was the case for the Netherlands, as noted by 
Smil (2008) [72], citing calculations from Unger (1984) [73].  The Dutch sailing ships in 
the seventeenth century contributed about 200 TJ/year, about the same as the country’s 
extensive windmill system.  Wind power in total represented less than 10% of the energy 
from the country’s peat consumption.  For comparison, Kander et al. (2007) finds energy 
from wind and water combined to be 25% of the energy obtained from fossil fuels in the 
Netherlands in 1850.  Smil notes that wind power did things that combustible fuels could 
not at that time, such as powering ships.  Smil also notes that “it is questionable to 
compare a limited and rapidly depleting store of fossil energy with an abundant and 
renewable resource.”  Wind power was harnessed for work at a greater efficiency than 
fossil fuels would be capable of for centuries, and so its share of work output was 
routinely far in excess of its share of energy inputs.  In the U.S. in 1850, for example, 
wind represented 0.3% of energy inputs, but 13% of mechanical work output. 
Wind turbines reappeared in the 1970s.  Electrification allowed wind to provide a greater 
range of energy services beyond mechanical power.  Brown (2009) [74] provides data on 
U.S. wind turbine capacity back to 1980, with 8 MW cumulative capacity in that year.  
EIA provides electricity generation figures from 1989.  I assume that between 1980 and 
1988 wind turbines had the same capacity factor as the turbines in 1989.  By 2010, use of 
wind energy per capita was six times the previous per-capita peak.  The statistics of wind 
energy are shown in Table 4, below.  
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Table 4: Wind Energy in the United States, 1790-2010 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), Brown (2009), and 
EIA (2012) [75] 
Year 
Mechanical 
Windmills 
MWh 
Electric 
Sailing 
Tonnage 
Total Energy 
Input (PJ) 
Mechanical Work 
Output (PJ) 
1790  
a 
 - 478,000 1.20 0.60 
1800  
a
  - 972,000 2.44 1.22 
1810  
a
  - 1,424,000 3.57 1.78 
1820  
a
  - 1,258,000 3.16 1.58 
1830  
a
  - 1,127,000 2.84 1.41 
1840  
a
  - 1,978,000 4.99 2.48 
1850 70,000  - 3,010,000 7.64 3.79 
1860 100,000  - 4,486,000 11.37 5.65 
1870 150,000  - 2,363,000 6.12 3.00 
1880 200,000  - 2,366,000 6.20 3.03 
1890 400,000  - 2,109,000 5.82 2.80 
1900 600,000  - 1,885,000 5.53 2.64 
1910 900,000  - 1,655,000 5.35 2.51 
1920 1,000,000  - 1,272,000 4.53 2.08 
1930 1,000,000  
b
 757,000 3.24 1.43 
1940 650,000  
b
 200,000 1.37 0.56 
1950 294,000  
b
 82,000 0.60 0.24 
1960 102,511  
b
 23,000 0.34 0.15 
1970 35,744  
b
 6,000 0.25 0.12 
1980 12,463 12,688 6,000 0.22 0.13 
1990 4,346 2,788,600 6,000 28.10 2.50 
2000 1,515 5,593,261 6,000 56.14 4.00 
2010 528 94,646,063 6,000 946.67 56.66 
a
 No data; some mechanical windmills did exist prior to 1850. 
b
 No data; small rural wind turbines existed from about 1930. 
  
51 
 
2.1.4.  Water power 
Watermills harnessed flowing rivers to grind grain, saw logs, and perform other 
mechanical tasks.  Estimating the energy utilized by watermills requires estimating their 
number, average power capacity, hours of operation, and efficiency.  Hunter (1979) [76] 
estimates watermills at 7,500 in 1790, based on an extrapolation from the incomplete 
1810 and 1820 Census reports.  This is very conservative.  An estimate of 13,000 mills 
corresponds to one mill for every 300 inhabitants, which corresponds better to surveys of 
specific localities as well as contemporary accounts, as detailed in Appendix 4.  Hunter 
considers the 1840 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1841) [77] to undercount mills, 
and so presents a value of 71,000 mills for 1840. 
Smil (1991) estimates that an average waterwheel in the eighteenth century was about 3.7 
kW, or about 5 horsepower.  This size is assumed for the early mills, and linear growth in 
the number of mills is assumed from 1790 to 1840.  After 1840, the installed capacity is 
assumed to grow linearly until it reaches the values for 1870 and 1880, from U.S.  Bureau 
of the Census (1872) [78] and U.S. Bureau of the Census (1883) [79].  Capacity is known 
but operation is speculative; the mills are assumed to operate 2,200 hours per year.  This 
value makes the 1870 and 1880 Census figures for capacity agree with the Dewhurst 
figures for energy production.   
Howell and Keller (1977) [80] note that grist mills grew in the early 1800s from small 
systems grinding grain for a local community to larger “merchant mills” that shipped 
ground flour to other regions.  These merchant mills replacing local mills are likely the 
52 
 
reason for the decrease in the number of mills between 1840 and 1870 even as the work 
output grew substantially.  The average size of individual wheels also increased during 
this time as metal wheels became increasingly common.  When hydroelectric power 
appears in 1890, the output is multiplied by the fraction of electricity devoted to the 
performance of mechanical work and added to the amount of direct mechanical work 
from waterwheels.  The fraction of electricity devoted to mechanical work is highly 
uncertain for much of this period (see Section 2.2.6).  Results are shown in Table 5. 
Table 5: Water Power in the United States, 1780-2010 
Sources: Hunter (1979), U.S. Bureau of the Census (1871 and 1883), Dewhurst 
(1955), and EIA (2012) 
Year Watermills 
10
9
 HP-hr 
Mechanical 
TWh 
Hydroelectric 
Energy Input 
(PJ) 
Mechanical Work 
Output (PJ) 
1780 9,000 0.07 -  0.5 0.2 
1790 13,000 0.09 -  0.6 0.3 
1800 25,000 0.18 -  1.2 0.5 
1810 36,000 0.26 -  1.8 0.7 
1820 48,000 0.34 -  2.4 0.9 
1830 59,000 0.42 -  2.9 1.1 
1840 71,000 0.51 -  3.5 1.4 
1850  
a 
0.88 -  6.0 2.4 
1860  
a
 1.30 -  8.0 3.5 
1870 51,018 1.77 -  9.8 4.7 
1880 55,404 2.01 -  10.1 5.4 
1890  
a
 2.02 0.3 10.5 6.1 
1900  
a
 2.09 2.8 21.3 12.6 
1910  
a
 2.39 8.6 46.4 26.3 
1920  
a
 3.46 19.7 94.6 50.5 
1930  
a
 1.22 37.5 157.8 73.4 
1940  
a
 0.73 52.2 214.0 90.4 
1950  
a
 0.57 100.9 405.5 154.1 
1960  
b
 0.20 149.4 712.4 202.1 
1970  
b
 0.07 251.0 1,195.3 297.7 
1980  
b
 0.02 279.2 1,329.5 285.4 
1990  
b
 0.01 292.9 1,394.6 251.6 
2000  
b
 0.00 275.6 1,312.3 191.7 
2010  
b
 0.00 257.1 1,224.1 153.6 
a Number not known; work output from Dewhurst. 
b Assumed 10% annual decline in work output. 
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The values of energy production reported by agencies such as the U.S. Census represent 
energy delivered at the shaft of the waterwheel.  Efficiency from water to shaft is used to 
calculate the primary energy input, as shown in Equation (4).  Efficiency from shaft to 
work bench is used to calculate energy output in the form of mechanical work, as shown 
in Equation (5).  The reported “energy production” Ep is an intermediate stage, and 
therefore and intermediate value, between the energy input Ei and energy output Eo.  
Appendix 4 provides details of these calculations. 
                  ( ) 
               ( ) 
Dewhurst (1955) provides efficiency values ηi and ηo for waterwheels from 1850 through 
1950.  These are applied, with the 1850 rate from 1780 to 1850 and the 1950 rate for 
years after 1950.  Dewhurst’s 1950 value of 90% water-to-shaft energy efficiency ηi is 
consistent with recently reported values for hydroelectric efficiency (Power Resources 
Office, 2005) [81].   
Schurr and Netschert (1960, 493) [82] show total hydroelectric generation of 101 billion 
kWh in 1950.  There are two different ways to account for the contribution of 
hydropower to energy supply.  A kilowatt-hour of electricity has an actual energy content 
of 3,412 BTU, but might have required several times that much energy in fossil fuels to 
generate.  The Energy Information Administration multiplies hydroelectric generation by 
the prevailing fossil fuel heat rate, counting hydropower’s contribution as equal to the 
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fossil fuels that would be needed to replace it.  Therefore, EIA reports 1.415 quads of 
energy (1.49 EJ) supplied by hydroelectricity in 1950.  Smil (2008) notes that few 
hydroelectric-dependent countries would use as much electricity if it all had to come 
from fossil fuels, and considers it inaccurate to convert hydropower on the amount of 
fossil fuels needed to replace it.  Smil instead uses a straight thermal equivalent, which 
puts the 1950 hydropower energy input at 0.36 EJ.  A similar difference of opinion exists 
over the quantification of energy inputs from other forms of primary electricity, such as 
nuclear or wind power.   
My analysis is close to Smil’s approach.  It employs Equation (4), above, with the 
hydroelectric generation reported by EIA as Ep and an efficiency of 90% as ηi.  The 
“Energy Input” value Eo is the kinetic and potential energy extracted from the 
environment.  “Work Output,” included for historical reasons, is the electricity generation 
is multiplied by the share of electricity used to do mechanical work.  In 2010, U.S. 
hydroelectric power extracted about 1 quadrillion BTU of energy from the environment 
(roughly 1 EJ); it would take about 2.5 quads of fossil fuels to replace the electricity that 
hydropower provides.  According to Dewhurst’s estimates, direct use of waterpower in 
waterwheels continued to rise until 1920.  After that point, waterwheels declined, but 
mechanical work output from water continued to rise as hydroelectric facilities expanded.  
Hydropower generation has been fairly constant since 1970.  The apparent decline since 
1990 in Table 5 is a statistical artifact.  The resource varies greatly from year to year.  
Hydroelectric generation exceeded the 1990 level in the years 1995-1999 and in 2011.    
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2.1.5.  Fuel wood 
Reynolds and Pierson (1942) are the main source of information on firewood 
consumption in the early U.S.  They find U.S. average annual consumption peaking at 4.5 
cords per capita in 1840, or about 100 GJ per capita, with regional rates as high as 4.9 
cords per capita for New England from 1800 to 1820.  Smil (1991) discusses the use of 
fuel wood across countries of varying income levels and climates.  He notes that a poor 
country in a warmer climate may use 10 GJ per capita, and that Northern and Western 
Europe in the nineteenth century used 15-50 GJ per capita in wood stoves.   
Reynolds and Pierson (1942) do not base their estimates on documentation of wood 
burned.  Firewood was so abundant in the mid-19
th
 century that there was no need to 
document its consumption.  Rather, they estimated per-capita consumption by region 
based on climate, demographics, housing conditions, deployment of stoves, and the 
market penetration of coal.  The authors exclude, and do not provide separate time series 
for, wood burned to produce charcoal for iron smelting (about 100 million cords) as well 
as lumber waste burned for power by sawmills (about 550 million cords).  These latter 
quantities, although representing about 13 EJ of energy, are minor compared to the fuel 
wood consumption of nearly 12 billion cords (240 EJ) from 1780 through 1930.   
Lillard (1948) [83] provides anecdotal evidence supporting extravagant consumption of 
firewood.  Schurr and Netschert (1960, 50) estimate that fuel wood produced as a 
byproduct of clearing land accounted for “more than half, possibly much more” of all 
fuel wood used between 1850 and 1860.  For those cutting their own firewood, the cost of 
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this resource was the labor required to cut, split, and stack it.  Some of this labor was 
performed in order to clear land for agriculture.  The cost of using wood for fuel was the 
additional labor required to prepare the wood for use in fireplaces or stoves.  Stoves took 
a long time to gain acceptance in frontier areas because the fuel savings from increased 
efficiency over fireplaces did not warrant the high capital cost (including transportation) 
and the labor required to cut wood small enough for use in stoves.  Reynolds and Pierson 
(1942) note that the Franklin stove was invented in 1744, but that even in the densely-
populated Northeast “the general and widespread use of the wood stove did not come 
about much before 1840.” 
The vast majority of firewood was used for heating, but wood also performed mechanical 
work in steam engines.  White (1979) estimates that railroad use of fuel wood peaked at 
3% of overall wood use in 1860, at which time wood represented 90% of the fuel used for 
locomotives.  Dewhurst (1955, 1112) estimates wood for all steam power (railroads, 
steamboats, and industry) to represent 5% of total wood consumption in 1860.  I assume 
that the share of wood used for mechanical work grew linearly, from 0% in 1800 to 
Dewhurst’s value of 6% in 1850.  I assume that the share used for mechanical work has 
since remained constant at 0.2%, Dewhurst’s estimate for 1950.  Waste wood, sawdust, 
and black liquor are used as fuels in the pulp and paper industries and the lumber 
industry, and at least some of this use is to generate electricity to provide mechanical 
power for the industrial operations.  I assumed that steam engine efficiency improved by 
2% per year, rising from about 0.4% in 1800 to Dewhurst’s value of 1.1% in 1850.  The 
mechanical work output from wood is shown in Equation (6), where Eo is the work 
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output, Q is the quantity of wood consumed, f is the fraction of wood used for mechanical 
work, and ηo is the conversion efficiency: 
                ( ) 
Statistics of fuel wood consumption are shown in Table 6.  While Census data is present 
for sales of firewood in some years, it is a vast undercount, as most wood was used by the 
producer and not sold commercially.  In 1840 there were 5 million cords of wood sold 
(U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1854).  Reynolds and Pierson (1942) suggest that 
consumption in that year was around 75 million cords (at 4.5 cords per capita). 
The transition from wood to coal in early steam engines is discussed in Section 2.2.5.  
The prices of wood and coal are listed in Section 2.4.2.  Details of the consumption 
calculations are provided in Appendix 1-5.  Wood remains the primary source of space 
heating for 2.8 million U.S. homes in 2009, and a secondary source of space heating for 
an additional 8.8 million homes (EIA 2013e) [84].  Wood and wood waste currently 
represent the third largest source of renewable electricity, behind wind and hydropower.   
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Table 6: Fuel Wood Consumption in the United States, 1780-2010 
Source: Reynolds and Pierson (1942) and EIA (2012) 
Year 
Thousand 
Cords 
Cords per 
capita 
Energy Input 
(PJ) 
GJ per 
capita 
Mechanical 
Work Ouput (PJ) 
1780 13,977 5.0 309 111.17 0.00 
1790 17,797 4.5 394 100.17 0.00 
1800 23,467 4.4 519 97.76 0.00 
1810 31,276 4.3 692 95.54 0.00 
1820 41,857 4.3 926 96.04 0.02 
1830 56,611 4.4 1,252 97.35 0.08 
1840 76,540 4.5 1,693 99.20 0.35 
1850 101,665 4.4 2,248 96.94 1.48 
1860 125,514 4.0 2,776 88.28 1.80 
1870 138,125 3.6 3,055 79.22 2.20 
1880 135,537 2.7 2,997 59.76 2.07 
1890 119,560 1.9 2,644 42.00 1.37 
1900 100,179 1.3 2,130 28.03 0.83 
1910 91,454 1.0 1,872 20.36 0.82 
1920 82,967 0.8 1,699 15.96 0.83 
1930 75,000 0.6 1,536 12.48 1.04 
1940 70,000 0.5 1,433 10.85 0.70 
1950 78,115 0.5 1,599 10.50 0.59 
1960 65,994 0.4 1,351 7.48 0.78 
1970 71,432 0.3 1,463 7.13 0.89 
1980 123,693 0.5 2,533 11.15 1.50 
1990 110,808 0.4 2,269 9.09 1.39 
2000 113,086 0.4 2,315 8.20 1.43 
2010 99,297 0.3 2,033 6.58 1.25 
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2.1.6.  Other Biomass 
Other biomass used for energy in the nineteenth century included whale oil, spermaceti, 
lard oil, tallow, and camphene (a lamp fuel made from alcohol, turpentine, and camphor 
oil).  These were generally used for lighting.  Tallow candles, animal oils, and alcohol 
each represented energy inputs on the order of 1 PJ in 1860, in which year U.S. energy 
consumption was about 3,800 PJ.  
Annual production series for whale oil is available from 1804 through 1905 based on 
Clark (1887) [85], Starbuck (1878) [86], and Tower (1907) [87].  The record of whale oil 
is seen in Figure 5.  The more valuable sperm whale oil had peaked in the early 1840s, 
and its price continued to rise until about 1865.  Sperm oil was able to command high 
prices due to its superior performance in lamps, providing bright light with minimal odor.  
Lard oil was prone to congealing (Davis et al., 1997) [88], and fish oil had an unpleasant 
smell and produced lower-quality light (Fouquet and Pearson, 2006) [89].  Candles made 
from spermaceti, another whale product, provided better light than tallow candles and so 
carried a price premium.  The demand for high-quality lighting, demonstrated through the 
high prices consumers were willing to pay for sperm oil, spurred innovation and 
competition.  Lard oil improved due to new refining techniques in the late 1830s, gas 
lighting companies operated in the five largest cities by 1840, and camphene entered the 
lighting market in the 1830s (Davis et al. 1997, 354-357).  The major innovation in the 
lamps themselves was the invention of the Argand lamp in the 1780 (Fouquet and 
Pearson, 2006). 
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Figure 5: Whale Oil Production, Consumption, and Total Value 
Source: Tower (1907)  
The three-year average combined yield from sperm whales and other whales peaked at 
1.7 PJ in 1844.  Domestic consumption was likely near 1 PJ in most of the years between 
1836 and 1858.  
Biomass such as tallow and spermaceti was widely used for making candles prior to the 
development of paraffin from petroleum.  A supporting document for the 1810 Census 
(Coxe, 1814) [90] and the 1840 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1841) both report 
production of tallow and spermaceti candles in pounds.  Candles and soap were reported 
in combined dollar value for 1850 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1854), 1860 (U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, 1865) [91], 1870 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1872), and 1880 (U.S. 
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Bureau of the Census, 1883).  Assuming tallow candles to represent 50% of the combined 
dollar output in 1850 and 1860 and employing prices from Bezanson (1937) [92] results 
in the quantities included in Figure 6.   
 
Figure 6: Consumption of Other Biomass Fuels, 1810-1860 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census (multiple years), and Bezanson (1937) 
Lard oil is reported in 1850 and 1860.  The 1860 Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1865) shows a particularly diverse group of energy resources used in the U.S., as shown 
in Table 7.  Bezanson (1937) and Bezanson (1954) [93] provides a means for converting 
the various dollar values into volume, assuming that Philadelphia wholesale prices are 
representative.  For converting into energy content, Adams (2002) [94] finds tallow to be 
16,920 BTU per pound and 7.4 lb/gallon.  This gives a total of 132 MJ per gallon for oils 
(compared to 88 MJ per gallon for alcohol). 
62 
 
Table 7: Energy Production in the United States, 1860 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1865) 
Energy Product Value ($M) 
Bituminous coal $8.4 
Anthracite coal $11.9 
Gas (coal-derived) $12.0 
Charcoal $0.4 
Camphene $2.8 
Coal oil $4.3 
Whale Oil $5.4 
Kerosene $2.1 
Lard Oil $2.6 
Candles (Adamantine/Stearin) $1.1 
Soap and Candles (Tallow) $18.5 (I assume 50% for candles) 
Coke $0.2 
Noncommercial use of biomass fuels, such as tallow candles rendered and consumed on 
farms, or charcoal produced and consumed by the same foundry, would not be included 
here.   
Alcohol was also used for fuel and as a chemical feedstock, in addition to its 
consumption as spirits.  As with alcoholic liquors, fuel alcohol is produced from biomass, 
typically starchy crops such as wheat or barley.  Potatoes were the feedstock for German 
fuel alcohol in the 1890s (Bernton et al., 1982) [95].  Kovarik (1998) [96] suggests that 
distilleries in the mid-1800s sold between 33% and 80% of their product as fuel.  Table 8 
shows the production of distilled alcohol in the mid-1800s.  Wells (1866) [97] estimated 
that 1860 consumption for burning fluid was over 25 million gallons of distilled spirits.  
This is about 28% of total distilled spirits production in that year.  Table 8 assumes this is 
the share of alcohol consumption as fuel in all years, and assumes that distilled spirits are 
50% alcohol.  It is possible that alcohol was used as fuel in 1830, but the first patent for 
alcohol as a lamp fuel was issued in 1834, so my series begins in 1840.  Alcohol fuels are 
not included in Table 7 in order to avoid double-counting; some of the distilled spirits 
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would have been sold as inputs to camphene production, and camphene is included in 
Table 7.  However, it is possible that not all fuel use of alcohol is included in the 
camphene entry, since Wells’ figures would indicate fuel alcohol value of $7.5 million, 
and the camphene market was only reported at $2.8 million (which would also have to 
include the other inputs to camphene, such as turpentine and camphor oil). 
Table 8: Distilled Spirits Production in the United States, 1840-1870 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census and author’s estimates 
Year 10
6
 Gallons Value ($M) Fuel Use (PJ) Fuel Value ($M) 
1840 41.4 $12.3 (est.) 0.51 $3.4 (est.) 
1850 53.3 (est.) $15.8 0.67 $4.4 
1860 90.4 $26.8 1.11 $7.5 
1870 72.6 $36.1 0.89 $10.1 
The supplies of turpentine were cut off in 1861 due to the Civil War, and escalating taxes 
were applied to alcohol to pay for the war.  As a result, alcohol-based fuels lost ground to 
petroleum rapidly in the lamp oil market.   
Biomass-based fuels such as biodiesel and ethanol have increased in recent years.  In 
2000, biofuels amounted to 232 PJ, equal to 0.6% of petroleum consumption.  In 2010, 
biofuels totaled 1,841 PJ, equal to 4.9% of petroleum consumption.  This increase is 
driven by several political reasons, including “energy security,” local economic 
development, and climate change.  Biofuels have uncertain climate benefits.  Indirect 
impacts on land use are potentially large, if the demand for biofuels causes a rise in food 
prices that leads to the clearing of forested land for agriculture.  Searchinger et al. (2008) 
[98] and Fargione et al. (2008) [99] investigate these impacts.    
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2.1.7.  Ice 
Ice, cut from frozen ponds and lakes in the winter, provided another form of energy in 
nineteenth century America. It has not normally been included in surveys of energy use, 
but it did provide an energy service that, today, accounts for a considerable portion of 
U.S. energy demand.  The ice trade was comparable in value to crude petroleum 
production in 1880, and comparable in energy content to wind and water power in that 
decade.  The natural ice trade did not simply replace an existing fuel.  It pioneered the 
commercial provision of a new energy service, and so contributed to the development of 
aspects of society that influenced later patterns of energy use.  These range from the 
popularity of ice cream and lager beer to the transport of exotic fruit, fresh-caught fish, 
and butchered meat.  
Ice provided an energy service, that of cooling, that is today provided by electrical 
refrigeration.  The amount of cooling provided by a ton of ice is readily converted into 
other energy units; in fact, a “ton of refrigeration” is derived from the heat absorbed by a 
ton of ice as it melts.  One ton of ice requires 288,000 BTU (304 MJ) to melt, and so that 
is the energy equivalent used in this analysis.   
Jones (1984) [100] notes that the peak year was 1886, in which ice cut from frozen lakes 
amounted to 25 million tons.  In energy terms, this represents about 7.6 PJ out of the 
6940 PJ used in that year, so about 1 part in 1,000. This far exceeds the peak amount of 
energy obtained from whaling (about 1.8 PJ produced in 1847).  By 1886, wind 
accounted for about 6 PJ extracted from the environment, and waterpower about 10 PJ.  
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Ice was therefore of similar magnitude to those energy inputs, and about 13% the size of 
oil’s energy inputs in that year.  Even accounting for a 50% loss in transportation and 
distribution, it was still a very significant energy resource, as it provided a service that 
could not be easily obtained by other types of energy.  Mechanical refrigeration remained 
an emerging technology for decades.  Artificial ice-making began to take hold in the 
warmer Southern cities where the price of natural ice was high, beginning with a plant in 
New Orleans selling ice for $35/ton in 1868 (Utterback, 1994) [101].  The transition was 
not rapid by any means.  Weightman (2003) [102] notes that New York City’s 
consumption in 1906 was 4 million tons of ice, of which manufactured ice supplied only 
700,000 tons.  Cummings (1949) [103] places the supply of natural and manufactured ice 
as nearly equal in 1914; both cooling technologies were soon thereafter replaced by 
electromechanical refrigeration for most purposes.  Figure 7 shows shipment of ice from 
U.S. ports (primarily Boston, the base of the industry pioneer Frederick Tudor).   
 
Figure 7: Ice Shipments from U.S. Ports, 1806-1910 
Sources: Weatherell (1864) [104] and Cummings (1949) 
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Although the export industry declined after 1860, domestic consumption continued to 
increase for another generation.  Natural ice expanded its Northern markets in brewing 
(due to the increasing popularity of lager beer, beginning in the 1840s), meat-packing 
(due to expanding railroads and local pressures to move slaughterhouses out of city 
centers), fishing, and domestic use.  Anderson (1972) [105] notes that by 1845, fish from 
Boston and Maine were packed on ice and sent inland on railroads, and ice was carried 
on board fishing ships for preserving the catch.  Darius Eddy, a Massachusetts pioneer in 
the icebox industry, began manufacturing “refrigerators” for household use in 1847. 
Hall (1883) [106] estimates 1879-80 consumption in the U.S. at around 5 million tons, 
based on consumption of 4 million tons in 25 large cities with a combined population of 6 
million.  The remaining 200 smaller cities, with a combined population of 4.5 million, 
were assumed to use only around 40% as much ice per capita as the larger cities.  Hall 
estimated that, accounting for loss of ice in transport and distribution, an ice harvest of 8 
million tons would supply the U.S. demand.  The 1886 figure of 25 million tons 
harvested may reflect a substantial growth over the decade or it may reflect higher 
estimates for consumption in small cities and rural areas.   
Hall (1883) notes that, by 1880, retail prices were typically near $3/ton in Boston in the 
winter and $8/ton in the summer.  Prices were more variable in New York, as the Hudson 
produced a less reliable ice crop than did the lakes of Massachusetts.  Prices on the Gulf 
Coast were usually around $20/ton retail, although $60-75 in years of yellow fever 
epidemics.  A low wholesale price of $2/ton corresponds to about $7 per GJ.  The price 
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was generally not much lower than this, and could be far higher.  Despite the high cost of 
ice and the loss of it in transportation and distribution, it could be used quite efficiently, 
delivering the actual energy service of cooling at low cost.  Smith (1962) [107] relates 
that Tudor calculated in 1806 that a drink could be served chilled in the Caribbean for a 
cost of about half a cent.  The increased appeal of the drink would enable a bartender to 
sell so many that they would easily make up the cost of the ice.  Tudor advised bartenders 
to not charge a premium for chilled drinks, in order to increase adoption of this custom.  
The reduced cost of ice as the industry expanded and evolved did eventually enable its 
use to become ubiquitous, not only for drinks, but for food preservation.  Its eventual 
successor, electromechanical refrigeration, would supply air conditioning, which has 
become a very significant energy demand.   
The eventual decline of the natural ice industry was caused principally by reductions in 
the cost of manufactured ice.  In energy terms, harvested ice was replaced by coal, which 
supplied the manufactured ice plants either directly or through central power stations.  
Utterback (2001) [108] documents how substantial improvements in the operations of the 
industry were outpaced by even greater advances in manufactured ice.  In this regard, the 
transition from natural ice to manufactured ice is similar to the transition from sailing 
ships to steamships, as the pressures of competition spurred innovation in the established 
technology.  Weightman (2003) and others note that in some areas pollution increased 
costs of harvested ice.  The lower Hudson River became so contaminated with sewage 
that its ice could not be used, and more remote sources had to be tapped.   
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2.1.8.  Coal 
Coal was not widely used in Colonial America, although its use was well known in 
Britain.  Freese (2004, 56) [109] notes that, by 1700, Britain was getting more energy 
from coal than it could possibly have gotten from all of its woodlands even had they all 
been managed for fuel production.  Coal therefore likely surpassed wood’s energy input 
in Britain sometime in the 1600s, a shift that would not happen for another two centuries 
in the U.S. (coal surpassed wood in the mid-1880s).  By the mid-1780s British coking 
technology had advanced enough to enable the use of coal, rather than charcoal, for all 
stages of iron production.  This development was not as readily adopted in the U.S., 
where bituminous coal had a higher sulfur content and so was more difficult to process 
into coke.  It was not until the 1840s that anthracite smelting of iron became common, 
although after that point it ascended rapidly.  In 1842, charcoal produced about seven 
times as much as iron as did anthracite; by 1860 anthracite was well ahead (Schurr and 
Netschert 1960, 66).  The presence of coal was not unknown in Colonial America and the 
early U.S., but the abundance of wood made it of little economic utility outside of 
Pittsburgh.  Philadelphia in 1820 was only beginning to shift from fuel wood to coal 
(Freese 2004, 117), and wood cost slightly less per BTU than coal in that city in 1826-27 
(Schurr and Netschert 1960, 51).   
Schurr and Netschert (1960, 58) explain that the knowledge of how to burn coal 
effectively did not persist in many regions of Colonial America, as many attempts to use 
the fuel were unsuccessful, and attempts to market it in the 1840s faced considerable 
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resistance due to unfamiliarity with its use.  White (1979) relates similar failures in early 
railroads, and Freese (2004, 114) recounts how attempts at using anthracite as a fuel 
failed in Philadelphia in 1803.  Eventually, declining costs of coal enabled the fuel to 
overcome initial reluctance to its use.  White (1979, 87) states, “It was this decline in coal 
prices, rather than the dramatic increase in wood prices, that brought about the great 
conversion in locomotive fuel.”  In fact, White notes that the price of wood was quite 
variable across locations and years, and did not show a trend of significant price increases 
during the period of conversion.  However, the decline in coal cost was real.  Coal was 
$7-10/ton in the 1830s, but had fallen to $3/ton by the mid-1850s, and in 1862 the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad could obtain coal at $0.75/ton (see Section 2.4.2).  The 
ability of railroads to obtain cheap coal was in part a reflection of their ownership of coal 
mines.  This market power in turn led to worker protests and strikes, which Podobnik 
(2005) [110] cites as an important factor driving the transition from coal to oil. 
The rise of coal as an energy resource in the United States is well documented.  Schurr 
and Netschert (1960), Freese (2004), Eavenson (1942) [111], and many others provide an 
excellent discussion of coal’s ascent as an energy resource in the United States.  None of 
these sources estimate total U.S. coal production or consumption prior to 1800, so I have 
made estimates as detailed in Appendix 1-8.  Table 9 shows the record of U.S. coal 
consumption and mechanical work output.   
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Table 9: Coal Consumption in the United States, 1780-2010 
Sources: Schurr and Netschert (1960, 508-509), EIA (2012), and author’s estimates 
Year 
Thousand Tons 
Bituminous 
Thousand Tons 
Anthracite 
Tons per 
capita 
Energy 
Input (PJ) 
Mechanical Work 
Output (PJ) 
1780 19 0 0.007 1 0.00 
1790 46 0 0.012 1 0.00 
1800 108 0 0.020 3 0.02 
1810 176 2 0.025 5 0.04 
1820 330 4 0.035 9 0.08 
1830 646 235 0.068 24 0.20 
1840 1,345 1,129 0.145 67 0.56 
1850 4,029 4,327 0.360 227 1.88 
1860 9,057 10,984 0.637 545 4.92 
1870 20,471 19,958 1.049 1,101 12.98 
1880 50,757 28,650 1.583 2,171 32.52 
1890 111,302 46,469 2.506 4,322 71.94 
1900 207,275 55,515 3.458 7,217 140.07 
1910 406,633 81,110 5.303 13,413 342.56 
1920 508,595 85,786 5.583 16,357 571.77 
1930 454,990 67,628 4.246 14,389 791.71 
1940 430,910 49,000 3.632 13,224 708.14 
1950 454,202 39,900 3.245 13,026 545.95 
1960 380,835 17,247 2.203 10,379 512.93 
1970 514,922 8,309 2.552 12,939 758.48 
1980 697,600 5,129 3.093 16,271 1076.13 
1990 901,416 3,082 3.623 20,227 1261.97 
2000 1,079,478 4,617 3.842 23,821 1269.85 
2010 1,046,422 1,874 3.395 21,962 1033.11 
The output of mechanical work from coal from 1850 to 1950 is taken from Dewhurst 
(1955), and is calculated using Equation (7): 
                ( ) 
Similar to Equation (6), Eo is the work output, Q is the total quantity of coal consumed, f 
is the fraction of coal used for mechanical work, and ηo is the conversion efficiency.  
From 1800 to 1850, f is assumed to be the same as in 1850 (75%), and ηo is assumed to 
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grow by 2% per year from around 0.4% efficiency in 1800 to 1.1% efficiency in 1850.  
After 1950, the mechanical work output from coal is calculated by Equation (8): 
                       ( ) 
In Equation (8), fe is the fraction of coal used for electricity production, fw is the fraction 
of electricity used for the performance of physical work, ηg is the efficiency of electricity 
generation, and ηt is the efficiency of electricity transmission and distribution.  For 1950, 
Dewhurst’s value of ηo (the efficiency of conversion of coal into mechanical work) is 
18.5%, and values of ηg and ηt from EIA are 24.0% and 86.8%, respectively, for a 
product of 20.8%.   
As the defining fuel of the Industrial Revolution (or, to use Rifkin’s terminology, the 
First Industrial Revolution), coal has been strongly tied to cultural views.  It shapes these 
views and is shaped by them.  Geels (2012) talks about the loss of coal’s cultural 
legitimacy in Great Britain as one factor in the industry’s demise, as its competitors 
positioned themselves as “clean” and “modern.”  Podobnik (2005) cites the power of coal 
unions as a factor in industry switching to oil and gas.  Coal also necessitated changes in 
aesthetics.  Coal soot from domestic heating led to the abandoning of tapestries in interior 
decoration (Freese 2004, 36), and soot from railroads led to decreased use of color in the 
design of both locomotives and the uniforms of engineers (Freese, p. 123), possibly also 
diminishing the social status of the engineer. 
  
72 
 
2.1.9.  Oil 
The discovery of oil at Titusville in 1859 was the beginning of the American oil industry.  
Williamson and Daum (1959a) [112] characterize from 1859 to 1899 as “The Age of 
Illumination.”  Figure 8 shows the transition in shares of refinery output over the period 
1874-1919 (prior to this, the mix was similar to that in 1874).  Illuminating oils 
represented 82% of refinery output from 1883 to 1885, but just under 50% by 1904.   
 
Figure 8: Shares of U.S. Oil Refinery Output, 1874-1919 
Source: Williamson and Daum (1959a, 489 and 615), Williamson and Daum (1959b, 
111) [113], and Peckham (1884) [114, p. 270] 
As transportation became a more important application for petroleum, gasoline and fuel 
oil became the dominant products, as seen in Figure 9.  Kerosene and lubricating oil have 
since dwindled to minimal components of refinery output.  Fuel oil comprised over 50% 
of refinery output in the years 1920 and 1925, but gasoline overtook it by 1930.   
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Figure 9: Shares of U.S. Oil Refinery Output, 1920-2010 
Source: Schurr and Netschert (1960, 93) and EIA (2012) 
Oil production is well documented over the industry’s period of existence.  I use Schurr 
and Netschert’s values for consumption, which are available at 5-year intervals from 
1860 to 1900, and interpolate the missing values.  After 1949, EIA data is used. 
Dewhurst (1955, 1111) estimated the fraction of oil that was directed towards work 
output from 1860 to 1950.  By the end of the period he evaluated, oil had become the 
single largest source of mechanical work output in the U.S.  For mechanical work output 
after 1950, I include the following types of petroleum consumption, from EIA (2012): 
 All transportation-sector petroleum; 
 The petroleum used for electricity generation multiplied by mechanical work’s 
share of electricity generation in that year (see Section 2.2.6); 
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 All motor gasoline in the industrial and commercial sectors; and, 
 Half of commercial and industrial distillate fuel oil. 
This results in an estimate of the share of petroleum used for mechanical work of 60% for 
1950, close to Dewhurst’s estimate of 58%.  The share rises to 74% by 2010 as the 
transportation sector consumes a larger fraction of petroleum.  Results are shown in Table 
10.  I follow EIA’s methodology by including natural gas liquids with petroleum 
consumption.  
Table 10: Petroleum Consumption in the United States, 1860-2010 
Sources: Schurr and Netschert (1960, 508-509), Dewhurst (1955), and EIA (2012) 
Year 
Thousand 
Bbl 
Bbl per 
capita 
Energy 
Input (PJ) 
Work Output 
(PJ) 
1860 500 0.016 3 
a 
1870 2,011 0.052 12 
a
 
1880 17,203 0.343 105 
a
 
1890 27,652 0.439 169 0.08 
1900 39,564 0.521 242 1.09 
1910 173,559 1.887 1,062 14.34 
1920 454,242 4.267 2,824 77.09 
1930 970,762 7.887 6,199 252.90 
1940 1,284,954 9.725 8,151 381.05 
1950 2,357,140 15.480 14,048 754.23 
1960 3,585,819 19.847 21,015 1087.30 
1970 5,364,473 26.162 31,144 1557.29 
1980 6,242,444 27.473 36,086 2067.22 
1990 6,200,801 24.841 35,397 2781.38 
2000 7,210,593 25.552 40,366 3313.89 
2010 6,989,073 22.637 37,949 3449.93 
a
 Negligible 
Although this analysis focuses on consumption, the history U.S. oil production is of 
interest if it can provide some insights into global “peak oil,” as discussed in Section 
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1.1.3.  Domestic petroleum production grew until 1970, then peaked and declined as 
production grew more expensive.  Depletion of low-cost resources raised the cost of 
producing domestic oil, and the availability of a low-cost substitute (imported oil) led to 
declining production.  Domestic oil production has had two partial reversals to date, as 
shown in Figure 10, below.  When imported oil prices increased, domestic oil production 
rebounded, increased by nearly 900,000 barrels per day from 1976 to 1985.  Beginning in 
2008, high oil prices drove an increase in domestic oil production of nearly 1.5 million 
barrels per day.  These high prices have also suppressed demand, with petroleum 
consumption per capita falling by 15% from 2005 to 2010.  
 
Figure 10: U.S. Oil Production and Price, 1950-2012 
Source: EIA (2013c) 
  
76 
 
2.1.10.  Natural Gas 
Natural gas is a young industry with a well-documented record of production.  It has 
succeeded in capturing a significant share of applications from industry to electricity 
generation to residential and commercial space heating.  Smil (1991) notes that 
household demand for clean fuel was one reason for increased production of natural gas.  
In addition to producing fewer emissions, natural gas furnaces and stoves require 
virtually no attention on the part of the homeowner, as compared to coal furnaces and 
stoves which required considerable stoking and cleaning, as noted by Wright (1964) 
[115].  When a homeowner’s value of time is greater, the operating cost of the coal boiler 
is higher. In some cities, policy initiatives aimed at reducing air pollution served to 
encourage the use of alternative fuels such as natural gas (Tarr, 1981) [116]. 
Prior to the widespread development of natural gas resources, manufactured gas from 
coal supplied streetlights in many cities (Davis et al. 1997, 354-355).  Also called “town 
gas,” this was a mix of hydrogen, light hydrocarbons (such as methane), carbon 
monoxide, and other compounds produced by heating bituminous coal.  Manufactured 
gas was an energy carrier, and not an energy resource, and does not have a consumption 
series of its own; consumption of coal includes that used to produce town gas.  Gas 
lighting experienced competitive pressures from electricity, and made strides in 
improving efficiency during this transition.  Welsbach’s first incandescent mantle for gas 
lighting was patented in 1885.  Fouquet and Pearson (2006) consider this to have tripled 
the efficiency of gas lights.  Much like the case of sailing ships or ice harvesting, the 
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improvements in the mature technology were outpaced by innovations in the emerging 
technology, in this case electric lights.  Fouquet and Pearson term the improvement in gas 
lighting in response to the emergence of electric lighting the “sailing ship effect.”  
As with oil, the most complete consumption series for natural gas is from Schurr and 
Netschert (1960, 508-509), which does not have annual data from 1880 to1900.  I use the 
five-year values with interpolation for that period.  Following EIA’s methodology, 
natural gas liquids are included with petroleum, rather than with natural gas.  Dewhurst 
(1955) finds that 28% of gas was for mechanical work output in 1950, which seems high.  
Gas used for electricity generation is multiplied by the share of electricity used for work 
(42% in 1950).  Natural gas for residential and commercial uses is nearly all for heating 
(including cooking).  Industrial use would have to be about 50% for mechanical work in 
order for the overall share of natural gas devoted to mechanical work to be 28% in 1950.  
In fact, much of the natural gas used in industry is for chemical synthesis or process heat.  
From 1949 through 2010, I use a value of 25% of industrial natural gas for mechanical 
work, as well as the corresponding annual values for electricity, and the entirety of 
natural gas used for transportation (most of which is in pipeline operation).  This results 
in about 18% of gas used for mechanical work in 1950, and 13% in 2010.  The efficiency 
of conversion uses Dewhurst’s values through 1950, and thereafter the efficiency of 
generation from the electricity sector, increasing from 24.4% in 1951 to 42.5% in 2010. 
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Table 11: Natural Gas Consumption in the United States, 1890-2010 
Sources: Schurr and Netschert (1960, 508-509) and EIA (2012) 
Year 10
12
 BTU 
10
6
 BTU 
per capita 
Energy Input 
(PJ) 
Work 
Output (PJ) 
1890 257 4.08 271 
a 
1900 253 3.32 267 
a 
1910 540 5.87 569 3 
1920 813 7.63 857 9 
1930 1,932 15.70 2,038 53 
1940 2,665 20.17 2,812 108 
1950 5,968 39.20 6,297 205 
1960 12,385 68.55 13,067 694 
1970 21,795 106.29 22,993 1,325 
1980 20,235 89.05 21,348 1,111 
1990 19,603 78.53 20,681 1,067 
2000 23,824 84.42 25,135 1,255 
2010 24,644 79.82 25,999 1,388 
a
 Negligible 
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2.1.11.  Nuclear Power 
This analysis only considers nuclear power used for central station electricity generation.  
Nuclear energy used for naval vessel propulsion is not included.  Table 12 uses the EIA 
conversion of nuclear power generation to energy supply, based on the thermal heat rate 
of nuclear power plants. 
Table 12: Nuclear Power in the United States, 1960-2010 
Source: EIA (2012) 
Year TWh 
Energy 
Input (PJ) 
1960 0.52 .006 
1965 3.66 .046 
1970 21.80 .253 
1975 172.51 2.004 
1980 251.12 2.890 
1985 383.69 4.300 
1990 576.86 6.440 
1995 673.40 7.465 
2000 753.89 8.295 
2005 781.99 8.610 
2010 806.97 8.905 
Nuclear power grew rapidly in its early years, rising from 0.35% of electricity generation 
in 1965 to 9.0% in 1975.  Its growth continued, reaching 15.5% of electricity generation 
in 1985 and 21% in 1991, but it has remained there since.  During the rapid rise of 
nuclear power, it was easy to look at prior transitions and project that nuclear power 
might, like coal and oil before it, come to claim a large share at least of the electricity 
market, if not overall energy consumption.  This is evidenced in Marchetti (1992) [117] 
and Haefele et al. (1981) [118].  Haefele et al. (1981, 49) projects a scenario with high 
growth of nuclear power, to a global capacity of 3640 GW by 2010, about ten times the 
actual total for that year (IAEA, 2012) [119].  Haefele et al. (1981, 43) provides “an 
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exploration of what its potential would be if most of the crucial questions holding back its 
development were resolved,” a situation that has not come to pass.  Other analyses of that 
era are more definitive, with Kursunoglu (1983) [120] stating, “Needless to say, the 
eventual worldwide use of nuclear energy should provide all with a source of cheap 
energy,” and Fortescue (1983) [121] stating, “The massive deployment of nuclear power 
is inevitable…”  Earlier analyses were hesitant to project a nuclear transition.  Dewhurst 
(1955, 766) considered the possibility of nuclear power to become the chief source of 
energy as “problematical,” citing costs of fissionable materials and developing effective 
reactor shielding.  Conversely, he viewed waste disposal as “nearly solved.”  Schurr and 
Netschert (1960, 22-28) have different reservations.  They note that breakthroughs of new 
energy supply technologies come from providing new or enormously improved energy 
services, and that simply replacing coal with nuclear power for electricity generation was 
unlikely to have such an effect by itself.  Nuclear power would only have a revolutionary 
impact if it were to find new applications where its characteristics enabled superior 
performance.  Naval propulsion represents one such niche application for nuclear power, 
and radioisotope thermoelectric generators another, but these have not yet led to wider 
use of nuclear power beyond the power grid.   
The abbreviated transition to nuclear power is noted as an example of a transition that 
failed to occur by Grubler (2012), Smil (2008), and others.  Nuclear electricity 
experienced its most rapid share growth in the 1960s and early 1970s.  This was a period 
of rapid electricity demand growth, as seen in Figure 11.  Demand growth in the 
industrial sector slowed in the 1960s, but commercial and residential growth remained 
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high, as seen in Figure 12.  All sectors showed a marked reduction in demand growth in 
the 1970s, due in part to electricity price increases resulting from the oil price shocks.  
The price of electricity is shown in Figure 13.  A later reduction in electricity prices did 
not cause demand growth to increase.   
The anticipated expansion of nuclear power did not materialize.  Edmonds and Reilly 
(1985, 171) [122] note slowing growth after 1970 due to “a shutoff of government 
subsidies, combined with the increasing costs for additional safety requirements, a 
lengthening of the time needed to approve and construct a nuclear plant, and higher than 
expected operating costs.”  Edmonds and Reilly (1985) also note that the slowdown in of 
demand growth meant utilities had over-ordered new generation capacity of all types.  
This excess capacity was partially shed by cancelling orders for reactors in the 1980s and 
1990s.  Some of the lost growth of nuclear power was instead taken by measures that 
slowed the growth of energy demand, such as energy efficiency and conservation.  
Energy efficiency is not normally evident from graphs of fuel shares of electricity 
generation, but it does represent a resource that has grown in importance. 
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Figure 11: U.S. Electricity Retail Sales by Sector, 1949-2011 
Source: EIA (2012) 
 
 
Figure 12: U.S. Electricity Retail Sales Growth Rates, Five-Year Average, 1952-2009 
Source: EIA (2012) 
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Figure 13: U.S. Electricity Prices by Sector, 1960-2010 
Source: EIA (2012) 
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2.1.12.  Chemical Energy 
Chemical energy forms used in the nineteenth century included gunpowder, matches, 
explosives, and batteries.  Although not of major significance in energy terms, they were 
moderately significant in economic terms and had a high value per energy unit.  
Gunpowder is an energy carrier that was often both mineral and biomass-derived.  Black 
powder was partly charcoal by composition, and some potassium nitrate was obtained 
from guano.  At about 1.4 MJ per pound, gunpowder has roughly one-tenth the energy 
content of coal.  The 1810 production of 1.4 million pounds of gunpowder (700 tons) 
represents about 2 TJ of energy, or roughly 70 tons of coal.  Gunpowder would be 
classified as performing mechanical work according to Dewhurst’s definition, but both 
wind and water were performing over 1 PJ of mechanical work in 1810, so gunpowder’s 
contribution would be negligible in that measurement as well.  The 1840 production of 9 
million pounds would be equal in energy content to about 450 tons of coal, whereas 
actual coal production in that year was 1.3 million tons. 
Chemical energy would be more significant in an analysis of energy expenditures, with 
perhaps $12 million for combined gunpowder, high explosives, fireworks, and matches in 
1880, as compared to about $100 million for coal, $16 million for oil, and $28 million for 
ice.  Electrochemical batteries are not explicitly recorded in that Census nor in prior ones, 
although they provided the power for telegraphs from 1844 until the 1880s, when 
replaced by grid power. 
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2.2.  Results 
2.2.1.  Total Energy 
Absolute energy consumption in the United States is higher than ever before, due to a 
growing population and a growing economy.  Energy consumption is the population, 
times the GDP per capita, times the energy intensity, as shown in Equation (9).   
    
   
 
 
 
   
                ( ) 
This is a variant of the “IPAT” identity, I = PAT, where the environmental impact I of a 
society is equal to the population P times the affluence A times the technology effect T.  
In this case, affluence is measured in GDP per capita, technology effect in energy per 
dollar of GDP, and the impact I is total energy consumption.  The IPAT identity is 
attributed to Paul Ehrlich by Commoner (1971) [123], as cited in Chertow (2001) [124].  
Energy consumption itself is not an adverse environmental impact, so to convert this into 
a true IPAT equation would require adding a term (I/E), environmental impacts per unit 
of energy consumed.  In the case of climate change, the carbon intensity of energy is an 
applicable metric.  
Although the third term in Equation (9) has tended to decline over time, the first two have 
increased dramatically in the long term, leading to an increase in overall energy 
consumption, as seen in Figure 14, below.  This graph begins in 1790 rather than 1780 
because income statistics do not exist for 1780.  Energy consumption per capita is the 
product of the second and third terms in Equation (9), and peaks in 1979.  Energy 
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consumption per capita in 1979 was just barely above the 1973 value, so the actual peak 
in per-capita consumption could well have been the earlier year.  Technological progress 
allowed real income per capita to increase 63% from 1979 to 2010 even while energy 
consumption per capita consumption declined 11%.  Growth in energy consumption since 
the 1970s is attributable to population growth.   
 
Figure 14: Indices of U.S. Energy Consumption, 1790-2010 
Sources: Various; see Section 2.1 
Energy consumption in 2000 was nearly ten times as great as it was in 1900, and in 1900 
it was eighteen times as great as it was in 1800.  Figure 15 shows energy consumption by 
fuel, and Figure 16 shows this same information on a logarithmic scale so that the early 
period is not obscured. 
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Figure 15: U.S. Energy Consumption, 1780-2010 
Sources: Various; see Section 2.1 
 
Figure 16: U.S. Energy Consumption, 1780-2010 (Logarithmic Scale) 
Sources: Various; See Section 2.1 
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2.2.2.  Energy Input Shares 
The contributions of the various energy sources to primary energy supply are shown in 
Figure 17, below.   
 
Figure 17: Shares of Inputs to U.S. Energy Consumption, 1780-2010 
Sources: Various; see Section 2.1 
As can be seen, the energy inputs are dominated by fuel wood until about 1880.  Coal 
represents an absolute majority of energy inputs from 1890 to 1945.  Oil and gas together 
represent an absolute majority of energy inputs from 1950 to 2010, although oil by itself 
falls just short of providing 50% of U.S. energy in its peak years. 
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2.2.3.  Energy Intensity of GDP 
Calculating the energy intensity of the U.S. economy throughout its history requires 
determining the Gross Domestic Product.  Numerous analyses attempt to determine U.S. 
GDP for the periods before such records were kept; the period before 1840 is seen as 
particularly difficult to ascertain.  Maddison (2010) [125] presents estimates back to 
1820, at 10-year intervals until 1870.  Johnston and Williamson (2011) [126] present an 
annual series back to 1790.  Weiss (1992) [127] shows that GDP per capita in 1774 was 
virtually identical to that in 1793. The 1780 GDP per capita is assumed to be the same as 
the 1790 value, although the effects of wartime would introduce considerable uncertainty 
into this assumption.   
Most GDP series present the quantity in both real (constant) and nominal (current) 
dollars.  Price series may be in either real or nominal dollars, with earlier series such as 
Bezanson (1937 and 1954) or early Census reports usually in nominal terms.  Schurr and 
Netschert (1960, 545-548) offer both, but it is generally preferable to take the nominal 
quantities from earlier works and convert them using more recent series for GDP 
deflators or CPI indices.  The series from Johnston and Williamson (2011) is shown in 
Figure 18.  In international comparisons, the conversion of local currency to international 
dollars based on Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) introduces another complication.  Since 
this section is exclusively concerned with the United States, conversion to PPP is not 
necessary. 
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Figure 18: GDP Deflator, 1790-2010 
Source: Johnston and Williamson (2011) 
Figure 19 shows two GDP series from the beginning of Maddison’s annual data in 1870 
until 1950, after which time the two series agree.  Maddison finds about 20% higher GDP 
than do Johnston and Williamson over the 1910s and 1920s.   
 
Figure 19: Comparison of U.S. GDP Series, 1870-1950 
Sources: Johnston and Williamson (2011), Maddison (2010) 
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Energy intensity shows a less pronounced increase from 1900 to 1918 if using the 
Maddison series than if using the Johnston and Williamson series.  The difference is seen 
in Figure 20: 
 
Figure 20: GDP Series Effect on Energy Intensity, 1870-1950 
Sources: Johnston and Williamson (2011) and Maddison (2010) 
In both cases, a long-term decline in energy intensity over time is observed, as seen in 
Figure 2, above.  The reasons for this decline include multiple aspects of efficiency.  
Some economic efficiency results from competition.  Producers that develop process 
improvements can create more goods and services for any fixed amount of inputs.  This 
will mean that their costs are lower, and consumers will buy their goods and services 
rather than those of more expensive producers.  Producers do not specifically have an 
incentive to reduce energy inputs, but rather to reduce the total cost of inputs including 
capital, labor, materials, and energy.  In some cases the optimal approach is to increase 
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energy as an input to production while reducing others.  The transition from human-
powered workshops to steam-powered factories involved the substitution of energy, 
materials, and capital for labor.  This substitution created more output of manufactured 
goods per dollar of inputs, thereby lowering the cost of manufactured goods.   
Economic efficiency is also increased by infrastructure changes that reduce transaction 
costs.  Transportation infrastructure improves economic efficiency, by reducing the costs 
of transporting the goods to the consumer.  The Internet improves economic efficiency by 
greatly expanding the availability of information to the consumer and reducing the cost in 
time needed to determine the availability and characteristics of a product. 
2.2.3.1. Energy Efficiency  
Technological improvements increase the energy efficiency of energy converters.  More 
efficient converts can convert primary energy into energy services (such as mechanical 
work, light, heat, cooling, and communication) with less waste.  The progress in 
efficiency of obtaining mechanical work from coal (including steam engines, steam 
turbines, and electrical generation) is shown in Figure 21, below.   
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Figure 21: Approximate Efficiency of Work from Coal, 1850-1950 
Source: Dewhurst (1955) 
These first fifty years improvements in Figure 21 resulted from design innovations such 
as the triple-expansion engine and improved metallurgy allowing higher-pressure boilers.  
Later improvements reflected the major transition described by Geels (2006), from steam 
engines driving millwork to steam turbines supplying power to electric motors.  During 
and after this transition, efficiency in both electricity generation and electric motors 
continued to improve, increasing the overall coal-to-work efficiency. 
The greatest gains in efficiency are not from incremental improvements in the existing 
technologies, but from the adoption of new energy ones.  New lighting technologies can 
result in order-of-magnitude improvements in light output per unit of energy consumed, 
as illustrated by Fouquet and Pearson (2006).  Figure 22 is based on their findings. 
94 
 
 
Figure 22: Efficiency of Lighting Technologies, 1700-2000 
Source: Fouquet and Pearson (2006) 
The improving efficiencies seen in Figure 21 and Figure 22 were accompanied by large 
expansions of energy consumption.  As steam engines became more efficient over the 
19
th
 century, they became more widely adopted, and so consumed more coal in the 
aggregate.  This paradox was noted by Jevons (1865) [128].  Jevons argued that 
efficiency would be unable to prevent England from running out of coal, since increased 
efficiency only led to increased consumption.  The Jevons Paradox, and the associated 
phenomenon of the rebound effect, are widely cited by opponents of efficiency standards.  
This opposition is misplaced.  The goal of energy efficiency standards should not be to 
reduce energy consumption, because energy consumption itself is neither good nor bad.  
The goals of such standards should be to reduce the externalities of energy consumption 
and to realize cost savings (and therefore welfare improvements) that are missed through 
market imperfections such as bounded rationality.  
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2.2.3.2. The Rebound Effect 
Modern economists do note the “rebound effect.”  The direct rebound effect is due to 
greater efficiency leading to greater energy consumption, as the provided energy service 
becomes less expensive.  This direct effect is not so great as to outweigh the savings from 
the standards.  Greening et al. (2000) [129] shows a wide range of estimates by 
application with many centered around 20 percent.  Schipper and Grubb (2000) [130] and 
Laitner (2000) [131] argue for lower values.  A rebound of 20% means that a doubling of 
fuel economy will result in a 40% reduction in fuel consumption, not a 50% reduction, as 
20% of the savings are taken back by the rebound effect.  (Fuel economy is a form of 
energy efficiency, although it is not precisely thermodynamic efficiency.)  A doubling in 
fuel economy halves the fuel cost of driving, but it does not halve the overall cost of 
driving.  The American Automobile Association estimated the cost of driving to be 
$0.596 for an average sedan in 2012, of which only $0.142 (about one-quarter) was fuel 
cost (AAA, 2012) [132].  Furthermore, the AAA statistic does not include the value of a 
driver’s time; even were the car, fuel, and maintenance to be free, many drivers would 
still not wish to have a two-hour commute.   
The indirect rebound effect is potentially larger, but has a high degree of uncertainty, as 
seen in Thomas and Azevedo (2013) [133].  The indirect rebound effect is a consequence 
of the fact that improved energy efficiency creates economic growth.  A driver does not 
entirely negate his fuel savings with increased driving, but spends some of the money 
saved on other goods and services.  These in turn require energy to produce, and so some 
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of the savings on energy will result in additional energy consumption elsewhere.  Ayres 
and Warr (2008) [134] argue that increasing energy efficiency, through the indirect 
rebound effect, accounts for a large part and perhaps even a majority of all economic 
growth since the Industrial Revolution.   
Improvements in energy efficiency allow for reduced energy intensity and reductions in 
energy use for a given level of GDP.  The rebound effect means that improving efficiency 
leads to a higher level of GDP, possibly increasing overall energy consumption.  
Efficiency by itself is no guarantee of creating an absolute reduction in energy 
externalities, but it presents an opportunity to reduce these externalities without 
increasing cost per unit of energy services.  Adding pollution control equipment to power 
plants increases the cost of energy inputs, as does removing sulfur from gasoline to allow 
the use of catalytic converters.  Low-carbon options such as natural gas with carbon 
capture and sequestration (CCS) or photovoltaic power also carry a higher economic cost.  
Coupling higher-cost lower-pollution energy resources with improved energy efficiency 
redirects some of the savings from energy efficiency to reducing the externalities of 
energy use.  
2.2.3.3. The Interrupted Decline of Energy Intensity  
Despite the overall decline in energy intensity, the U.S. did have a 40-year period, from 
roughly 1880 until 1920, in which energy intensity either stayed roughly constant or 
increased (depending on the GDP series used).  This is shown in Figure 20, above, and 
corroborated by contemporary sources.  Daugherty (1928) noted that production per wage 
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earner did not rise as fast as installed horsepower per wage earner from 1889 to 1919, and 
suggested that increasing mechanization was showing diminishing economic returns.  As 
Geels (2002) describes, factories in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries stopped seeing 
significant economies of scale due to constraints on building size and shape, machine 
arrangement, and power losses from transmission.  The inefficiencies of millwork at large 
scale, evident in the increasing energy intensity, led manufacturers to develop new 
technologies and processes.  Some of these changes, such as the shift from on-site steam 
engines to grid-connected electric motors, are reflected in Daugherty (1928).  As Geels 
notes, advances in manufacturing included not only technological solutions, but also 
operational innovations such as Frederick Taylor’s “scientific management” system.  
Landscape developments accelerated this transition.  The First World War required 
reconfiguration of manufacturing for the production of munitions and vehicles.  The coal 
price spike from 1917 to 1924, as seen in Section 2.4.2, provided an additional incentive 
to improve efficiency.  The new manufacturing systems exemplified by Henry Ford’s 
River Rouge plant of 1920 led economic output to increase faster than energy 
consumption.  Further discussion of this transition is found in Devine (1983) [135].  
Devine shows that 1920 marked a turning point in energy intensity, which began 
declining after a period of increase, and in productivity of capital, which began increasing 
after a period of decline.  It also marked a decades-long acceleration of growth in labor 
productivity, and the point at which electric motors surpassed steam engines as sources of 
mechanical drive.  Since 1920, there has been no ten-year period over which energy 
intensity has increased.   
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Reduction in energy intensity is not an inevitable consequence of economic development.  
It is quite possible for a country’s energy use to increase faster than its economy over a 
period of 10 or 20 years, or even more.  My analysis finds that U.S. energy intensity did 
not return to the 1890 level until about 1935.  This is also seen in the graph of fossil fuel 
exergy intensity in Ayres and Warr (2003).  However, Ayres and Warr identify a much 
higher level of non-fossil inputs in 1900, such that total exergy intensity over the 
twentieth century shows a consistent declining trend with only very short-term increases. 
Section 2.3.2 explains why my findings differ from those of Ayres and Warr.  Kander et 
al. (2007) shows that the Netherlands maintained generally constant energy intensity 
from 1800 through 2000.  Italy had a period of increasing energy intensity from about 
1960 to 1970, followed by a decline, but by 2000 not yet back down to the level of 1960. 
2.2.4.  Mechanical Work Output 
Work refers to the services provided by energy.  Although “work” can encompass energy 
services such as lighting, cooling, and chemical synthesis, early energy scholars focused 
on the provision of mechanical work.  It is this task that can most directly be compared to 
labor.  It is in the provision of mechanical work that machines originally competed with 
and replaced draft animals and human laborers.  The measurement of cars engines in 
horsepower continues to illustrate just how much mechanical power is at an average 
American’s disposal compared that harnessed by their ancestors.  Dewhurst (1955, 1102) 
notes the importance of work output (meaning mechanical energy) and derives time 
series for that quantity.  As he notes, “of special significance for the economy are the 
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amounts and kinds of energy devoted to the performance of work and the amounts of 
work performed…It includes only those operations which have been or could be done 
(however inadequately) by the muscle power of animals and men” (italics in original).  
As noted in Section 1.2.1, the emphasis on mechanical energy is not a feature of most 
modern energy analyses.  Still, it is interesting to see from a historical perspective how 
many “workers” were built as sailing ships and waterwheels in the 19th century. 
The contributions of the energy sources to the performance of mechanical work (as 
defined by Dewhurst) are shown in Figure 23 and Figure 24.  Wind and water are much 
more significant in mechanical work output than in energy input, amounting to the same 
order of magnitude as human muscle power in the mid-1800s, as seen in Figure 23.  
Animal power is consistently above 300 MJ per capita from 1780 until 1923.  Coal 
quickly rises off the graph; by 1900, mechanical work output from coal is nearly 1900 MJ 
per capita.  Oil rises quickly once the automobile comes on the scene, although the first 
40 years of petroleum saw essentially no work output from this resource.  The decline in 
the sailing fleet after 1860 is in part due to the change to steamships, but in part due to an 
overall decline of the U.S. merchant fleet.  Figure 23 ends in 1910 in order to better 
illustrate the relative contributions of the various non-fossil energy resources in early 
mechanical work output.  
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Figure 23: Mechanical Work Output per Capita, 1780-1910 
Sources: See Section 2.1 and Section 2.2.4 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century different fuels dominated energy supply and 
work output, with wood for the former and animal muscle for the latter.  The steam 
engine (and, later, the internal combustion engine) allowed thermal fuels to be converted 
into mechanical work.  The difference in efficiency is another reason why different 
energy resources dominated energy inputs and work output.  Steam engines were only 
about 1.1% efficient in 1850 according to Dewhurst, whereas animal labor was about 5% 
efficient at converting fodder into mechanical work (even accounting for non-working 
animals).  Wind is barely visible in Figure 17, but is quite prominent in Figure 24.  Its 
efficiency of conversion to mechanical work was very high compared to the conversion 
efficiency of other energy resources. 
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Since 1880, fossil fuels have come to dominate both energy inputs and mechanical work 
output.  About 56% of mechanical work (using Dewhurst’s definition) in 2010 was 
transportation, which was nearly all supplied by petroleum.  The remainder of mechanical 
work would be industrial processes, appliances, construction equipment, and other uses.  
 
Figure 24: Contributions to Mechanical Work Output in the U.S., 1780-2010 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955) and author’s calculations 
The amount of mechanical work per dollar of GDP is shown in Figure 25, below.   
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Figure 25: U.S. Mechanical Work Intensity, 1780-2010 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955) and author’s calculations 
The increase in mechanical work intensity from 1780 to 1790 is due to the development 
of a merchant marine fleet, which accounted for 20% of the country’s motive work in 
1790.  The decline to 1890 is due to economic efficiency—economic activity improving 
faster than work performance.  The rise to 1930 is due to power capacity increasing faster 
than productivity, as Daugherty (1928) observed.  From 1900 to 1917, the increase is 
primarily due to coal.  During that time, coal consumption increased 137% and work 
output per unit of coal increased 68%.  The net effect was a quadrupling of the 
mechanical work output from coal, without a corresponding increase in economic output 
(as discussed in Section 2.2.3).  The amount of coal-driven mechanical work per dollar of 
GDP increased until 1917, plateaued, and then declined.  The increase in work intensity 
from 1917 to 1930 is the result of oil.  Daugherty considered private automobiles in that 
era to be “not productive,” meaning their use was an end use and was not an input to 
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production of goods and services.  The work output from petroleum per dollar of GDP 
continued to increase, although not as quickly as in the 1920s.   
The steep decline from 1938 to 1943 is due to the economic recovery and World War II; 
the economy increased by 90% in those five years, while mechanical work output 
increased by 51%.  The steep decline since 1970 may be partially due to the declining 
role of manufacturing in the U.S. economy, with economic growth now being more 
dependent on processing information than on processing materials.  The fraction of 
electricity devoted to the performance of mechanical work remains highly uncertain for 
much of this time period (see Section 2.2.6).   
2.2.5.  Early Steam Engines: Transition from Wood to Coal 
Beginning in the mid-1800s (earlier in the United Kingdom), the steam engine provided 
the first means to convert thermal fuels into mechanical energy.  The steam engine is 
often associated with coal, but other fuels were used.  Wood dominated the early railroad 
engines.  As can be seen in Figure 23 and Figure 25, coal rose rapidly to prominence.  
This section offers a short discussion on the transition from wood to coal in the provision 
of mechanical work.   
White (1979) notes that wood was the dominant fuel in railroads until 1870, but 
Dewhurst (1955) finds coal providing more overall work output as early as 1850, 
suggesting that coal’s dominance in stationary engines overwhelmed its low penetration 
in the railroad market.  Table 13 shows the relevant statistics.   
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Table 13: Wood to Coal Transition in Work Output, 1850-1880 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955), Daugherty (1928), and White (1979) 
Year 1850 1860 1870 1880 Source 
Railroad HP 
(thousands) 586 2,156 4,462 8,592 
Dewhurst, from 
Daugherty 
Total Steam 
HP 
(thousands) 2,121 4,516 7,927 13,712 
Dewhurst, from 
Daugherty 
Railroad % 
Wood 95% 90% 50% 10% 
White (with my 
estimate for 1850) 
RR Cords 1,260,000 3,780,000 3,640,000 1,388,723 White 
RR tons coal 44,211 280,000 2,426,667 9,531,080 
1880 from White; 
others derived (at 1 
ton coal = 1.5 cords 
wood) 
Wood for 
Work Cords 6,099,885 6,275,700 5,525,010 4,066,110 Dewhurst 
Coal for 
Work tons 6,270,087 13,915,718 26,487,357 51,723,816 Dewhurst 
Coal share 
of inputs to 
work 60.7% 76.9% 87.8% 95.0% 
Assuming 1 ton coal 
= 1.5 cords wood 
As can be seen, Dewhurst’s estimates suggest that far more mechanical work was being 
done by coal than by wood in 1860, even though the railroads—which accounted for 
nearly half of all horsepower—were 90% wood-fueled at that time.  There would have to 
be not only a near-exclusive use of coal in other applications, but also much greater 
utilization of that power capacity in order for coal to produce 77% of the energy inputs to 
steam engines.  Figures for wood consumption from White (1979), with horsepower 
totals from Daugherty (1928) and an efficiency estimate of 1.3% for 1860 from Dewhurst 
(1955), suggest that railroad engines did not in fact have a very high utilization.  A 
generation of 405 million horsepower-hours from the 1.94 million horsepower of wood-
fueled locomotives suggests operation of 209 full-capacity hours per year.  This is not the 
total hours of operation, since much of the operation could be at part-load.  White (1979) 
notes that the early years of railroads in the U.S. were characterized by low speeds, since 
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higher speeds resulted in much higher operating costs due to fuel consumption and wear 
and tear on the engines and the infrastructure.  This suggests that the engines were 
capable of going faster, but normally operated at less than their rated horsepower. 
Daugherty finds a use factor of 6.8% for locomotives in the 1920s, meaning 600 full-
capacity hours per year.  It is plausible that railroads had over that sixty-year period 
achieved greater utilization of their power capacity due to operating at higher speeds and 
perhaps (due to superior construction) less time spent undergoing repairs.  
Given the low utilization of railroad capacity in 1860, it is possible that if other engines 
were operating at a much higher utilization rate, and had a much higher share of coal, 
then coal would have provided more work output in 1860.  This would be possible if, for 
example, other engines were used for 1700 full-load hours per year, and were 85% coal-
fueled.  Steamships, which accounted for another 11% of the installed steam horsepower 
in 1860, were likely a mix, with riverboats using both fuels and ocean-going vessels 
using exclusively coal due to the higher energy density.  Williamson and Daum (1959a, 
140) note that wood was the fuel of choice in the steam engines driving the oil drilling 
rigs in Pennsylvania in the early 1860s, due to coal’s higher cost at that place and time.  
Wood was $7-10 per cord, or about $0.30-$0.50 per GJ.  Coal was $0.60-$1.25 per 
bushel, or about $0.60-$1.30 per GJ.  Wood was dominant or at least competitive in 
markets other than railroads in 1860. 
More than any other factor, the spatial energy density of coal enabled it to surpass wood.  
A kilogram of coal has about 33% more energy than a kilogram of dry wood.  This 
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energy density advantage enables modest cost savings in transportation.  In spatial terms, 
an acre of coal field has several thousand times more energy content than an acre of 
forest.  A forest might have 20 cords of wood per acre, equivalent to about 15 tons of 
coal.  At a yield of 1,800 tons per acre-foot, a coal seam one inch thick would have ten 
times the energy content of the forest.  The local abundance, the concentration of so 
much energy in one place, allowed for tremendous savings in fuel transportation costs by 
routing rail lines through coal fields or locating factories near mine-mouths. 
Improvements in extraction and logistics reduced the price of coal for the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad by a factor of 10 between 1840 and 1862.  Fuel wood prices stayed fairly 
stable, as noted in Section 2.4.2.  Scarcity of an existing fuel and cost decreases of an 
emerging fuel can both create relative cost advantage.  Only one of these need be present 
to effect a transition based on fuel cost.  
2.2.6.  Electricity and Work Output  
The rise of electricity complicates the calculation of work output.  Although turning a 
turbine and thereby creating electricity technically is an operation that “could be done” 
by muscle power, Dewhurst (1955) considers the ultimate use of the electricity to be the 
deciding factor in calculating work output attributable to a fuel used for generation.  The 
quantity of fuel used is pro-rated by the amount of electricity used to provide motive 
power.  Waide and Brunner (2011) [136] find that motors accounted for 45% of global 
electricity consumption in 2006, and 38.4% in the U.S.  They divide motor applications 
into pumps, fans, compressors, and mechanical movement and provide global shares for 
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these applications.  Mechanical movement falls entirely within Dewhurst’s definition of 
work, and compressors mostly outside of it, since Dewhurst excludes cooling.  Irrigation 
pumps would be included, but those circulating a refrigerant would not, nor would 
furnace fans.  I sum the “mechanical movement” and “pumps” categories to approximate 
Dewhurst’s definition of work.  Applying these global averages to U.S. motor electricity 
demand, as in Table 14, below, shows that approximately 16.6% of U.S. electricity 
provides motive power as its end-use.  Dewhurst estimated that 42% of electricity was 
used for mechanical work output in 1950.  I use a linear interpolation between the values 
of 42% in 1950 and 16.6% in 2006, then maintain the 2006 figure for 2007 through 2010. 
Table 14: Motors for Mechanical Movement and Pumps in 2006 
Source: Waide and Brunner (2011) 
Sector U.S. Motor 
TWh   
% of Motor Use for 
Mechanical Movement 
and Pumps, Globally 
U.S. TWh 
Mechanical 
Share of Total 
U.S. Electricity 
(3722 TWh) 
Industrial 632 59% 372.9 10.0% 
Commercial 498 34% 169.3 4.5% 
Transport 4 60% 2.4 0.1% 
Residential 297 25% 74.3 2.0% 
Total 1431  618.9 16.6% 
As can be seen from Table 14, the majority of mechanical work done by electricity is 
done in the industrial sector.  Therefore, a decline in work done in the U.S. industrial 
sector, as the economy shifts to be more service-based and as companies improve their 
efficiency, could explain the slowing of growth and slight decline seen in Figure 26.  
Better data on the fraction of electricity used for mechanical work between 1950 and 
2006 would improve this analysis. 
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Figure 26: Estimated Mechanical Work Performed by Electricity, U.S. 1950-2010 
Sources: Dewhurst (1955), Waide and Brunner (2011) and Author’s estimates 
Some reductions might result from process changes.  For example, devoting energy 
resources to chemical production—a task not included in Dewhurst’s definition of 
work—can create wood preservatives that reduce the mechanical energy needed for 
logging, transporting, sawing, and installing wood surfaces.  In this manner, the need for 
mechanical work can be reduced by the provision of other energy services.  
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2.3.  Comparison to Other Studies 
Kander et al. (2007) summarizes the results of a number of long-term studies of 
commercial and non-commercial energy consumption in Europe.  These studies, 
conducted by the Energy, Growth, and Pollution (EGP) Network, were a significant 
inspiration for this analysis.  Ayres and Warr (2003) present the most comparable 
analysis for the United States, although they do not extend their analysis as far back in 
time. 
2.3.1.  EGP Studies 
Figure 27 and Figure 28 show how the findings of this analysis compare to those of the 
other EGP studies.  Table 15 provides a breakdown of the energy inputs for each country 
in selected years.  
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Figure 27: Energy Consumption per Capita in Selected Countries, 1800-2000 
Sources: Section 2 for U.S., Warde (2007) for UK, Kander et al. (2007) for Sweden, 
Netherlands, Italy, and Spain 
 
 
Figure 28: Energy Intensity in Selected Countries, 1820-2000 
Sources: As Figure 27, with Maddison (2010) 
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Table 15: Energy Shares (Percentages) by Country and Year 
Sources: Kander et al. (2007) and Warde (2007) 
1800 U.S. Sweden Netherlands Italy Spain England & Wales 
Food (Humans, Animals) 11.8 20 33 
  
15.8 
Firewood 87.1 80 14 
  
4.3 
Wind, Water 0.6 0 19 
  
2.4 
Fossil Fuels 0.5 0 34 
  
77.5 
Energy per Capita (GJ) 112.3 47.3 21.8 
  
54.4 
     
1850 U.S. Sweden Netherlands 
Italy 
(1861) Spain England & Wales 
Food (Humans, Animals) 11.4 25 28 41 50 6.9 
Firewood 80.1 73 13 51 46 0 
Wind, Water 0.5 <1 12 1 2 1.4 
Fossil Fuels 8.1 2 47 7 2 91.7 
Energy per Capita (GJ) 121.3 35.4 24.9 18.8 20.2 93.0 
Intensity (MJ/$1990, PPP) 67.2 34.7 10.5 13.0 18.7 39.9 
       
1900 U.S. Sweden Netherlands Italy Spain England & Wales 
Food (Humans, Animals) 9.5 17 15 39 31 3.8 
Firewood 19.5 45 2 34 26 0 
Wind, Water 0.2 <1 3 1 5 0.3 
Fossil Fuels 70.8 38 80 26 38 95.9 
Primary Electricity 0.0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 
Energy per Capita (GJ) 143.5 50.6 44.8 18.8 21.9 146.9 
Intensity (MJ/$1990, PPP) 35.1 22.9 13.1 10.5 12.3 32.7 
       
1950 U.S. Sweden Netherlands Italy Spain England & Wales 
Food (Humans, Animals) 2.4 6 9 27 27 2.7 
Firewood 4.4 21 0 17 12 0 
Wind, Water 1.1 <1 0 0 0 0 
Fossil Fuels 92.1 64 91 47 59 97.3 
Primary Electricity 0.0 9 0 9 2 0 
Energy per Capita (GJ) 238.0 81.5 62.1 24.7 26.7 152.6 
Intensity (MJ/$1990, PPP) 24.9 12.0 10.4 7.1 12.2 22.0 
       
2000 U.S. Sweden Netherlands Italy Spain England & Wales 
Food (Humans, Animals) 1.1 2 2 4 5 2 
Firewood 2.3 23 0 2 0 0 
Fossil Fuels 87.2 40 88 88 88 89.2 
Primary Electricity 9.4 33 10 6 7 8.8 
Energy per Capita (GJ) 367.4 167.2 183.2 132.6 115.3 177.7 
Intensity (MJ/$1990, PPP) 12.9 8.1 8.3 7.1 7.4 8.7 
As can be seen in Table 15, fuel wood consumption in the early United States was far in 
excess of even that found in a colder European country such as Sweden.  This abundance 
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of firewood, and the extravagance of its use, have long been noted by other authors.  
Schurr and Netschert (1960, 49) quoting Lillard (1948), write “All cabin dwellers gloried 
in the warmth of their fireplaces, exploiting their world of surplus trees where a poor 
man, even a plantation slave, could burn bigger fires than most noblemen in Europe.”  
Reynolds and Pierson (1942, 2) noted, “Cordwood was about as plentiful as air.”  Coxe 
(1814, xxxii) noted that because “There being in effect, no limit to our fund of charcoal” 
iron could be smelted without having to use coal, which, at the time, would weaken the 
metal.   
Much of this abundance was driven by the need to clear land for farming.  Sweden, while 
fairly cold and forested, was not clearing land at the same rate as the United States.  
Schurr and Netschert (1960, 50) estimate that settlers cleared 5 million acres per year for 
farmland in the decade 1850-60; assuming a low yield of only 15 cords per acre this 
becomes 75 million cords per year, out of total 100 to 125 million cords per year 
consumed for fuel.   
Kander (2002) found a range of values for Sweden, including an 1880 estimate of 150 ft
3
 
per capita (1.2 cords), and a 1924 range of 1.7-5 sm
3
 per capita (0.6-1.7 cords) depending 
on the region; she estimates 1800 consumption at 4.7 sm
3
 per capita (about 1.6 cords, 
roughly 33 GJ).  Sweden was an early adopter of technologies that increased energy 
efficiency, such as the chimney damper (already widespread at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century) and the Cronstedt stove.  Kander estimates that 20% of stoves in 
Sweden were of the Cronstedt type in 1800, and 60% by 1850.  By comparison, Reynolds 
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and Pierson (1942) estimate that, in the U.S., the Franklin stove only began to catch on in 
cities and larger villages after 1825, at a time when the U.S. was still mostly rural.  
Stoves became widespread enough to start to reduce per-capita fuel wood consumption 
only around 1850.  Kander uses solid cubic meter (sm
3
) as the measurement for firewood.  
The conventional conversion is 3.6 m
3
 per cord, based on a cord of wood being 128 cubic 
feet, but a stacked cord of wood is not solid.  Kander’s energy conversion of 7000 
MJ/sm
3
, compared to an estimated 21,000 MJ per cord, suggests that 3 sm
3
 is about equal 
to a cord (so a solid cubic meter represents about 20% more wood than a stacked cubic 
meter).   
The United Kingdom was no longer heavily forested by 1800, and so its fuel wood 
consumption was only about 2 GJ per capita in that year (1/10 of a cord per capita).  By 
1850 it was negligible.  The Netherlands was similarly lacking in fuelwood, relying 
instead on peat.  It used only 3 GJ per capita of wood in 1800.  Per-capita fuelwood 
consumption in Spain in 1850 and Italy in 1861 was one-third that of Sweden, but three 
times as great as in the Netherlands. 
When comparing the various countries, food per capita depends mostly on the level of 
draft animal ownership, as human calorie intake does not vary greatly among the 
different countries.  Food share of energy inputs depends on both the level of draft animal 
ownership and the total level of energy inputs.   
Kander (2002) cites Hamilton (1982) [137] as noting that, in Sweden in 1800, animal 
motive power represented about 2.7 times the amount of human motive power.  Under 
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Hamilton’s methodology (60% of the population rated at 0.5 horsepower), draft animals 
would have represented 4.4 times the amount of human motive power in the U.S. in 
1800.  The early U.S. consumed much more energy in the form of firewood, and also 
much more in the form of animal fodder, than did Sweden.   
England also had a much smaller draft animal population than the U.S.; Warde (2007) 
finds feed for draft animals in England in 1800 to be 34.4 PJ, compared to 41 PJ for 
human food, whereas for the U.S. in 1800 this study finds 48 PJ for animal feed and 22 
PJ for human food.  At no time in Warde’s series did animal feed exceed human food in 
England, while in the U.S. it was routinely twice as high, and up to 260% of the human 
food amount. 
As with firewood, the more crowded countries of the UK and the Netherlands did not 
maintain the same levels of draft animals as did the less densely populated U.S.  Per-
capita draft animal ownership in Italy and Spain was similar to that of Sweden, and 
higher than the Netherlands or UK. 
2.3.2.  Ayres and Warr   
Ayres and Warr (2003) examine the exergy inputs to, and the work output of, the U.S. 
economy from 1900 to 1998.  Exergy is the amount of useful energy available in a 
resource, and determines the maximum work that can be done by that resource.  For 
chemical energy resources such as fossil fuels, it is roughly equal to the energy content as 
used in this analysis.  Because Ayres and Warr (2003) is one of the most comprehensive 
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recent studies of historical U.S. energy consumption, and utilizes many of the same 
sources as I do, it is worthwhile to see how the findings compare. 
Ayres and Warr (2003) differs in several key respects from the present analysis in both 
methodology and outcomes.  My analysis shows an increase in energy intensity over 
from 1900 to 1917.  While GDP does increase, energy consumption increases far faster, 
leading to the only medium-term increase in energy intensity in this data series.  It then 
takes time to recover from this increase, such that the low energy intensity level of 1898 
is not reached again until 1936.  The peak of 1917 is 45% higher than the low of 1898.  
Ayres and Warr do not have such an increase.  Their trajectory of energy intensity differs 
from this analysis for two main reasons.   
First, Ayres and Warr (2003) rely on the Maddison GDP series, which results in a higher 
GDP in the 1910s and 1920s, and therefore lower energy intensity than my series.  
Revising this analysis using the Maddison series, the “bump” in energy intensity is 
smaller and does not last as long.  Using the Maddison series, there is a rise of 27% from 
a low in 1901 to a peak in 1917, and then a decline to the 1901 level as soon as 1924.  
This difference is shown in Figure 20, above. 
Second, Ayres and Warr (2003) find a much higher value for phytomass exergy 
consumption.  Ayres and Warr found phytomass exergy consumption of 12 EJ in 1900 
(Figure 2 in their paper), whereas this study finds energy consumption of 3 EJ.  The much 
higher starting point for 1900 means that Ayres and Warr do not find an increase in 
energy intensity over the next 15 to 20 years, as the decline in their phytomass value 
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outweighs the increase in fossil fuel consumption.  Figure 3 of their paper explicitly 
shows this; fossil fuel exergy per unit of GDP shows the “bump” for several decades, but 
overall exergy per unit of GDP declines over that interval.  I do not find non-fossil energy 
consumption to be high enough that its decline over the first part of the twentieth century 
could enable such a result.  Table 16 shows the breakdown of all energy inputs in 1900 
for this analysis.  The differences between exergy and energy do not explain the gap of 9 
EJ (300%) in biomass consumption. 
Table 16: U.S. Energy Inputs in 1900 
Sources: See Section 2.1 
Resource Measurement Quantity Conversion EJ 
Food Population 75,994,575 2700 Calories/day 0.313 
Animal Fodder Draft Animals 24,978,000 18900 Calories/day 0.721 
Waterwheels 
B HP-hr 
Produced 2.61 80% input efficiency 0.009 
Sailing Vessels Tonnage 1,885,000 467 HP-hr per ton 0.005 
Windmills 
B HP-hr 
Produced 0.105 35% efficiency 0.001 
Fuel Wood Million Cords 100 21,100 MJ per cord 2.130 
Coal Million Tons 262.8 26 MMBTU/ton 7.217 
Oil Million Barrels 39.6 5.8 MMBTU/bbl 0.242 
Natural Gas Billion Cubic Feet 235.0 1075 BTU/ft3 0.267 
Hydroelectricity MWh 2,786,000 80% input efficiency 0.013 
Ayres and Warr describe exergy, not energy.  This makes only a minor difference for fuel 
wood and fossil fuels.  They note (Ayres and Warr 2003, 221), “the heat of combustion 
(enthalpy) of a fuel is nearly equivalent to its exergy content.”  Exergy values are derived 
by first taking net heating value and then applying an exergy coefficient, which adjusts 
combustible fuels for the heat lost in vaporizing water and in dissipating combustion 
products.  This tends to inflate the consumption of all fuels by a small amount.  Firewood 
has a higher exergy coefficient than coal, which has a higher exergy coefficient than fuel 
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oil or diesel fuel, which have a higher exergy coefficient than gas.  Therefore, shifts from 
wood to coal to oil are seen as decreasing exergy even if the heat of fuels consumed in 
BTUs remains the same.  This has a very minor effect on the magnitude of energy 
intensity changes.  Using Ayres and Warr’s exergy coefficients and my consumption 
series, exergy intensity in 1998 would be 37% of its 1900 level, while energy intensity 
would be 38% of its 1900 level.  There is a slightly greater decline in exergy intensity due 
to a shift to fuels with lower exergy coefficients.   
Ayres and Warr (2003) also use a more expansive definition of work than did Dewhurst, 
as they also include high-temperature industrial heat, and electricity generation.  
Therefore, the series for work output in their paper is not comparable to the one in this 
analysis.   
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2.4.  Prices 
The price of energy partially explains the differences in energy intensity between 
countries and over time.  Some of the price series that exist for U.S. energy resources in 
the 19
th
 century are wellhead oil prices and mine-mouth coal prices, and so are lower than 
the prices paid by most consumers.  Transportation of all forms of goods could carry a 
high cost, especially for goods moved overland.  Wholesale price indices do exist for 
Philadelphia, but prices would be different for other cities.  Schlebecker (1975) provides 
a number of insights into the cost of freight transport: 
 In the late 18th century, it cost considerably less to ship freight from England to 
Philadelphia than from Lancaster, only 75 miles away.  Similarly, freight could be 
sent more cheaply from Pittsburgh down the Ohio and Mississippi and then by sea 
to Philadelphia than overland from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia.” 
 The Erie Canal dropped Albany-Buffalo transit costs from $100/ton to $10/ton, 
and from 20 days to 6 (from 1817 to 1825).   
 In 1818, flour sold at $8 per barrel in New York, of which $4.50 was 
transportation from Cincinnati. 
 In 1850, canal freight was about 2¢/ton-mile, river about 1¢, and rail from 4¢ to 
25¢, depending on whether or not it had water competition. 
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Smil (2008, 197) notes that documentary evidence exists for this disparity in 
transportation costs as far back as the Roman Empire.  Diocletian’s Edict on Maximum 
Prices, from 301 AD, illustrates that it cost more to move grain 120 km, even on good 
Roman roads, than to ship it across the Mediterranean.  Smil notes, “Land transport was 
thus the most ubiquitous energy-limited hindrance to the complexification of 
preindustrial societies; only railways changed that.” (Smil 2008, 198) 
2.4.1.  Labor 
Numerous sources attest to the high labor cost in the American Colonies and early United 
States.  Carroll (1975) [138] notes that iron was expensive in Colonial New England, 
since the high cost of labor totally offset the advantage of an abundant fuel supply.  
Carman (1939) [139], re-issuing an anonymous 1775 essay, notes that day laborers were 
2.5 times as expensive in New England as in England.  Schlebecker (1975) highlights the 
low cost of draft animals relative to human labor, noting that to own and maintain ten 
horses would not cost as much as hiring a single free white male worker, whereas in 
Britain, owning a horse or hiring a worker cost about the same.  Schurr and Netschert 
(1960, 50) cite the high labor cost in the early U.S. as a deterrent to the use of stoves.  
The labor cost of cutting wood to fit in stoves exceeded the energy savings from stoves’ 
increased efficiency, and so open fireplaces were used instead.  This example and 
Schlebecker’s both point to substitution of other energy resources for labor due to labor’s 
high cost. 
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Lebergott (1960) [140] cites typical monthly pay for farm labor in 1830 as $6-12 plus 
board, with 1850 rates only slightly higher at $7-13.  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
provides the series shown in Table 17.  Some locations commanded much higher prices.  
At the height of the Gold Rush, California farm hand earned about $60 per month.   
Table 17: Farm Laborers Average Monthly Earnings with Board 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
Year Monthly Earnings 
1818 9.45 
1826 8.83 
1830 8.85 
1850 10.85 
1860 13.66 
1870 16.57 
1880 11.70 
1890 13.93 
1899 14.56 
1909 21.30 
1919 41.52 
1929 40.40 
1940 28.05 
1948 91.00 
Typical wages in the Philadelphia area from 1794 to 1830 were $1/day for laborers, 
$0.40/day for agricultural workers, and around $1.75 for artisans.  Nonfarm laborers in 
New England also earned about $1/day in 1815, 1825, and 1850 (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1975).  Women in the Lowell mills earned about $0.50/day around 1830, 
compared to the $0.25-$0.30 they might have earned in shoe factories or weaving palm 
leaf hats. 
Kinsman (1925) estimated the cost of agricultural labor to be $0.30 per hour in 1924 
(possibly $3/day), with mechanical power costing about $0.19 per hp-hr (animal power at 
that point somewhat higher at $0.25 per hp-hr, and so being replaced by tractors).  Note 
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that Table 17 is the earnings in addition to board, and so it is not as high as Kinsman’s 
figures. 
Officer and Williamson (2011) [141] provide an hourly wage series for production 
workers and a daily wage series for unskilled laborers from 1774 to the present.  
Production workers are those in the manufacturing sector.  I derived a daily wage series 
for the production workers using assumed hours per day of work, based on Dewhurst 
(1955).  Hours per day start at ten, decline to nine from 1900 to 1920, and fall to eight per 
day in 1950.  This creates the series shown in Figure 29, below.  Officer and Williamson 
note that their series for production workers includes women and children, who made up 
a significant share of early factory employees and were not paid as much as men.   
 
Figure 29: Wage Series, 1774-2010 
Source: Officer and Williamson (2011) 
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For unskilled workers, the index is scaled according to the 2010 median earnings of full-
time employed wage and salary workers (25 and over) without a high school diploma, 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) [142].  This was $444/week in 2010, or 
$88.80/day for a five-day workweek.  That number then provides the basis for the index, 
allowing conversion of all prior values into nominal dollars.  Agricultural labor in 1924 
would then be about $2.15/day, which is somewhat less than Kinsman’s estimate of $0.30 
per hour (assuming a 10-hour day for agriculture in 1924 as per Dewhurst).   
2.4.2.  Coal and Wood 
Numerous isolated estimates for coal prices exist for the nineteenth century.  Schurr and 
Netschert (1960, 545-546) offer a mine-mouth price series beginning in 1880, with 
entries at five-year intervals until 1900.  Bezanson (1937 and 1954) offers a number of 
wholesale price series for Philadelphia, with some beginning in 1784.  Other citations 
exist for early coal prices, and are shown in Table 18, with energy conversions from 
Schurr and Netschert (1960).  Wood is 20.9 MMBTU/cord, bituminous coal is 26.2 
MMBTU/ton, and anthracite is 25.4 MMBTU/ton.  Many prices are reported in cost per 
bushel; the conversion used here is 28 bushels per ton.  The railroad prices cited by White 
(1979) reflect the buying power of these corporations, as well as their ability to lay track 
and place stations near coal fields.   
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Table 18: U.S. Wood and Coal Prices, 1791-1862 
Sources: Eavenson (1942), Mather (1838), Adams (2003) [143], White (1979), and 
Williamson & Daum (1959a) 
Year Location Price Type 
Current 
$/GJ 
Source 
1791 Western PA  $3.36/ton Coal 0.12 Eavenson 
1794/5 Western PA  $1.12/ton Coal 0.04 Eavenson 
1813 NY $17.92/ton Coal 0.65 Eavenson 
1826 Philadelphia  $4.50/cord Wood 0.20 Eavenson 
1826 Philadelphia  $6.25/ton Anthracite 0.23 Eavenson 
1826 Philadelphia  $7.68/ton Bituminous 0.28 Eavenson 
1826 Philadelphia  $10.00/ton Charcoal 0.39 Eavenson 
1830 Kentucky  $2.50/cord Wood 0.11 Mather 
1830 Not specified $11/ton Anthracite 0.41 Adams 
1830s North and East $7-10/ton Coal 0.31 White 
1838 Boston area $7/cord Wood 0.32 White 
1838 Kentucky  $2.80/ton Bituminous 0.10 Mather 
1840 Baltimore & Ohio RR $2.50/cord Wood 0.11 White 
1840 Not specified $7/ton Anthracite 0.26 Adams  
1840 Baltimore & Ohio RR $8/ton Anthracite 0.30 White 
1844 Kentucky  $1.75/ton Bituminous 0.06 Eavenson 
1851 Not specified $4.50/cord Wood 0.20 White 
1854 Baltimore & Ohio RR $1.79/cord Wood 0.08 White 
Mid-1850s Not specified $3/ton Coal 0.11 White 
1855 Not specified $3/cord Wood 0.14 White 
1850s Rochester area $2.17/cord Wood 0.10 White 
1855 Boston area $3.50/cord Wood 0.16 White 
1855 New York  
$3.50-
6.40/cord 
Wood 
0.22 
White 
1857 Baltimore & Ohio RR $3.80/cord Wood 0.17 White 
1860 NYC $5.50/ton Anthracite 0.21 Adams  
1860 Boston area $5.61/cord Wood 0.25 White 
1862 Baltimore & Ohio RR $3.00/cord Wood 0.14 White 
1862 Baltimore & Ohio RR $0.75/ton Coal 0.03 White 
Early 
1860s 
Pennsylvania Oil 
Region 
$7-10/cord Wood 
0.40 
Williamson & 
Daum 
Early 
1860s 
Pennsylvania Oil 
Region 
$17-35/ton Coal 
0.95 
Williamson & 
Daum 
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Figure 30, below, adjusts the values to constant 2005 dollars.  Points represent the values 
in Table 18, which as noted derive from several different locations and sources.  Lines 
represent the Philadelphia wholesale price series from Bezanson (1937).  The graph 
shows that, depending on location, costs could vary considerably.  In most regions, 
bituminous coal was less expensive than anthracite, since the latter was cleaner-burning 
and carried a premium for its use in the home heating market.  In Philadelphia, due to the 
proximity of the anthracite mines and well-established supply routes, anthracite was often 
less expensive or comparably priced to bituminous coal until 1880, at which point 
bituminous coal became significantly less expensive.  Wood could be cheaper than 
bituminous coal or more expensive than anthracite, depending on location. 
 
Figure 30: Coal and Wood Prices, 1784-1862 
Sources: As Table 18, plus Bezanson (1937) 
The series from Bezanson (1937 and 1954), Schurr and Netschert (1960, 545-546), and 
EIA (2012) illustrate the steep reductions in real coal prices over the nineteenth century, 
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as seen in Figure 31 and Figure 32.  The Bezanson series are for wholesale prices in 
Philadelphia, while the Schurr and Netschert series and the EIA series are mine-mouth 
(freight on board) prices, explaining the price differences from 1880 to 1896 where 
Bezanson overlaps with Schurr and Netschert.  There is also a discontinuity for 
bituminous coal prices when shifting between Bezanson’s two series.  In the first volume, 
covering the years from 1784 to 1861, bituminous coal is specifically Virginia coal, while 
in the second volume, covering the period from 1852 to 1896, bituminous coal from 
Pittsburgh is included.   
 
Figure 31: Bituminous Coal Prices and Consumption 
Sources: Bezanson (1937 and 1954), Schurr and Netschert (1960, 545-546), and EIA 
(2012) 
Coal consumption increased during the 1970s even as its price increased sharply.  The 
consumption of a good will typically fall as its price increases.  The increase in tandem 
shows that prices rose due to increased demand, that demand was relatively inelastic with 
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price, and that there was an insufficient quantity of lower-priced alternatives.  
Conversely, when coal prices increased again from 2004 to 2010, natural gas was able to 
displace it, and coal consumption fell. 
 
Figure 32: Anthracite Coal Prices and Production 
Sources: Bezanson (1937 and 1954), Schurr and Netschert (1960, 545-546), and EIA 
(2012) 
Anthracite coal production follows the expected pattern of a normal good.  Consumption 
increased as price decreased throughout the 19
th
 century.  Anthracite coal averaged 
$33/ton from 1900 to 1909 (in 2005 dollars), and $32/ton from 1910 to 1919.  The 
economic growth of the 1920s led to increased demand, but the depletion of the easiest 
seams meant that this demand could only be met at a higher price.  The price increased to 
$48/ton in 1922, and stayed near this level for the rest of the decade.  As soon as the price 
began increasing, consumption began decreasing, with industry and home heating 
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switching to other fuels.  Anthracite prices did not fall below $40/ton until 1966, at which 
time consumption was one-eighth its peak level.  EIA estimates remaining anthracite 
reserves at 4.1 billion short tons, which would represent 44 years of peak anthracite 
consumption.  The resource declined for several reasons, but complete exhaustion was 
not one of them. 
Bezanson (1954) provides numerous price series for specific types of coal, as shown in 
Figure 33.  Anthracite occurs in two main forms, “red ash” and “white ash.”  Size 
categories used in the nineteenth century included (from smallest to largest) chestnut, 
stove, egg, and broken.  As can be seen, the prices generally track each other, although 
after 1880 the price of bituminous coal declines and the price of anthracite rises slightly.  
 
Figure 33: Philadelphia Wholesale Coal Prices, 1852-1896 
Source: Bezanson (1954) 
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Productivity of coal mining was roughly one ton per worker-day in the early 19
th
 century.  
The 1840 Census shows coal mining employed 3043 men for 863,489 tons of anthracite 
production, and 3768 men for 27,603,191 bushels of bituminous coal production.  At 28 
bushels per ton, this means that coal mine productivity was roughly 270 tons per worker-
year in 1840.  This roughly corresponds to the figures for 1810 given by Eavenson (1935) 
[144], in which output was 2.8 tons per man per day in one place, 1.29 in another, 400 
tons/year in another, and 177 tons/year in another.  Wood was similar, with a skilled 
woodcutter able to cut, split, and stack one cord of hardwood in a day (Reynolds and 
Pierson, 1942), with an energy content about 4/5 that of a ton of coal (Dewhurst, 1955).   
The steam engine greatly multiplied the mechanical work output of human labor, whether 
fueled by coal or by wood.  Assuming 1% efficiency of conversion in a steam engine in 
1840 based on Dewhurst (1955), the one ton of coal mined by a worker could produce 
about 100 horsepower-hours of motive energy, equal to about 200 worker-days.  The 
woodcutter’s cord of hardwood would produce around 80 horsepower-hours.  Coal prices 
in 1840 ranged from $3/ton to $8/ton, as seen in Table 18, above, and laborers cost 
around $1/day.  A ton of coal therefore cost as much as three to eight worker-days, but 
could do about 200 times as much mechanical work.  
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2.4.3.  Oils 
Illuminating oils commanded a high price relative to their energy content.  Williamson 
and Daum (1959a, 36) provide a list of retail prices in Philadelphia from 1852 to 1860, 
years in which several alternatives had strong market presence.  Turpentine and alcohol 
were the major components of camphene, also known as “burning fluid.” 
Table 19: Illuminating Oil Prices per Gallon, Philadelphia 
Source: Williamson and Daum (1959a) 
Year Lard Oil Sperm Oil Turpentine Alcohol 
1852 $.95 $1.34 $.635 $.546 
1854 .855 1.97 .525 .909 
1856 1.04 1.95 .46 .649 
1858 .895 1.32 .505 .519 
1860 .975 1.62 .355 .431 
Coal oil (called kerosene) was also used as an illuminating oil in the 1850s, and it sold for 
between $0.50 and $2.00 per gallon (Giddens, 1947) [145]. 
Williamson and Daum (1959a, 29) note the local scarcity of whale oil as early as latter 
part of the eighteenth century, which led to adoption of lard oil for lamps.  This scarcity, 
and the observed willingness to pay for illuminating oil, led to the emergence of sperm 
whaling, a more difficult and lengthy venture than the hunts for right whales. 
Domestic production of sperm whale oil peaked in 1837, and overall whale oil in 1847.  
There was still a significant market in the 1850s, and the market reached its greatest size 
in dollar value in 1853 (real dollars) or 1854 (nominal).  Lard oil was also important as a 
commercial commodity, and home manufacture and use of tallow would have increased 
this energy resource’s use further. 
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When petroleum appeared, prices were very volatile in the early years of the industry.  
Yergin (2009) [146] notes prices of $10/barrel in January 1861, $0.50/bbl in the middle 
of that year, $0.10/bbl by the end, and then back up to $4/bbl by the end of 1862. Local 
excess capacity could account for much of this, as early production costs included $2/bbl 
for the barrel itself, and $2-3 for transport from the well to the railroad (Giddens, 1947).  
Schurr and Netschert (1960, 85) notes the processing cost for oil as about 4-10¢/gallon 
($1.68-$4.20/bbl) in the1860s. 
Although pipelines reduced the cost considerably, there was still a substantial difference 
between prices at the wellhead and those in the cities; Giddens (1947) notes that Lima 
crude in 1880 sold for $0.15/bbl at well and $0.60/bbl in Chicago. 
Figure 34 shows four series of petroleum prices.  The series from Williamson and Daum 
(1959a, 118) captures the volatility of the early years of the industry.  The series from 
Bezanson (1954) is for refined petroleum rather than crude, and as such is considerably 
higher, with values through 1877 nearly always above $100/bbl in real dollars.  By 1880, 
refined petroleum was selling in Philadelphia for a price that would not have been 
unusual for crude oil a decade earlier.  
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Figure 34: Petroleum Prices; all crude oil except for Bezanson 
Sources: Williamson & Daum (1959a), Bezanson (1954), Schurr and Netschert 
(1960, 546-547), and EIA (2012) 
 
Figure 35: Illuminating Oil Price Series 
Source: Bezanson (1937 and 1954) 
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As Figure 35 shows, the real price for illuminating oils was generally between $50 and 
$150 per GJ until the discovery of petroleum.  Tallow candles were about 25-30% more 
expensive per pound than the tallow itself, but the data series for tallow is longer than the 
one for candles and so it is used in the above figure.  Sperm whale oil was higher-quality 
than other whale oils or lard oil due to its brighter light, lower odor, and less smoke, and 
commanded a price premium.  It continued to be used for lubrication after it had ceased 
being used as an illuminant.  Refined petroleum was introduced at the same price as the 
lower-quality whale oil, and quickly declined to a much lower price than the other 
illuminating oils.   
The low price of kerosene enabled it to become the dominant lamp oil, but the oil lamp 
offered limited potential for domestic market growth.  Kerosene was never the primary 
lighting fuel in the U.S.  Among all illuminants, the value of kerosene production was 
second to gas lighting in the 1870, at $27 million to $32 million (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1871).  In 1889 gas was $57 million and kerosene was $48 million (U.S. Census 
Office 1895, 364 and 699) [147].  In 1909, illuminating gas increased to $167 million and 
kerosene to $95 million (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1913, 448-452) [148].  Kerosene 
could be exported, whereas gas could not, so the consumption statistics would be more 
heavily skewed in favor of gas.  Both of these products were eventually surpassed by 
electricity.  Between 1850 and 1900, coal was converted into three fundamentally 
different energy carriers to provide light in oil lamps, gas lights, and electric lighting.  
Petroleum also supplied power for lighting through both oil lamps and electric lights. 
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2.5.  Concluding Discussion 
The record of U.S. energy use displays similar trends to those seen in Kander et al. 
(2007), Grubler (2012), Geels (2006), and other sources.  Energy intensity shows a 
general pattern of decline when traditional energy resources are considered.  Of these, 
fuel wood was overwhelmingly dominant for heating in the 19
th
 century and earlier, 
while draft animals provided a majority of motive power.  Direct use of wind and water 
were each comparable to human muscle power in magnitude in the 19
th
 century.  Coal 
provided a majority of both energy inputs and mechanical work outputs by 1890.  Price is 
the most important factor in selecting between energy supply options, with transitions 
occurring when a new energy technology experiences cost reductions, an established one 
experiences cost increases, or both.  Market scale influences the relative cost advantages 
of different energy technologies.  Fuels can compete on performance characteristics, 
although competing on grounds other than price requires improvements in the quality of 
service or reduction in associated costs, which are more often seen with new end-use 
technologies.  End-use technologies with superior performance can command a price 
premium and provide a sheltered niche for further technological development.   
A transition in energy supply can occur whether the previously dominant resource is 
increasing in price or decreasing in price; what matters is relative advantage.  Most often 
an emerging energy resource achieves significant cost reductions.  This was the case for 
manufactured ice surpassing natural ice and for coal overtaking wood in railroads.  The 
replacement of alcohol fuels by kerosene was accelerated by the increase in the cost of 
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alcohol due to the Civil War tax, but kerosene’s cost was so much lower that it likely 
would have gained dominant market share even had alcohol fuels reduced their costs to 
compete.  A transition may be motivated by price increases in a dominant technology, but 
this is not a requirement.  Whale oil and anthracite coal both entered a state of permanent 
decline after a period of high prices, as consumers switched to readily available 
alternatives.   
Any energy option has a range of scales at which it is competitive.  Below that level of 
demand, the technology’s advantages do not warrant the requisite capital investment.  
Above that point, constraints will lead to diminishing returns.  Consider the case of rural 
electrification.  If electricity demand in a sparsely-settled area is low, it is not economical 
to lay power lines.  Small wind turbines and photovoltaic systems with battery backup 
will have a lower cost.  At a higher level of demand, grid extension from a distant power 
plant becomes the least-cost option.  At a very high level of demand, transmission 
capacity may be strained, and locating a power plant in the area may become the least-
cost option.  Grid extension has a window of viability over a certain range of demand.  
This is seen repeatedly in energy transitions.  Options developed for smaller scale are 
replaced by those that require larger scale to be economical, perhaps requiring greater 
investments in infrastructure or manufacturing.  Rather than simple storehouses, 
manufactured ice required factories and decades of research and development.  Oil and 
gas pipelines, electricity generators and grids, and automobile factories and highways all 
represent major capital investment.  None of these would have been developed had not 
prior smaller-scale technologies demonstrated and grown a demand for energy services.   
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Market scale drives transitions in two ways.  Increased market size can allow a new 
technology to become feasible, possibly leading to major cost reductions.  In this case, an 
existing technology can be out-competed even though its cost is not increasing.  In other 
cases, the diminishing returns of an existing option become evident as the market 
expands.  Scale constraints exist at both the market level and at the unit level.  As Geels 
(2006) observed, steam-driven factories encountered diminishing returns to growth at the 
physical factory size.  Scale constraints also limited the growth of horse-drawn 
transportation in cities, the size of sailing ships, and the use of gas lights in theaters.  The 
market for heating fuel in England grew beyond the scale fuel wood could support, 
leading to a transition to coal.  The heavy reliance on taxis and mass transit in New York 
City is due to the space required for parking automobiles, a problem of market scale.  
Environmental impacts also represent a scale-based limitation on fuels.  Smoke 
ordinances and later air quality policies emerged in response to high levels of pollution, 
requiring additional capital expenditures to mitigate the damages.  Climate change is 
another problem of scale.  Peak oil, or at least increasing reliance on higher-cost 
unconventional oil resources, is another example of fossil fuels encountering diminishing 
returns to scale as market size increases.   
Several examples from U.S. history illustrate that the associated costs and benefits of an 
energy technology are often of greater impact than the cost of the energy itself.  Labor 
costs delayed the transition from fireplaces to stoves, since stoves required more labor.  
Conversely, gas and oil furnaces required less labor than coal furnaces, which accelerated 
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the transition away from coal for home heating.  The time savings from driving rather 
than bicycling or taking mass transit constitute a portion of the automobile’s value.  Other 
associated costs include the capital cost of the energy technology, the infrastructure 
required, the knowledge to acquire and use the equipment, and the environmental 
externalities (particularly those proximate to the point of use).  Steam engines allowed 
factories to be sited near raw materials and markets, making them have lower associated 
costs of transportation than waterwheels.  Certain energy-efficient technologies in 
buildings may offer benefits in health and productivity that are greater than their energy 
savings (Kats 2003) [149].  
The “associated benefits” of an energy technology include a broad spectrum of 
performance characteristics.  Not all vehicle-miles represent equally valuable 
transportation, nor do all BTUs represent equally comfortable heating.  The history of 
U.S. energy transitions shows many instances of new energy technologies succeeding on 
quality of service.  As Grubler (2012) notes, this is more common with end-use 
technologies, but there are instances in which fuels compete on properties such as energy 
density, safety, and other qualities.  The competition among lamp oils in the 1840s and 
1850s is a vivid illustration of competing claims and advantages.  No fuel was bright, 
safe, and inexpensive; all met only one or two of these criteria.  The energy density of 
petroleum, crucial for air travel, is another instance in which a fuel’s inherent properties 
render it competitive above and beyond its price.  Chemical batteries, despite costing 
much more per kilowatt-hour than grid electricity, offer portability and convenience that 
warrant their higher price.  Photovoltaic technology has found several niche applications 
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for off-grid power, ranging from the space program to camping equipment.  Among end-
use technologies, early electric lights competed against gas lighting by offering superior 
safety in environments such as factories and theaters.  Automobiles competed against 
streetcars by offering greater flexibility and speed.   
2.5.1.  Changes in Energy Converters 
Between 1800 and 1920, the U.S. saw a succession of changes in manufacturing 
technologies and in lighting, with dominant technologies lasting around 50 years.  The 
first half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of water-powered factories, growing out 
of Slater’s mill in 1793.  The Boston Manufacturing Company’s plant on the Charles 
River, built in 1814, used a system of drive belts that was the basis for mechanical power 
transmission throughout the century.  Steam engines became the dominant power source 
for factories around 1870, and held that position for around 45 years.  Electric motors 
supplanted motors, attaining a 55 percent share of total manufacturing horsepower by 
1919.  As noted by Geels (2006), the transition occurred in steps, with factories first 
employing electric motors as an addition to their millwork systems.  As the transition 
continued, coal continued to be the most important energy source for factories, although 
now first converted into electricity and then into motive power.  Water power also 
progressed from being a major source of direct motive power to being a major source of 
electricity.   
The rise of electricity has allowed a wide range of fuels to contribute to energy supply.  
Daugherty (1928, 28) notes, “The electric generator and the electric motor are, of course, 
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not prime movers, but the current produced by one and used by the other has enabled this 
country to use sources of power which otherwise would be largely untouched.”  This 
refers to water power, which had been largely rendered a minor niche player for direct 
motive power by the steam engine.  Water power could not be easily transported, and so 
water-driven factories had to be sited on fast-moving rivers.  Hydroelectricity could be 
transported much more readily, allowing water to return to competitiveness.  This aspect 
of electricity generation is seen repeatedly.  Coal lost its market share in transportation to 
oil, and its market share in heating (both residential and industrial) to natural gas.  
Electricity generation not only opened up a new market for coal—enabling it to recover 
and exceed its previous levels of consumption—but also opened up markets for low-
quality coal that had previously been ignored, such as lignite.  More recently, electricity 
has enabled the reintroduction of wind power to the U.S. energy economy. 
Lighting technology saw a succession of changes, not always corresponding to changes 
in the fuel.  A single fuel, coal, supplied lighting technologies from gas lights (beginning 
in 1816) to electric lights ranging from incandescent bulbs to LEDs, and coal oil for oil 
lamps was an emerging product in the 1850s, soon displaced by petroleum.  And a single 
lighting technology, the oil lamp, utilized fuels made from whale blubber, pig fat, 
vegetable seeds, coal, petroleum, or alcohol and turpentine.  Similarly, a modern electric 
light can be supplied by any of a variety of different energy resources.  Transitions in 
lighting end-use technologies expanded the provision of energy services much more than 
did changing the energy supply technology.  New energy end-use technologies can offer 
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new or greatly improved energy services, offering superior quality of service or orders of 
magnitude improvements in efficiency.   
Road transportation transitioned from animal and human muscle power to petroleum.  
Smil (2008, 198) notes that horse-drawn transport had an “unprecedented, albeit short-
lived, intensity” in the late-nineteenth century cities of Europe and North America.  The 
horse was replaced not just by the streetcar and the automobile but, as Williamson and 
Daum (1959b, 186) note, by the bicycle.  The train’s dominance in inter-city travel lasted 
from about 1850 until about 1920.  
Energy technologies or systems with a relatively short period of dominance are often 
pioneers in serving a new energy demand.  There are several reasons why they may be 
replaced: 
 They are optimal at small scale, but encountering diminishing returns at larger 
market sizes; 
 They assume initial leadership due to low initial costs, but are surpassed by 
technologies that require larger scale or market size to be economical; 
 The demonstrated demand serves to stimulate innovation, which leads to 
competitors emerging; and, 
 Innovations developed by the pioneer directly enable future competitors.  
Examples include the following: 
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 Whale oil’s heyday lasted from 1830 to 1870, peaking in 1847 for volume and 
1853 for dollar value.  The demonstrated demand for lighting fuel and its 
diminishing returns to scale were both seen in its high price.  These factors 
encouraged the development of more lighting fuels, including alcohol-based fuels 
and improved lard oil (Davis et al. 1997, 356), followed by coal oil and kerosene. 
 Coal oil, developed in the 1850s, was soon replaced by petroleum kerosene, 
which was available at lower cost and employed many of the same refining 
technologies. 
 Horse travel in the cities had a relatively short period of dominance, with 
alternatives emerging as it horse-drawn transportation neared logistical limits.  
These alternatives included the electric streetcar and the bicycle. 
 Bicycles had a short period of massive popularity in the 1890s.  Numerous 
features of the 1890s bicycle industry would be transferred into the automobile 
industry, such as pneumatic tires, variable speed transmission, advocacy for paved 
roads, extensive advertising, and mechanized mass production.  Automotive 
inventor Hiram Maxim specifically noted that the bicycle “could not satisfy the 
demand which it had created,” (Williamson and Daum 1959b, 186) a common 
downfall of pioneer technologies. 
 Windmills for electricity generation proliferated in the Midwest and Prairie states 
in the 1920s and 1930s.  At a small scale, they had a lower cost per kilowatt-hour 
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than central-station power plants.  However, the demonstrated demand for 
electricity, and sales of lights and appliances, provided the impetus for the U.S. 
government to proceed with rural electrification programs in the 1930s. 
2.5.2.  Relative Importance of Energy Inputs versus Work Output 
The set of energy transitions known as the Industrial Revolution is much more significant 
when viewed in terms of work output delivered to society than when looking at energy 
inputs.  This is for three reasons: the magnitude of the work output increase was greater, 
the work output was an energy service, and the technology that provided the mechanical 
work was the transformative aspect of the Industrial Revolution.   
The first point is illustrated by Figure 36, below.  The increasing efficiency of energy use 
meant that from 1800 to 1900, a 44-fold increase in work output could be accomplished 
by a 19-fold increase in energy consumption.  
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Figure 36: Indices of Energy Inputs and Mechanical Work Output, 1780-2010 
Sources: See Section 2.1 and 2.2.4 
The second point recalls the observations of Grubler (2012), Lovins (1999), and others.  
It is the provision of energy services that are important to consumers, not consumption of 
energy inputs.  And, it is useful energy that is an input to production.  Work output as 
classified by Dewhurst is one measure of this, although mechanical work is by no means 
the only economically significant energy service.  The more expansive definition of 
Ayres and Warr (2003) includes lighting, cooling, chemical synthesis, and other services. 
The third point is that the invention and improvement of the steam engine drove the use 
of coal.  An abundance of coal did not drive the adoption of the steam engine.  Great 
Britain used coal for domestic heating throughout the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries with very 
minimal use of the steam engine.  Not until Watt’s patents expired in 1800 did the engine 
see much use beyond coal mines.  And, the U.S. adopted the steam engine for 
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transportation while wood was still the principal fuel.  Sachs (2005, 41) [150] notes, “The 
essence of the first Industrial Revolution was not the coal; it was how to use the coal.”  
Crosby (2006) cites the examples of 11
th
-century China and 17
th
-century Netherlands, in 
which vastly expanded use of fossil fuels did not lead to an industrial revolution, because 
the fuels were not coupled to new energy converters. 
The inherent properties of coal compared to wood offer some advantages for use as a 
fuel; its higher energy density means that it costs less to transport and offers greater range 
before refueling.  Still, the inherent differences are not so great that wood would have 
been unusable as a fuel for the steam engine.  Sachs (2005, 33) notes that the most 
important characteristic of coal was its abundance.   
“The steam engine marked a decisive turning point in modern history.  By 
mobilizing a vast store of primary energy, fossil fuels, the steam engine unlocked 
the mass production of goods and services on a scale beyond the wildest dreams 
the preindustrial era…  
 Before coal, economic production was limited by energy inputs, almost all of 
which depended on the production of biomass…none of these energy sources, 
however, could unleash the potential for mass production that coal did.”  
Coal is abundant globally, and the United States is particularly rich in this resource.  
Demonstrated reserves in the U.S. represent nearly 500 billion tons, according to EIA 
(2012).  Annual consumption is about 1 billion tons, representing about 22 EJ of energy.  
Some projections do suggest that U.S. sustainable biomass production could approach or 
even surpass this level without impacting food, feed, and fiber crops (DOE, 2011) [152].  
Sustainable biomass may have the technical potential to replace most coal use, but the 
costs would be higher due to the expense of transporting the fuel to power plants.   
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2.5.3.  Implications for Future Transitions 
Many efforts have been made to predict how energy technologies can change.  Smil 
(2003) [153] recounts the observation of Cesare Marchetti in 1979 that energy transitions 
seemed to be regular and predictable, “as though the system had a schedule, a will, and a 
clock.”  The oil crisis of 1979 seemed to suggest that another transition would have to 
occur.  The shares of the various energy sources have instead remained much more stable 
over the past 25 years than over any prior 25-year period since the Industrial Revolution 
began, as seen in Figure 37.  Smil (2003, 177) argues that it is possible that energy 
transitions cannot be mathematically modeled, and that scenarios are better used in a 
normative sense, saying what should happen rather than what will happen.  Nye (1998, 
255) [154] argues similarly, that transitions are the consequence of human decisions and 
not deterministic trends.  Rifkin (2011) also stresses the importance of culture and 
choices, rather than assuming mathematical models explain energy use.   
 
Figure 37: Energy Input Shares 1780-2010 
Sources: Various; see Section 2.1 
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Researchers are not attempting to predict future changes when we say that transitions in 
energy supply technologies have historically happened on the order of 40-50 years.  
Nevertheless, the record demonstrates that societies can accommodate shifts on that 
timescale.  Goals to transition to a low-carbon energy system over 40 years, as have been 
repeatedly issued by organizations, nations, and states in the past two decades, are not 
unrealistic seen from this point of view.   
Transitions in energy supply technologies may take several decades, but recent decades 
have seen a transition to much greater efficiency in end-use technologies.  Prior 
transitions in energy inputs occurred within an expanding market.  Nuclear power did not 
rise to claim a plurality of electricity generation, in part because U.S. electricity demand 
growth slowed.  Energy demand growth overall slowed, with consumption per capita 
declining since 1979, as discussed in Section 2.2.1.  These trends are the consequences of 
changes in end-use technologies. 
Lovins et al. (2005, 6) [155] observes that transitions in end-use technologies take about 
12-15 years.  Examples include the transition from horses to automobiles, from steam to 
diesel/electric locomotives, and from landlines to cellphones.  Transitions tend to be 
fastest for purchases done at the individual level, since the industrial stock consists of 
large capital investments that generally have a slower turnover.  Grubler (2012) 
postulates that, because of the more rapid adoption of end-use technologies, a transition 
to a low-carbon economy will be best accomplished by a focus on end uses.  Building on 
two of Grubler’s theses, since early adoption of a new end-use technology is often driven 
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by performance rather than economics, emerging low-carbon end-use technologies 
should focus on performance characteristics, including but not limited to their lower 
emissions or energy use.  The shift from desktop computers to laptops and smartphones is 
illustrates these principles.  The smaller devices gained market share rapidly, based on 
performance characteristics such as portability.  Portability required reductions in energy 
consumption and improvements in battery technology.  Reduced energy consumption 
was not the goal of a shift to laptops and smartphones, but a necessary attribute in order 
to deliver portable computing.  The advances in lithium-ion batteries, in large part driven 
by the laptop and phone markets, have in turn accelerated development of mid-sized 
electric appliances such as lawnmowers, and to some degree electric vehicles.  Low-
emission technologies such as electric vehicles will do well to compete on grounds other 
than energy cost.  For example, by having independent wheel motors, an electric vehicle 
can be designed to offer superior handling and easier parallel parking.  As Schurr and 
Netschert (1960) advised for nuclear power, simply providing a replacement fuel in an 
existing system is unlikely to effect an energy transition.  For the time being, the 
environmental benefits or technological novelty of electric vehicles seem sufficient to 
sustain demand.  In the long run, substantially superior performance of the end-use 
technology is likely to be instrumental to success.  Lovins et al. (2005) uses the shift from 
10% of capital stock to 90% as the definition of a transition.  By that measure, electric 
vehicles have not yet “started the clock.”   
That energy transitions take several decades is not in dispute.  Credible warnings of 
severe anthropogenic interference with the climate system, backed by robust science, 
147 
 
were brought to the attention of the public and the government in the late 1980s.  It has 
already been decades, but in that time at least some progress has been made on energy 
efficiency.  On renewable energy and other low-carbon options, much progress has been 
made in the areas of research and development and early-stage commercialization.  Wind 
has done exceptionally well in many countries and stands poised for further growth.  
While the U.S. energy system is perhaps not where it should be, we are not starting from 
square one.  The transition to an energy system in which externalities are recognized and 
accounted for began around 1970.  The transition to a system in which it is understood 
that finite resources are finite also began around that time.  The transition to a system in 
which climate change mattered began, tentatively and haltingly, around 1990.  The long 
timescale typical of energy transitions does not mean that we need to wait another 40 
years before the energy system can adapt to a low-carbon future.  
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3.  Determinants of Energy Intensity 
3.1.  Introduction 
Section 2 chronicled changes in energy consumption in the United States over more than 
200 years.  As seen in Figure 27, above, U.S. energy consumption increased dramatically 
over the period considered, but not as fast as income.  As a result, energy intensity, or 
energy consumed per unit of economic activity, declined significantly, as seen in Figure 
28, above.  Figure 27 and Figure 28 also show that, compared to other countries for 
which a similar analysis has been performed, the U.S. has historically used more energy 
per capita and more energy per unit of economic activity.  Figure 38, below, shows a 
similar comparison of energy intensity over a more recent time period with a different 
selection of countries. 
How can we explain these differences?  Income is one factor, with wealthier countries 
consuming more energy, although this effect diminishes at high levels of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).  Income does not explain all differences, since energy consumed per unit 
of GDP also varies between countries.  Other factors must be considered.  Climate drives 
demand for heating and cooling, and energy prices affect all categories of energy use.  
The fuel mix matters, as some energy resources can be more efficiently converted into 
economic output than others.  Other factors influencing energy use include population 
density, building characteristics, transportation systems, economic structure, and 
governance.  This analysis applies panel data methodology to several of these variables in 
order to determine how much of an effect each variable has on energy intensity. 
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3.1.1.  Background 
In the debates surrounding ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, several large countries with 
histories of energy production expressed the strongest opposition.  The United States 
never ratified the treaty.  Canada ratified it in 2002, but withdrew from the treaty in 2011 
(UNFCCC 2011) [156].  Australia delayed ratification until 2007, with the Howard 
administration opposed and the subsequent Rudd administration in favor.  Russian 
officials indicated serious reservations about the treaty, with a principal economic advisor 
strongly opposing it, although the Russian Federation ultimately ratified the treaty in 
2004.  By contrast, the European Union and Japan readily ratified the treaty in 2002.  
Arguments against the treaty in the U.S. acknowledged the country’s high level of energy 
use.  In response to concerns about the nation’s high per-capita energy consumption, Ari 
Fleischer, spokesman for President George W. Bush, responded, “The President believes 
that it’s an American way of life, and that it should be the goal of policy makers to 
protect the American way of life.” (Fleischer, 2001) [157] 
The four countries noted as Kyoto holdouts or reluctant supporters have relatively high 
energy intensity, as seen in Figure 38 and Figure 39.  They are also large countries with 
relatively low population density, and all have considerable fossil fuel reserves.  It is 
possible that their fossil fuel reserves are the major impetus behind their reluctance to 
support cuts in greenhouse gas emissions (although Norway, a major oil producer, 
ratified the treaty in 2002).  High energy intensity could also lead to that reluctance, in 
which case it is worthwhile to identify the factors that lead to high energy intensity.  If, 
150 
 
for example, the U.S. climate leads to a higher demand for heating and cooling than does 
the climate in Italy, then its higher energy intensity is at least partly explained by climatic 
differences.  The climatic conditions that drive demand for heating and cooling can be 
approximated by degree days.  This analysis develops series of degree days to identify 
how much of the difference in countries’ energy intensity is explained by their climates. 
 
Figure 38: Energy Intensity for High-Income Countries, 1980-2010 
Source: EIA (2013a) 
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Figure 39: Energy Intensity for Low- and Middle-Income Countries, 1980-2010 
Source: EIA (2013a) 
Policy actions are a decision, rather than an inherent aspect of a country’s geography, and 
also play a role in energy intensity, by influencing energy prices.  End-user energy prices 
include taxes, subsidies, and the embedded cost of some pollution-control measures 
(particularly for electricity).  As a result, end-user energy prices provide some 
quantitative information about the degree to which a country’s policies encourage or 
discourage energy as an input to production. 
3.1.2.  Literature Review 
A number of studies have attempted to identify the impact of climate on energy use.  
Many other studies have attempted to identify why energy use varies between countries.  
Kaufmann (1992) [158] conducted a time series analysis of energy intensity for a number 
of countries.  The variables incorporated were fuel shares, energy prices, and the type of 
economic activity.  Kaufmann and Richmond (2006a) [159] and Kaufmann and 
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Richmond (2006b) [160] are panel data analyses of 36 countries, considered over the 
period 1973-1997.  Variables considered in these analyses included energy consumption, 
fuel shares, the price of light fuel oil, and the price of electricity (considered but found to 
be not significant).  Models considered included quadratic, semi-log, and double-log.  
The present analysis is most directly inspired by the Kaufmann and Richmond work.  It 
includes additional low- and middle-income countries, climate data, and governance 
indices, and uses a more recent time period. 
Nilsson (1993) [161] reviewed energy intensity for 31 countries over the period 1950-
1988.  The study includes non-commercial energy for all of the countries considered, 
including developing countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, and 
Brazil.  While the Nilsson paper does not present a full panel data analysis, it does offer 
some suggestions as to the determinants of energy intensity.  The paper makes the 
surprising assertion that “electricity prices do not appear to affect electricity efficiency 
significantly in the household and service sectors.” 
Metcalf (2008) examines energy intensity among the various U.S. states over the period 
1970-2001, considering a number of variables including income, energy prices, heating 
degree days (HDD), cooling degree days (CDD), population growth rate, and capital-
labor ratio.  The price variable is the average weighted price of energy in a state, 
considering all major fuel resources and their shares.  Metcalf employs two different 
approaches for energy intensity, a fixed effects regression and a partial adjustment model 
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(which includes lagged effects).  It finds that heating degree-days have a much greater 
effect on energy intensity than do cooling degree-days. 
Gingrich, Kuskova, and Steinberger (2011) [162] use decomposition analysis to identify 
the drivers of differing rates of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions between Austria and 
Czechoslovakia over the period 1830-2000.  The authors consider fuel shares, income 
levels, economic structure, and other factors.   
Mansur, Mendelssohn, and Morrison (2008) [163] project future energy consumption 
changes the U.S. residential and commercial sectors in response to climate change.  This 
analysis takes into account building characteristics, including the ability of buildings to 
switch between fuels.  They find annual welfare losses of $57 billion by 2100 in response 
to a 5°C warming.  A lower warming of 2.5°C causes a welfare loss of $26 billion.  The 
reduction in heating costs from warmer winters is more than outweighed by the increase 
in cooling costs from warmer summers. 
Deschênes and Greenstone (2011) [164], assessing U.S. energy consumption, estimate 
that an increase in CDD of 100 (based on 65°F, so about a 10% increase in CDD) leads to 
1.1% increase in energy consumption.  They estimates that an increase in HDD (from 
65°F) of 100 leads to 0.5% increase in energy. 
Eskeland and Mideksa (2010) [165] examine energy consumption in Europe over 1995-
2005, and find a very small effect of temperature on energy consumption.  For larger 
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European countries, they took HDD and CDD from three larger cities to be representative 
of the country as a whole. 
Albuoy, Graf, Kellogg, and Wolff (2013) [166] assess how climate change will impact 
quality of life.  They use hedonic analysis to ascertain “willingness to pay” to avoid high 
temperatures.  They project a 1.6-2.0% loss of welfare in the U.S. from higher 
temperatures by 2100.   
Bessec and Fouquau (2008) [167] conduct a panel analysis of electricity demand in 15 
European countries over the period 1985-2000, using monthly data and assessing the 
impact of temperature.  It is not clear whether the monthly average temperatures for each 
country are derived from spatial averages or from population-weighted averages.  The 
analysis lacks monthly electricity prices and so omits price as a variable, but the authors 
note the price elasticity of demand to be low.  Bessec and Fouquau find that cold 
countries and warm countries differ not only in their threshold temperatures (inflection 
points at which electricity demand does not vary with temperature) but in their electricity 
consumption response to temperatures above or below those thresholds.   
Arooneungsawat and Auffhammer (2009) [168] examine the impact of climate change on 
California.  They provide a review of the literature, noting several forecasts of changes in 
energy demand due to climate change leading to more cooling degree days: 
 Cline (1992) [169] projected a 9-19% increase in U.S. electricity peak and base 
demand for 1-1.4ºC warming, and a 14-23% increase for 3.7ºC warming.   
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 Baxter and Calandri (1992) [170] forecast electricity consumption to increase by 
0.6% for warming of 0.6ºC, and by 2.6% for warming of 1.9ºC.  They forecast 
peak demand to increase by 1.8% and 3.7% for warming of 0.6 ºC and 1.9ºC, 
respectively.   
 Rosenthal et al. (1995) [171] projected heating savings to outweigh warming 
costs, for net savings of $5.5 billion for 1ºC warming.   
 Franco and Sanstad (2008) [172] use time series to find that a 2ºC warming 
corresponds to a 3.8% increase in energy consumption. 
Arooneungsawat and Auffhammer’s own analysis projects an 18-55% increase in 
electricity demand in California by 2100 due to climate change.  The higher value is 
associated with the A2 path of the IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
(SRES) [173], which has an average global temperature increase of about 3.4°C by 2100.  
The lower value is associated with the B1 path, which has an average global temperature 
increase of about 1.8°C. 
3.1.3.  Scope of Analysis 
The countries and years considered in this analysis were constrained by data availability, 
primarily the availability of energy prices for countries that are not members of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  Kaufmann and 
Richmond (2006a) specifically note the lack of energy price data for non-OECD 
countries as a limiting factor in their analysis, which covered the years 1973-1997.  For 
more recent years, the International Energy Agency provides such series for certain large 
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non-OECD countries (IEA 1997-2012) [174], although the non-OECD coverage has been 
discontinued as of 2012.  Additionally, IEA reproduces Latin American energy price 
series back to 1996 from the Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE).  Extending 
the price series back to 1990 would not be reasonable for this analysis, as two of the 
largest world economies underwent major changes in their boundaries in the early 1990s: 
the U.S.S.R. dissolved, and East and West Germany reunited.  The period 1995-2010 
contains fairly complete energy price series, multiple complete governance index series, 
and no significant changes in national boundaries for the major economies, aside from the 
independence of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999. 
Availability of IEA energy price data for non-OECD countries helped identify the 
countries to include.  The countries selected are shown in Table 20.  They represent most 
of the largest economies, spanning a range of sizes, per-capita incomes, climates, and 
geographical locations.  Of the top 30 economies in the world by PPP in 2010, using 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012) [175], the only ones not included in this analysis 
were Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Malaysia, for which IEA had no price data.  The 
countries represented include 18 OECD countries and 14 non-OECD countries. 
Table 20: Countries Included in Panel Data Analysis 
Argentina Australia Brazil Canada 
Chile China Colombia France 
Germany Greece India Indonesia 
Italy Japan South Korea Mexico 
Netherlands Pakistan Peru Poland 
Portugal Russia Romania South Africa 
Spain Switzerland Taiwan Thailand 
Turkey United Kingdom USA Venezuela 
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3.2.  Development of a Climate Series 
Quantifying the climatic conditions faced by residents of various countries can illustrate 
how much of a role temperature plays in determining energy consumption.  This partially 
explains differences in energy consumption between a temperate country and one subject 
to greater climatic extremes.  Determining the interactions between climate, income, and 
energy will improve forecasts of future energy consumption as countries change due to 
both economic development and global warming.  
As detailed in Section 2.1.5, heating in the early United States represented an astonishing 
amount of energy demand, likely over 100 GJ per capita per year from firewood.  
Heating remains an important component of U.S. energy use, representing 22.5% of 
residential and commercial energy consumption in 2010, while air conditioning is about 
15% (DOE 2012) [176].  Cooling is a significant driver of peak electricity demand in 
summer months, with air conditioning power demand on very hot days placing strains on 
power grids. 
Some countries have no need for air conditioning, while others have no need for space 
heating.  Most major countries require at least some of each.  There is no publicly-
available data series illustrating HDD and CDD by country and by year.  Baumert and 
Selman (2003) [177] provide population-weighted HDD and CDD for 171 countries, but 
these values are long-term averages.  As a result, they are not usable for a panel analysis.  
The National Climatic Data Center (NCDC, 2013) [178] provides population-weighted 
HDD and CDD for the U.S. for the years 1932-2012.  The values are based on a reference 
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temperature of 65°F (18.3°C).  Eurostat (2013a) [179] provides population-weighted 
HDD for the European Union and selected other countries for the years 1980-2009.  
Eurostat specifically notes that it has not yet developed a CDD series due to lack of 
agreement on a methodology.  This section develops HDD and CDD series for all 
countries in the world, weighted according to the population distribution within each 
country, and covering both heating and cooling to multiple reference points.  
3.2.1.  Climate Series Methodology 
Detailed heating and cooling demand can be calculated for a specific building based on 
hourly temperature profiles, humidity, wind speed, solar insolation, and other metrics.  
This analysis is simpler, employing heating degree days and cooling degree days 
calculated from average monthly temperature.  There is also a single series of cooling 
degree days derived from wet-bulb temperatures, which account for humidity.  The series 
are population-weighted because energy consumption is driven by the climate 
experienced by the population, not by the climatic conditions in uninhabited areas.   
There is no single reference point for a heating degree day or a cooling degree day.  
Temperatures commonly used for reference include 18°C and 65°F, which are 
approximately equal.  Other values may also be used, and studies such as Blázquez et al. 
(2012) [180] suggest that a “comfort window” of 15-22°C is more meaningful, with 
heating demand only increasing below that window and cooling demand only increasing 
above it.  Using such a standard creates HDD15 and CDD22, rather than HDD18 and 
CDD18.  Eurostat’s methodology for the European Union is to use 18°C as the reference 
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point for heating degree days, but only for days at or below 15°C.  That is, when 
temperatures are below 15°C, heating is applied to bring the temperature up to 18°C.  
Table 21 shows the results these methodologies would give for specified temperatures.  
Eurostat HDD values for any given month would be below HDD18 values (unless every 
day were below 15°C), but above HDD15 values. 
Table 21: Sample Results of Heating Degree Day Methodologies 
Temperature (°C) HDD15 HDD18 Eurostat 
13 2 5 5 
14 1 4 4 
15 0 3 3 
16 0 2 0 
17 0 1 0 
18 0 0 0 
Ideally, heating degree days are calculated from daily weather data.  This is most 
commonly done using the daily average temperature, Tavg = (Tmax + Tmin)/2.  It is possible 
to calculated HDD and CDD at an even finer scale using hourly temperature data, such 
that a desert location seeing swings from 50°F at night to 80°F in the day might have 
demand for both heating and cooling in the same day, whereas the daily Tavg of 65°F 
would suggest no climate-related energy demand.  The greater precision of hourly 
temperatures does not necessarily imply greater accuracy in calculating degree days as 
experienced by the population.  In the desert climate considered, the thermal mass of a 
building could result in the daytime heat being absorbed and re-radiated at night, 
resulting in neither heating nor cooling being required (this is the concept behind a 
Trombe wall), in which case the daily average would be more accurate.   
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For a global analysis, there are no long-term hourly records, nor are there daily records at 
sufficient resolution and coverage.  Weather stations provide daily records at the cost of 
comprehensive spatial coverage.  Climate reanalyses provide global spatial coverage at 
the cost of temporal precision, as they provide only monthly average temperatures. 
3.2.2.  Weather Stations  
The first attempt at modeling climate in this analysis used two sets of weather station 
data.  The Global Historical Climatology Network (GHCN) has data for thousands of 
weather stations, some going back more than a century.  The European Climate 
Assessment & Dataset (ECA) provides the E-OBS gridded dataset, covering Europe and 
the Mediterranean.  Daily weather station data provides greater temporal resolution than 
the monthly averages found in reanalyses.   
Unfortunately, many large geographical areas are sparsely covered by weather stations in 
these networks.  Argentina is the eighth-largest country in the world, with the second-
largest economy in South America, and so was included in this analysis.  No GHCN 
weather station in the Buenos Aires area had 13 or more years of data in the period 1995-
2010.  The closest one fitting these requirements was in Parana, over 200 miles away, and 
due to other data gaps this single station would represent 57% of the population of 
Argentina.  Many other countries outside of North America and Europe had coverage 
gaps at their largest population centers.  As a result, HDD and CDD series based on the 
GHCN and ECA series were replaced by those based on climate reanalyses. 
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3.2.3.  Climate Reanalyses 
Climate reanalyses are developed by a number of research centers, such as the National 
Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), the Climate Prediction Center (CPC), and the 
University of Delaware.  Reanalyses combine a number of sources and models to derive 
monthly average temperatures over a long period of time.  Thevenard (2011) [181] 
provides a methodology to convert monthly average temperature into heating and cooling 
degree days, as described below.  The University of Delaware (Matsuura and Willmott, 
2012) [182] and the Climate Prediction Center (Fan and van den Dool, 2008) [183] 
climate reanalyses provide temperatures over land at 0.5-degree resolution.  Both series 
are global grids using the WGS (1984) coordinate system.  Unfortunately, the series omit 
certain coastal areas, which are often densely populated.  The CPC series offers greater 
coverage of oceanic coastal regions and the Mediterranean, while the Delaware series 
offers greater coverage of some inland coastal areas (such as on the Caspian Sea or Lake 
Ladoga), as seen in Figure 40 and Figure 41.   
 
Figure 40: Coastal Coverage of Land-Only Temperature Series 
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Figure 41: Close-up of Mediterranean Region 
A comparison of the populations captured by the two series is shown in Figure 42, below.  
For most countries, the CPC series captures a greater share of the population, although 
there remain many small island nations that are partially or entirely missed.  The CPC 
series covers at least 95% of the 1995 population for all but one country considered in 
this analysis (it captures only 87.8% of the 1995 population of Peru).   
163 
 
 
Figure 42: 1995 Population (CPC % Captured) – (Delaware % Captured) 
 
3.2.3.1. Development of Hybrid Resolution Temperature Series 
The population data is at a resolution of 2.5 arc-minutes, as seen in Figure 43.  This 
precision encouraged using the finest resolution possible for climate data.  The finer-scale 
temperature series missed some of the coastal areas, as shown in Figure 41. The NCEP-
NCAR Reanalysis series based on Kalnay et al. (1996) [184] provides temperatures over 
both land and sea, but only at 2.5-degree resolution.  It is also a global grid using WGS 
(1984).  A sample map from this series is shown in Figure 44.  Combining the fine and 
coarse series covers the missing coastal areas.  For both the CPC series (shown in Figure 
45) and the NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis series, I developed maps of HDD and CDD.  
Where population data existed, the CPC series was used if it was non-null (if the series 
considered a given cell to be “land”), and if it was null (considered to be “water”) then a 
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resampled NCEP-NCAR series was used.  This gives a map with hybrid resolution, as 
seen in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 43: Population Density (2.5 arc-minutes resolution) 
 
 
Figure 44: 2010 CDD18, 2.5-degree resolution, land and water (NCEP-NCAR) 
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Figure 45: 2010 CDD18, 0.5-degree resolution, land only (CPC) 
 
 
Figure 46: 2010 CDD18, CPC/NCEP-NCAR Hybrid Resolution Map 
In total, there are five sets of HDD/CDD series: 
1. University of Delaware 
2. CPC 
3. NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis 
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4. University of Delaware/NCEP-NCAR Hybrid 
5. CPC/NCEP-NCAR Hybrid 
Each set consists of four series: 
1. HDD15 
2. HDD18 
3. CDD18 
4. CDD22 
A final set, using only the NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis, is CDD18 using wet-bulb 
temperature.  This is discussed in Section 3.2.5.  There are then twenty-one population-
weighted climate series developed.   
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3.2.4.  Conversion of Monthly Average Temperature to Degree Days 
Thevenard (2011) provides a means of converting monthly average temperatures into 
HDD and CDD.  The Thevenard approach builds on two prior studies, that of Erbs et al. 
(1983) [185] and that of Schoenau and Kehrig (1990) [186].  The Erbs et al. (1983) 
methodology requires σm, the standard deviation of the long-term average temperature for 
each month.  This, together with a specific month’s average temperature and the 
reference point (such as 18°C) can be used to calculate the HDD for that month.  From 
the climate reanalyses it is easy to calculate the long-term averages for each month, so it 
is not necessary to use the Erbs et al. (1983) method of estimating σm from annual 
variation in temperature.  Thevenard (20110 shows that the methodology of Schoenau 
and Kehrig (1990) is considerably more accurate.  This approach requires sd, the standard 
deviation of daily average temperature, which normally requires daily records.  
Thevenard (2011) provides a means to estimate sd from monthly average temperature and 
annual variation in temperature.  Thevenard (2011) shows that combining this estimate 
with the Schoenau and Kehrig (1990) model, while not as accurate as using actual sd 
values, is more accurate than using Erbs et al. (1983).   
The HDD and CDD calculations are shown below in Equation (10) through Equation 
(13), reproduced from Thevenard (2011). 
     √∑ ( ̅   ̅  )
   
     ⁄    (10) 
                 ̅              (11) 
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 ̅  is the monthly average temperature,  ̅   is the annual average temperature,  ̅  is the 
reference temperature, and N is the number of days in the month. 
How much of a difference does this calculation make?  What if HDD and CDD were 
instead calculated on the assumption that every day in the month is identical to the 
monthly average?  This might be done for speed or ease of calculation, or when other 
variables with an unknown distribution are used (such as humidity, for wet-bulb 
temperature).  Figure 47 through Figure 50 show the correlation between the “rough” 
approach, in which the monthly average is taken to represent all values in a month, and 
the “distributed” approach, which is based on Thevenard (2011).  The distributed 
methodology should find an equal or greater number of degree days in all cases.  Months 
with average temperature of 18.1°C will have no HDD18 under the “rough” calculation, 
but will have some under the Thevenard (2011) methodology, since the distribution 
results in some days within that month being below 18°C.  The graphs in Figure 47 
through Figure 50 represent the annual total HDD or CDD for some or all of the grid 
cells in the NCEP-NCAR raster (a grid of 73 by 144 cells, each cell representing a 2.5 
degree box) over the period 1995-2010.  The HDD graphs are limited to those with 7,000 
HDD or less in order to better show the performance of the two data series in the most 
populated regions.   
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Figure 47: Distributed versus Monthly Average HDD15, NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis 
 
 
Figure 48: Distributed versus Monthly Average HDD18, NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis 
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Figure 49: Distributed versus Monthly Average CDD18, NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis 
 
 
Figure 50: Distributed versus Monthly Average CDD22, NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis 
At high levels of HDD or CDD, very little accuracy is lost by using the rough method.  
The disparity is much larger at low levels of HDD or CDD, as seen in Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: CDD22 Missed by Rough Method compared to Thevenard (2011) 
The rough method registers zero CDD22 for all locations with 37 or fewer CDD22 per 
year under the distributed method, and for some locations with up to 141 CDD22.  The 
error remains above 10% for countries with up to 600 CDD22 per year, a category that 
includes the U.S., China, Mexico, and all EU countries.  For temperate countries, a 
methodology employing some sort of distribution, such as that of Thevenard (2011), is 
necessary.  
3.2.5.  Wet-Bulb Temperature 
Demand for cooling is driven by humidity as well as by temperature.  Some analyses of 
energy demand incorporate precipitation or humidity as variables.  Wet-bulb temperature 
is another metric that takes into account the humidity of the air and the potential for 
cooling by evaporation.  This metric is normally less than standard (“dry bulb”) 
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temperature, except when the relative humidity is 100% and evaporative cooling is not 
possible.  Stull (2011) [187] provides a relationship between dry-bulb temperature, 
humidity, and wet-bulb temperature, as shown in Equation (14):  
 (14) 
The monthly average wet-bulb temperatures are converted into degree-days, using the 
Thevenard (2011) methodology and a reference temperature of 18°C.  The resulting wet-
bulb CDD18 series is termed Cw18.  Due to data limitations, it suffers from coarser 
spatial resolution than the other series, as well as less accurate temporal characterization. 
The NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis provides monthly mean values of relative humidity.  As 
with the temperature series, humidity is presented on a 2.5 degree latitude by 2.5 degree 
longitude global grid (144 x 73).  Using a finer-scale temperature map with a coarser-
scale humidity map would give false precision; the most appropriate method was to use 
the NCEP-NCAR reanalysis for both temperature and humidity.   
The temporal error arises from the fact that the Thevenard (2011) equations were 
developed for dry-bulb temperature.  In this analysis, the same distribution is used for 
wet-bulb temperature.  Using only the monthly averages and not employing any sort of 
distribution would cause significant inaccuracy in months with low levels of HDD or 
CDD, as shown in Figure 51, above. 
 𝑤 =   𝑑  𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛[0.151977(𝑅 % + 8.313659).5]  +  𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛( 𝑑 +  𝑅 %)   𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛(𝑅 %   1.676331) 
+  0.00391838(𝑅 %)1.5  𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑛(0.023101  𝑅 %) –  4.686035 
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3.2.6.  Population  
The Gridded Population of the World (GPW) data set (GPW 2005) [188] is provided by 
the NASA Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center (SEDAC), hosted by the Center 
for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) at Columbia University.  
The GPW data set provides population counts at a resolution of 2.5 arc-minutes, with 
maps for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2010.  This analysis uses the UN-adjusted population 
count raster files, with linear interpolation to calculate values for the intervening years.  
SEDAC also provides country boundary files (also as grids), which enable calculation of 
HDD and CDD by country.  All maps use the WGS (1984) coordinate system. 
3.2.7.  Population Weighting of HDD and CDD 
The equations from Thevenard (2011) enable conversion of monthly average 
temperatures annual HDD18, CDD18, HDD15, and CDD22, as detailed in 3.2.4.  The 
next step is to multiply the HDD or CDD by the population count.  Because the 
population count and national boundary data are at a finer resolution (2.5 arc-minutes), 
the finer resolution is enforced on the product.  The product is then summed over each 
country, and that sum is divided by each country’s population, as shown in Equation (15).  
The result is the population-weighted average HDD and average CDD for each country, 
reflecting the “typical” climate experienced by a resident of that country.  In the case of 
the land-only temperature series, only the population captured by the temperature series 
is used in Equation (15), for both the numerator and denominator. 
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  (15) 
In Equation (15), WDD is the population-weighted degree days, DD is the un-weighted 
degree days, Pop is population, and i is all grid cells within the country covered by the 
temperature series. 
3.2.8.  Climate Results 
The hybrid series give priority to the finer-resolution land-based components, only 
resorting to the coarser component where the land-based series is null.  As a result, the 
hybrid series are similar to their component land-based series in countries where the land-
based series captures most of the population, and follow the coarser NCEP-NCAR 
reanalysis otherwise.  Appendix 2-1 provides tables of the results, comparing all five 
series for all four dry-bulb degree day metrics.  It also provides the Cw18 series. 
The coarser resolution of the NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis leads to higher HDD and lower 
CDD in some mountainous areas than do the finer-resolution series.  In an area of 
expansive mountains, a 2.5-degree box will contain a large amount of land at a higher 
altitude, whereas a 0.5-degree box can more accurately capture the fact that population 
centers are located in valleys.  The coarser version finds higher HDD and lower CDD in 
Nepal, Bhutan, Austria, and other countries.  An opposite effect occurs in the case of 
Andorra, since the Pyrenees are not as extensive as the Alps or Himalayas.  The inclusion 
of nearby low-altitude locations in the 2.5-degree cell results in fewer HDD and more 
CDD than are found by the finer-resolution series.   
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Figure 52: HDD15 by Data Source 
As seen in Figure 52, HDD15 shows good agreement between the various temperature 
series.  The line x = y (using the NCEP-NCAR HDD as the prediction for the CPC or 
Delaware HDD) fits the CPC series with an R
2
 of .963, and fits the Delaware series with 
an R
2
 of .945.  The NCEP-NCAR series differs by 500 or more HDD15 from both of the 
land-based series in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, 
Georgia, Lesotho, and Liechtenstein.   
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Figure 53: HDD18 by Data Source 
Figure 53 shows that the HDD18 series also finds close agreement between the three 
series.  The R
2
 value is .964 when using the NCEP-NCAR series as a predictor for the 
CPC series, and .948 using it to predict the Delaware series.  The NCEP-NCAR series 
differs from the land-based series by 500 or more HDD18 in the case of Argentina, 
Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chile, Ecuador, 
Georgia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Nepal, and Swaziland.   
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Figure 54: CDD18 by data source 
There is greater divergence in the three data series for CDD18 than there is for the 
heating degree day series.  The R
2
 value is .904 for CPC and .847 for Delaware.  Somalia 
has the greatest number of CDD18 in the CPC series, and is always at least 1150 more 
CDD18 than found by either of the other series.  This causes the blue “peak” seen at the 
top of Figure 54.  The island of Reunion has much lower CDD under the Delaware 
climate series than under the CPC or NCEP-NCAR series; this is the red cluster at the 
bottom center of the figure. Other major outliers include Bhutan, Bolivia, Hong Kong, 
Jamaica, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. 
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Figure 55: CDD22 by Data Source 
The blue “peak” in Figure 55 is the CPC series for Somalia, and the red cluster at the 
bottom is Reunion, as in Figure 54.  The major outliers are the same as for CDD18.  
Using the NCEP-NCAR CDD22 series to project the other series, the R
2
 value is .815 for 
the CPC series and .765 for the Delaware series.   
The wet-bulb series shows fewer cooling degree-days than the dry-bulb series of the 
same reference point.  The Cw18 series generally falls above CDD22 and below CDD18 
but in many arid regions it is below CDD22.  Relationships between the CDD series are 
shown in Figure 56 through Figure 58, below.  A dry region may have 4,000 or more 
CDD18 per year using the dry-bulb temperature, but fewer than 1,000 using the wet-bulb 
method. 
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Figure 56: CDD22 vs. CDD18, NCEP-NCAR 
 
At high levels of cooling degree days, CDD22 is often about 1450 less than CDD18.  
This is the case in warm environments in which the temperature is consistently above 
22°C in every month of the year (generally those with 2000 CDD18 or more).  In 
environments with fewer CDD, the difference is less in absolute terms, although it can be 
greater in relative terms.  This is seen in the left side of Figure 56, where for values of 
CDD18 less than 1000, many grid cells have values of CDD22 near zero. 
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Figure 57: Wet-Bulb vs. Dry-Bulb CDD18 
Figure 57 shows the great degree of scatter in Cw18 values.  They are consistently less 
than CDD18, since only at 100% humidity are the two values equal, and no area has 
100% humidity for the entire year.  While most areas have Cw18 relatively close to 
CDD18, arid areas have far fewer Cw18 than CDD18. 
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Figure 58: Wet-Bulb CDD18 vs. Dry-Bulb CDD22 
As noted, Cw18 usually has a higher value than CDD22, but in arid areas the converse is 
true.  These areas are shown by Figure 58.  The blue dots represent humid equatorial 
regions where Cw18 exceeds CDD22 by an average of 500 degree days or more.  
Countries in this group include Indonesia, Colombia, Ghana, Malaysia, Laos, and many 
island nations.  The red dots represent warm arid countries, where CDD22 exceeds Cw18 
by an average of 500 or more.  Countries in this group include Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan, Niger, and other countries in Africa and the Middle East.  
3.2.8.1. Comparison of Climate Series to European and U.S Values 
Analyses of population-weighted degree-days exist for the U.S. and Europe.  The 
European series, developed by Eurostat, is heating only.  The U.S. series, developed by 
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the National Climatic Data Center, is both heating and cooling.  The findings in this 
analysis are consistent with those findings. 
As noted, Eurostat’s reference temperature for heating and cooling differs from the ones 
selected here.  Nevertheless, the results are similar.  Comparisons for selected countries 
are shown in Figure 59 through Figure 63, below.  The Eurostat methodology usually 
finds slightly fewer heating degree days.  Of the 31 countries covered by both Eurostat 
and the CPC map, twenty have the CPC values higher in at least 13 of 15 years, whereas 
only six have the Eurostat values higher that often.  This is because, for temperatures 
between 15°C and 18°C, my approach identifies heating degree days whereas the 
Eurostat methodology does not.   
 
Figure 59: Comparison of HDD18 Results, United Kingdom 
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Figure 60: Comparison of HDD18 Results, Germany 
 
 
Figure 61: Comparison of HDD18 Results, France 
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Figure 62: Comparison of HDD18 Results, Italy 
 
 
Figure 63: Comparison of HDD18 Results, Spain 
 
Results for the US can be compared to those from NCDC (2012).  Once again, they are 
similar, but there are differences due to the data sources employed and the methodology 
used.  This study uses monthly average temperatures, whereas the NCDC series uses 
185 
 
actual daily values and so is presumably more accurate.  The spatial characterization also 
differs.  Nevertheless, all series are within 5-10% of the NCDC values for HDD, as 
shown in Figure 64.  The CDD values exhibit greater disparity, as shown in Figure 65.  
The CPC series is about 15% higher than the NCDC series, the Delaware series 5-10% 
higher, and the NCEP-NCAR series 0-5% lower. 
 
Figure 64: Comparison of HDD18 Series, United States 
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Figure 65: Comparison of CDD18 Series, United States 
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3.2.9.  Climate Data Series Conclusions 
This work develops a series of population-weighted heating and cooling degree days for 
231 countries over the period 1995-2010.  The analysis includes two different standards 
for heating, and three different standards for cooling, including a wet-bulb series that 
incorporates humidity.  The series can help explain differences in energy intensity 
between countries, and can aid in forecasting how countries’ energy consumption will 
change in response to climate change.  
The three temperature series generally offer similar results, but the CPC data series offers 
the highest-quality results.  It has a finer resolution than the NCEP-NCAR Reanalysis, 
and it covers more of the coastal areas (and therefore a larger fraction of most countries’ 
populations) than does the University of Delaware series.  The hybrid series using the 
coarser reanalysis to patch the missing coastal areas of the CPC series offers more 
complete coverage, as the CPC series by itself misses several small island countries.   
Comparison to established data series show generally consistent results.  Future work will 
explore the reasons for the differences, focusing on areas with extensive weather station 
coverage (such as the United States).  The wet-bulb series should prove especially useful 
for modeling energy demand, because the combination of heat and humidity drives 
demand for air conditioning.  The wet-bulb series is not significantly superior at 
predicting energy demand in the following analysis, although that may be due to the 
relatively small sample size. 
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The series HDD15, HDD18, CDD18, CDD22, and Cw18 are independent variables in 
the following panel analysis.  All are from the hybrid series based on the CPC series, 
using NCEP-NCAR to patch missing coastal areas.  All of the degree day series are 
expected to increase energy intensity.  In Section 3.6.1, out-of-sample forecasts test 
which heating degree day series and which cooling degree day series allow for the most 
accurate predictions.   
3.3.  Energy Prices 
It is a basic tenet of economics that the price of a good influences the amount of it that is 
consumed.  Energy prices are essential to developing a model of energy intensity.  
Understanding how prices affect energy intensity can provide insight into policies that 
affect energy prices, such as carbon taxes.   
There are numerous challenges to developing satisfactory price series, particularly for 
non-OECD countries.  The most complete series is Energy Prices and Taxes (IEA 1997-
2012).  These reports contain price series for a number of non-OECD countries, most 
often the major economies in this group but also including others of interest, such as 
prospective OECD members.  The reports include price information from the Latin 
American Energy Organization (OLADE) beginning with data for the year 1996.  IEA 
has had to discontinue its coverage of non-OECD energy prices as of 2012, so a panel 
data analysis seeking to include major South American economies is limited to the period 
1996-2011.  Additional sources enable extension of the price series back to 1995, giving 
a period of 1995-2010 for this analysis.   
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No single number represents energy prices.  With sufficient data, it is possible to divide 
the total expenditures on energy in a country by the energy units consumed, and arrive at 
an aggregate cost of energy in terms such as dollars per BTU.  This approach does not 
account for energy quality.  Energy quality is the ability of an energy resource to perform 
useful work.  It is a subjective term and depends on the application.  For transportation, 
petroleum is generally seen as the highest-quality resource because of its energy density.  
Natural gas can be converted to electricity at a higher efficiency than petroleum can and 
so is a higher-quality fuel for that application.  To correct for energy quality, an analysis 
might use a composite index, weighting the prices of the energy resources according to 
their perceived quality.  Energy price series are not comprehensive enough to use such an 
approach for all of the countries selected.  In many countries, IEA price series over only a 
few energy resources, and these might not be the same resources as those recorded for 
another country.  Reasonably complete series exist for industrial electricity and for diesel 
fuel.  The panel data analysis uses the following price series: 
Price of Diesel Fuel (PDIESEL).  This is the average price of commercial diesel fuel per 
100 litres, in PPP (2005 international dollars).  It is expected to decrease energy intensity.   
Price of Industrial Electricity (PELEC).  This is the average price of industrial electricity 
per MWh, in PPP (2005 international dollars).  It is expected to decrease intensity.   
Availability of non-OECD energy prices was the limiting factor in this analysis for the 
period considered, the countries considered, and the specific energy types considered.   
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3.3.1.  Range of Energy Resources 
The IEA provides price data for the following energy resources: 
 High-sulfur fuel oil 
 Low-sulfur fuel oil 
 Heavy fuel oil for electricity generation 
 Light fuel oil for industry 
 Light fuel oil for households 
 Automotive diesel oil for commercial use 
 Automotive diesel oil for non-commercial use 
 Premium leaded (or lead-replacement) gasoline 
 Regular unleaded gasoline 
 Premium unleaded gasoline (98 RON) 
 Premium unleaded gasoline (95 RON) 
 Automotive LPG for commercial use 
 Automotive LPG for non-commercial use 
 Natural gas for industry 
 Natural gas for electricity generation 
 Natural gas for households 
 Steam coal for industry 
 Steam coal for electricity generation 
 Coking coal for industry 
191 
 
 Electricity for industry 
 Electricity for households 
Some of these resources, such as leaded gasoline, are no longer widely in use.  Others, 
such as steam coal for industry, represent a small fraction of most countries’ energy 
consumption and so are less likely to be significant determinants of a country’s energy 
demand.  Prices for resources used to generate electricity are not necessary if end-use 
electricity price is also included as a variable.  Appendix 2-2 shows the availability of 
data by country for a selection of energy resources. 
Certain energy price series can be derived from others with reasonable accuracy.  For 
example, the price of regular unleaded gasoline is strongly correlated with that of 
premium unleaded gasoline.  Industrial electricity and household electricity are not so 
correlated, with cross-subsidization common, and pricing structures applying differently 
to the two consumer classes. 
3.3.2.  Diesel Fuel 
Commercial diesel fuel is generally close in price to non-commercial diesel fuel, as seen 
in a comparison of 15 OECD countries in Figure 66, below.  Most countries considered 
in this analysis have a complete price series for one or the other.  Some have a data series 
that alternates between the two categories; although Russia has only nine values for 
commercial diesel and ten for non-commercial, it has fifteen values once a relationship is 
established.   
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Figure 66: Commercial and Non-Commercial Diesel Fuel Price, 1995-2010 
Fuel oils are a less complete time series, being particularly deficient in China and Russia 
compared to the diesel fuel series.  Gasoline series are reasonably complete, and could be 
used in lieu of the diesel series.  Diesel fuel usually represents a greater share of 
consumption in developing countries, while gasoline is more in demand in developed 
countries.  The prices of the two products tend to be correlated, although some deviation 
does occur. 
3.3.3.  Electricity Prices 
Developing an electricity price series requires accounting for the electricity price 
structures, which can take many forms.  Any of the following may be included: 
 A base service charge; 
 A capacity or peak demand charge based on the maximum power demanded; 
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 Taxes, fees, and other administrative levies; and,  
 A cost per unit of electricity consumed, which itself has several variations: 
o Uniform rate for all levels of consumption; 
o Increasing rate as consumption increases; 
o Declining rate as consumption increases; and, 
o Varying rate by time of day. 
A national statistic for “average end-user cost of industrial electricity” might take the 
aggregate total of revenue and taxes from industrial customers, and divide by the amount 
of electricity supplied (in kilowatt-hours).  If there is a declining rate, the marginal rate 
seen by industrial electricity user would be lower than the average end-user cost, and so 
one would expect to see greater consumption of electricity than the average rate would 
suggest.  Other cost structures can also impact the energy demand; high peak demand 
charges for residential customers, or time-of-use pricing, might serve to limit the use of 
household air conditioning.  A comprehensive energy model of a country can indicate the 
likely relationship between energy prices and energy demand, taking into account the 
distribution of pricing structures, user types, and demand curves.  I did not attempt to 
conduct comprehensive energy models of all 32 countries.  Rather, I used the average 
end-user cost of electricity, as determined by IEA, as an input to the model.  If it were to 
prove statistically significant, then the average end-user cost would still have some 
explanatory power over energy intensity, even if the end-user marginal cost would have 
been better. 
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The complications of price structures mean that separate analyses do not always find 
identical values.  Supplementing the incomplete IEA series with additional resources, as 
detailed in Appendix 2-2, carries the risk of variation in apparent prices due to 
methodology changes.  Limiting the analysis to countries with complete IEA price series 
for industrial electricity would have greatly reduced the number of countries, the range of 
economic levels considered, and the period of years considered.   
3.3.4.  Seasonality of IEA Data Series 
Energy Prices and Taxes (IEA 1997-2012) states that it reflects quarterly data, but close 
examination shows the values for most prices are virtually unchanged from one issue to 
the next.  The report for the first quarter of 2011 shows nearly identical prices to the 
reports for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 2011.  The significant and known 
seasonality in fuels such as heating oil would imply greater variation.  As this is not the 
case, the IEA series are taken to be annual values.  What differences there are from one 
IEA report to the next are principally the results of revisions.  These adjustments are 
generally minor.  The most recent publication is used wherever possible.   
3.3.5.  Purchasing Power Parity 
Energy prices expressed in terms or purchasing power parity (PPP), rather than using 
domestic currencies converted at official exchange rates, more accurately reflect the 
decision to substitute energy for other inputs to production in that country.  Price series 
using PPP account for this, giving an approximate price of energy relative to other inputs 
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to production.  The IEA series Energy Prices and Taxes employs a series of annual 
modifiers to convert OECD national currencies to current PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars.  
Energy Prices and Taxes does not include PPP values for non-OECD countries.  For 
those, I created adjustments using the ratio of constant-dollar PPP GDP to current-dollar 
nominal GDP from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2012).  The adjustments are included in 
Appendix 2-2. 
3.4.  Other Variables 
3.4.1.  Gross Domestic Product 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the denominator of energy intensity, as well as an 
independent variable.  It includes the value of all goods and services produced within a 
country’s borders.  When comparing multiple countries, GDP may be converted at the 
official exchange rate or adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP).  The dollars may be 
current (nominal) or constant (adjusted for inflation, also known as real).  Heston, 
Summers, and Aten (2012) provide GDP per capita (GDP).  The series used is in PPP 
(2005 dollars, chained method).  This variable is expected to decrease energy intensity.  
Using energy intensity as the dependent variable means that all independent variables 
have their effect on energy consumption through their product with GDP.  Including 
GDP as an independent variable for energy intensity is identical to adding a quadratic 
term for energy consumption.  Equation (16) shows energy intensity as the dependent 
variable, and Equation (17) shows energy consumption as the dependent variable, where 
X1 and X2 are other independent variables.   
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Estimates of GDP do not include the informal economy.  This includes illegal activities 
such as the drug trade or wildlife poaching, but also labor markets such as babysitting, 
lawn care, and dog-walking.  Estimates of GDP also omit subsistence production and 
barter, which can comprise a large share of the economy in low-income countries.  
Blunch et al. (2001) [189] found that the informal sector represented about 5-20 percent 
of non-agricultural employment in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 30-60 percent in 
Latin America and North Africa, and as high as 60-80 percent in parts of Southeast Asia 
and sub-Saharan Africa.  In some countries, such as Indonesia and the Philippines, 
Blunch et al. found the informal labor market to constitute a higher share of non-
agricultural GDP than its share of non-agricultural labor force, meaning that informal 
workers were receiving higher-than-average earnings.  The uncertainty regarding these 
estimates should be considered to be fairly high.  There is no adequate time series for the 
level of informal economic activity.  Ultimately, I can only ascertain the effect of energy 
prices, climate, and governance on reported economic activity.   
3.4.2.  Governance 
Governance indicators may also influence energy intensity.  A well-known case study, 
described in Cornillie and Fankhauser (2002) [190] and many others, is that of the 
European experience over the period 1990-2010.  The centrally planned economies of 
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Eastern Europe had generally high energy intensity, which rapidly decreased as these 
countries transitioned to market economies.  This is shown in Figure 67. 
 
Figure 67: Energy Intensity in Selected European Countries, 1990-2010 
Source: EIA (2013a) 
The economic inefficiencies of central planning led GDP to be lower for any given 
amount of inputs.  It was lower for a given amount of labor, for a given amount of 
capital, and for a given amount of materials and energy.  This translates into higher 
energy intensity.  Central planning is not the only sort of economic inefficiency present.  
Corruption in all its forms can act as a drag on GDP, so a country with poor governance 
and high corruption would be expected to have a lower GDP for any given level of inputs 
than would a country with good governance.  Governance indices are only available for 
relatively recent years.  The Freedom in the World index (Freedom House, 2013) [191] 
begins in 1972, and the Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International, 2013) 
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[192], or CPI, begins in 1995.  The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) 
series begins in 1996 but is biennial until 2002, and so was not employed. 
The CPI series is limited geographically, covering only 41 countries in 1995.  Energy 
prices are also limited in their coverage, so the CPI series do not present an additional 
limitation.  Of the 512 data points (32 countries times 16 years), only eight are missing.  
CPI values show only minor changes from year to year in most cases.  Therefore, missing 
values at the beginning of the time period (Peru 1995-1997, Poland 1995, Romania 1995-
1996) were assigned values from the nearest years with data.  Missing values in the 
middle of a series (Pakistan 2000) were interpolated.  The Freedom House series had no 
missing values.  The governance series provided the following two variables: 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).  The Corruption Perceptions Index uses a scale 
from 1 to 10, where 10 is least corrupt.  This is expected to have a negative impact on 
energy intensity. 
Freedom House (FH).  Freedom House uses a ranking from 1 to 7, where 1 is “most 
free.”  This is the opposite “direction” of the CPI index.  The series is expected to have a 
positive impact on energy intensity.   
Governance indicators rely on estimates and perceptions, not absolute truths.  Still, even 
the perception of corruption impacts a country’s economic performance.  In a country 
with a perception of high corruption, capital will tend to be more expensive, and so 
energy and other inputs to production will play a larger role.   
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3.4.3.  Energy Intensity 
Energy Intensity (EINT).  The dependent variable in this analysis is the energy 
consumption per capita divided by the GDP per capita.  It is expressed in MJ per dollar of 
GDP (2005 international dollars).  Energy consumption per capita is the total energy 
consumed in a country divided by the population.  Total energy consumption is based on 
Energy Information Administration (2013a) with a variant methodology.  Non-fossil 
electricity is converted at its energy content (3412 BTU/kWh), not the heat rate.  Biofuels 
are included, with EIA data for 2000-2010, and an assumption that in 1995-1999 biofuels 
exist in the same ratio to petroleum consumption as in 2000.  Biomass not used for 
biofuels or electricity generation (such as firewood used for heating) is excluded.  
Electricity imports and exports are included, and are treated as primary energy.  Tables of 
total energy consumption by country and energy consumption per capita by country are 
included in Appendix 2-2. 
3.4.4.  Fuel Shares 
Energy resources differ in their ability to do work.  One MJ of coal generally cannot 
produce as many goods and services as one MJ of natural gas.  Adding series of fuel 
shares can quantify this impact.  If a country heavily reliant on oil generates more GDP 
from a given amount of energy than a country heavily reliant on coal, the conclusion is 
that oil is a higher-quality energy resource than coal is.  
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I developed four series: PRIMARY, COAL, OIL, and GAS.  These are the percentages 
of energy consumed that are primary electricity (nuclear and renewable, including 
hydropower), coal, oil, and gas.  Biofuels are included in the total, but do not have a share 
series, so some countries will have these shares sum to slightly less than 100%.  Imports 
and exports are not included in the total for this calculation, as doing so causes errors for 
countries with high levels of electricity exports.  PRIMARY should decrease energy 
intensity.  The method of counting hydropower at its energy content (as discussed below) 
means that a country may seem to be using relatively little energy for electricity 
generation, even though hydropower is often inexpensive.  A negative sign on 
PRIMARY explains this effect.  COAL would likely have a positive coefficient, since 
countries generally need a larger energy content of coal to produce a good (such as a 
kilowatt-hour of electricity).  Portugal had GAS share of 0.0 in 1995 and 1996, so 
ln(GAS) cannot be determined for those years.  It is assigned the 1997 value so that the 
ln(GAS) series can be used in the semi-log and log-log analyses.  These series are shown 
in Appendix 2-2.  The impact of biofuels is very minor, so COAL is nearly equal to 100 
minus the total of the other three share series.  Including COAL is therefore unnecessary 
3.4.5.  Methodological Issues for Energy Series 
Developing series of energy consumption requires several assumptions, and a number of 
problems repeatedly appear.  The first issue is the treatment of non-fossil electricity.  
Resources that generate electricity without fossil fuels include hydroelectric power, wind 
turbines, wave and tidal power, and photovoltaic systems.  These are primary electricity.  
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Should hydroelectric power be converted on the basis of the fossil fuels that would be 
needed to replace it, it will appear larger in the energy portfolio of a country.  As 
discussed in Section 2.1.4, Smil (2008) advises that this tends to the importance of 
hydropower, as it is likely that countries heavily dependent on hydropower would not use 
so much electricity if they had to use fossil fuels to generate it.  On the other hand, if 
hydropower is converted on the basis of electricity’s energy equivalent, then it will 
appear quite small in the energy portfolio of a country, even though it is economically 
very important.  Countries heavily dependent on hydropower appear to use less energy 
than others, even though their electricity is very inexpensive!  And, during a drought, 
hydropower is in fact replaced by consumption of fossil fuels at the heat rate, not the 
energy content.  For this analysis, all non-fossil electricity is converted at the energy 
content.  The inclusion of the PRIMARY term addresses this problem.  If the analysis 
were to use the EIA methodology (converting hydropower at the fossil fuel heat rate), the 
PRIMARY coefficient would be of smaller magnitude. 
Most energy consumption series also suffer from the omission of non-commercial energy 
resources.  Firewood and other gathered biomass represent is the largest such resource.  
These fuels are used for heating and cooking.  Non-commercial biomass can account for 
50% or more of the total energy consumed in a developing economy.  Nilsson (1993) 
estimated the fraction of non-commercial energy for 31 countries in 1970 and 1985, 
estimating the 1985 fraction to be 60% for Nigeria, 49% for Indonesia, 42% for Thailand, 
and 28% for India.  Smil (2004, 28) [193] estimated the fraction for China to be 15 per 
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cent in the mid-1990s, with India and Indonesia at 30 per cent and Brazil at 25 per cent.  
These are estimates do not represent complete time series.   
Kander et al. (2007) showed that when non-commercial energy is considered over the 
200-year history of developed nations such as Sweden, the overall pattern is one of 
continual decline in energy intensity.  Energy intensity does not necessarily increase 
significantly during the transition to industrialization, as many pre-industrial societies 
used copious amounts of firewood.  This is true as well for the USA, as seen in Section 
2.1.5.  Firewood is the main driver of this difference, although the analyses also look at 
energy resources such as wind, water, and animal muscle power. 
The existing figures for energy intensity in developing nations to some degree 
underestimate the actual energy intensity.  This effect is most pronounced in forested 
countries with fairly low population densities or low urbanization. 
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3.5.  Panel Data Analysis Methodology 
3.5.1.  Integrated Order of Variables 
Cointegration is a powerful tool in analysis of time series.  It can be used to establish that 
time series have a statistically significant long-run relationship.  Two or more time series 
are cointegrated if they share a common stochastic trend.  Consider a dependent variable 
Y and an independent variable X.  If the variables are cointegrated, then given a certain 
coefficient β, the equation Y = α+ β*X + ϕ has an error term ϕ that is random noise, with 
no stochastic trend of its own.  If a series contains a stochastic trend (it is “non-
stationary”), and its first derivative of a series is stationary or “I(0)” (it has no stochastic 
trend), then the original series is of Integrated Order 1, or “I(1).”  I tested all variables 
with the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) [194] test to determine their order of integration.  
Results are shown in Table 22, below. 
Table 22: Integrated Order of Variables. 
Variable Z(tbar) Significance Order 
EPERCAP 1.82 0.965 I(1) 
EINT 0.05 0.521 I(1) 
CPI -3.31 0.000 I(0) 
GDP 7.04 1.000 I(1) 
HDD15 -10.83 0.000 I(0) 
HDD18 -10.94 0.000 I(0) 
CDD18 -10.45 0.000 I(0) 
CW18 -11.76 0.000 I(0) 
CDD22 -10.21 0.000 I(0) 
PDIESEL -0.41 0.341 I(1) 
PELEC 0.20 0.578 I(1) 
PRIMARY -0.33 0.370 I(1) 
COAL -3.07 0.001 I(0) 
OIL 0.78 0.782 I(1) 
GAS 3.80 1.000 I(1) 
FH -0.68 0.249 I(1) 
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The COAL series was I(0) while all of the other share series were I(1).  Further 
investigation reveals that oil and gas are essentially competing with each other for energy 
shares over the time period considered.  Although OIL is I(1), and GAS is I(1), the share 
of oil and gas combined is I(0).  In most of the selected countries, OIL decreases over the 
period 1995-2010, while GAS increases.  COAL shows little overall trend.  The ten 
countries with the heaviest coal dependence are shown in Figure 68, below.  While 
Poland and Greece have declining trends over time, and Taiwan has an increasing trend, 
most of the others are fairly stable. 
 
Figure 68: Coal Shares for Selected Countries, 1995-2010 
Source: EIA (2013a) 
The Freedom House series is I(1), but several countries show no variation over the period 
considered.  As a result, including that series leads to non-invertible matrices.  It cannot 
be used to establish “within-group” variation.  Therefore it is omitted.  The Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) series is I(0) and cannot be considered for cointegration. 
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3.5.2.  Relationships 
I tested the following relationships between the I(1) variables.  The relationships are 
shown in Table 23, below.   
1. Linear 
EINT = α + β1GDP + β2PDIESEL+ β3PELEC+ β4PRIMARY+ β5OIL+ β6GAS 
2. Price-Log 
EINT = α + β1GDP + β2ln(PDIESEL)+ β3ln(PELEC)+ β4PRIMARY+ β5OIL+ β6GAS 
3. Semi-Log 
EINT = α + β1GDP + β2ln(PDIESEL)+ β3ln(PELEC)+ β4ln(PRIMARY)+ β5ln(OIL)+ 
β6ln(GAS) 
4. Log-Log 
ln(EINT) = α + β1ln(GDP) + β2ln(PDIESEL)+ β3ln(PELEC)+ β4ln(PRIMARY)+ 
β5ln(OIL)+ β6ln(GAS) 
 
Table 23: Cointegration Model Specifications. 
Model Dependent Independent 
1 EINT GDP PDIESEL PELEC PRIMARY OIL GAS 
2 EINT GDP ln(PDIESEL) ln(PELEC) PRIMARY OIL GAS 
3 EINT ln(GDP) ln(PDIESEL) ln(PELEC) ln(PRIMARY) ln(OIL) ln(GAS) 
4 ln(EINT) ln(GDP) ln(PDIESEL) ln(PELEC) ln(PRIMARY) ln(OIL) ln(GAS) 
 
3.5.3.  Panel Cointegration 
The Pedroni (2004) [195] tests assess the presence of panel cointegration.  The null is that 
the series do not cointegrate.  To reject the null, the panel-v statistic must be large and 
positive, while the rho and t-statistics (referred to as pp-stat in the function) must be large 
and negative.  Of these criteria, only the t-statistic (pp-stat) is met by the data series, as 
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seen in Table 24, below.  Therefore, the series do not cointegrate.  This likely a result of a 
low T, with only 16 observations.  
The Westerlund (2008) [196] cointegration test also evaluates panel data.  This test 
similarly failed to establish cointegration.   
Table 24: Panel Cointegration Results. 
Variable {1} t-stat {2} t-stat {3} t-stat {4} t-stat 
         
lnGDP     -3.176 -35.640 -0.421 -33.277 
GDP 0.000 -30.932 0.000 -31.543     
lnPDIESEL   -0.074 -3.211 -0.057 -1.357 0.005 -0.722 
PDIESEL -0.002 -5.520       
lnPELEC   -0.194 -6.630 -0.232 -6.790 -0.039 -7.456 
PELEC -0.006 -6.681       
lnPRIMARY     -1.672 -24.131 -0.202 -23.734 
PRIMARY -0.273 -19.651 -0.335 -19.931     
lnOIL     1.874 3.818 0.334 4.800 
OIL 0.053 3.664 0.044 3.144     
lnGAS     1.953 2.027 0.239 2.394 
GAS 0.013 2.211 0.012 1.404     
panel v-stat -1.77 -1.77 -1.69 -1.69 -1.56 -1.56 -1.50 -1.50 
panel rho-stat 4.69 4.69 4.81 4.81 4.68 4.68 4.69 4.69 
panel pp-stat -6.95 -6.95 -6.33 -6.33 -5.86 -5.86 -5.49 -5.49 
panel adf-stat -2.86 -2.86 -2.74 -2.74 -4.85 -4.85 -4.06 -4.06 
         
group rho-stat 6.82 6.82 6.94 6.94 6.81 6.81 6.83 6.83 
group pp-stat -10.34 -10.34 -9.96 -9.96 -10.36 -10.36 -9.52 -9.52 
group adf-stat -3.87 -3.87 -3.50 -3.50 -6.85 -6.85 -5.07 -5.07 
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3.5.4.  Non-Cointegrated Panel Data Estimation 
Since the series do not cointegrate, the I(0) variables can be used in an evaluation of the 
relationships without cointegration.  The relationships tested are shown in Table 25.  
Using non-cointegrating series does raise the risk of spurious correlations.  However, the 
energy price series for non-OECD countries is too short to establish cointegration.   
Table 25: Non-Cointegrating Model Specifications. 
Model Dependent Independent 
1 EINT GDP PDIESEL PRIMARY OIL GAS 
   PELEC HDD CDD CPI 
       
2 EINT GDP ln(PDIESEL) PRIMARY OIL GAS 
   ln(PELEC) HDD CDD CPI 
       
3 EINT ln(GDP) ln(PDIESEL) ln(PRIMARY) ln(OIL) ln(GAS) 
   ln(PELEC) ln(HDD) ln(CDD) ln(CPI) 
       
4 ln(EINT) ln(GDP) ln(PDIESEL) ln(PRIMARY) ln(OIL) ln(GAS) 
   ln(PELEC) ln(HDD) ln(CDD) ln(CPI) 
The three general structures for panel data are Pooled OLS, Fixed Effects, and Random 
Coefficients.  Results of the Chow (1960) [197] tests used to compare these are presented 
in Table 28, below.  The tests themselves are shown in Equations (18) and (19): 
    
 (         )  (   )(   ) 
          (   ) 
   (18) 
    
 (         )  (   )( ) 
          (   ) 
   (19) 
Where N is the number of countries (32), T is the number of observations per country 
(16), K is the number of parameters estimated, RSS1 is the Residual Sum of Squares from 
Random Coefficients, RSS2 is the Residual Sum of Squares from Fixed Effects, and RSS3 
is the Residual Sum of Squares from Pooled OLS.  Results are distributed as F statistics 
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with degrees of freedom [(N-1)(K+1),NT-N(K+1)] for F3 and [(N-1)(K),(NT-N(K+1))] 
for F2. 
I tested two types of HDD (HDD15 and HDD18), and three types of CDD (CDD18, 
CDD22, and Cw18).  There were four possible relationships between the variables, as 
seen in Table 25, above.  
An out-of-sample forecast compares the accuracy of the models.  The data series 
consisted of 512 points (32 countries over 16 years).  The out-of-sample forecast involves 
removing one data point for the dependent variable, estimating a relationship using a 
multivariate linear regression on the remaining 511 points (Pooled OLS), forecasting the 
missing point, and then calculating the difference from the actual value.  This procedure 
is then repeated for 512 omissions.  The out-of-sample forecasts are evaluated as 
described in Section 3.6.  
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3.6.  Panel Data Analysis Results 
3.6.1.  Climate Series 
In direct comparisons, the HDD15 series performed better than the HDD18 series for 
models {1} and {2}.  There was no statistically significant difference in the heating 
degree day series for models {3} and {4}.  The CDD18 series proved superior to the 
Cw18 series and the CDD22 series for models {1} and {2}, and no model was superior 
for models {3} and {4}.  Forecast accuracy is compared using the S2a and S3a test 
statistics from Diebold and Mariano (1995) [198].  These are generated using equations 
(20) through (22). 
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Where N is the number of observations being compared, eit is the out-of-sample forecast 
error for the omitted observation t for model i, and I+ is a function that equals 1 if dt is 
positive, or 0 otherwise.  These test statistics follow a t-distribution with degrees of 
freedom equal to N-1 (in this case, 511).  The 5% critical threshold is 1.96.  Values 
exceeding the critical threshold are in bold in Table 26, below.  A large negative value 
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indicates that the first series allows for better out-of-sample forecasts, and a large positive 
value indicates that the second series allows for better out-of-sample forecasts.  
Table 26: Predictive Accuracy Tests for Climate Series.  
Series Compared Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
First  Second S2a S3a S2a S3a S2a S3a S2a S3a 
HDD15 HDD18 -2.30 -3.85 -3.54 -5.08 0.71 -0.60 1.06 -0.86 
CDD18 CDD22 -5.04 -5.18 -4.68 -4.97 -1.41 -1.04 -0.27 0.36 
CDD18 Cw18 -4.60 -5.24 -2.30 -3.52 -2.74 -0.63 -1.24 0.60 
Cw18 CDD22 3.45 4.24 -0.44 1.34 2.56 0.19 0.62 -1.21 
3.6.2.  Selection of Model 
As noted in Section 3.5.4, four different relationships are considered between the 
variables.  Because HDD15 and CDD18 proved to be the most accurate in Section 3.6.1 
and were never significantly inferior to other temperature series regardless of the model 
used, those climate series were used in the comparison of the various models.  The out-
of-sample forecast tests find Models {2} and {4} to be significantly superior to Model 
{3}, but otherwise do not establish any model as superior.  Models {1} (linear), {2} 
(price-log), and {4} (log-log) are statistically equivalent in out-of-sample forecast 
accuracy.  Results are shown in Table 27, with bolded values exceeding the critical value. 
Table 27: Predictive Accuracy Tests, Selection of Model 
  
HDD15/CDD22 
First Model Second Model S2a S3a 
1 2 1.14905 1.58189 
1 3 -1.59099 -1.93933 
1 4 1.5026 1.48476 
2 3 -1.94454 -2.62283 
2 4 1.59099 0.95935 
3 4 6.0988 6.44441 
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One set of out-of-sample forecast tests establishes that, regardless of model, the degree 
day series allowing for the greatest accuracy are HDD15 and CDD18, as shown in Table 
26.  A second set of tests establishes that, given these climate series, the most accurate 
models are {1}, {2}, and {4}, with no statistically significant difference between them.  
Table 28 shows the results of the Pooled OLS regression using those three models, with 
the selected climate series. 
Table 28: Pooled OLS Results 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 
Constant 20.0 33.1 6.73 
LNGDP   -1.47E-02*** 
GDP -1.03E-04 -1.04E-04  
LNPDIESEL  -1.1 -1.87E-01 
PDIESEL -2.37E-02   
LNPELEC  -3.1 -1.55E-01 
PELEC -2.25E-02   
LNPRIMARY   -6.73E-02 
PRIMARY -1.19E-02 -1.42E-02  
LNOIL   -7.75E-01 
OIL -1.40E-02 -1.11E-02  
LNGAS   -1.48E-02*** 
GAS -2.64E-02 -2.85E-02  
HDD15 1.36E-03 1.56E-03  
LNHDD15   4.64E-03*** 
CDD18 9.21E-04 7.61E-04  
LNCDD18   1.69E-02*** 
CPI -1.28E-01** -1.60E-01*  
LNCPI   -1.30E-01 
Centered R^2 .766 .763 .699 
SSR 1518.6 1536.5 25.6 
Regression F(9,502) 182.2 179.5 129.4 
Random Coeff SSR 7.982 8.014 .10828 
OLS vs. Random Coeff F(310,192) 117.2 118.1 145.8 
Fixed Effects vs. Random Coeff F(279, 192) 22.1 22.4 11.9 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 10% level. 
*** Not significant 
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The following relationships are statistically significant at the 1% level for Model {1} and 
Model {2}: 
 Increasing income is correlated with decreasing energy intensity.   
 Higher energy prices are correlated with decreasing energy intensity. 
 Shares of primary electricity, oil, and gas are correlated with decreasing energy 
intensity (as all of these decrease the use of coal, which as a lower-quality 
resource generally requires more energy input per unit of GDP).   
 Heating and cooling demand are correlated with increased energy intensity.   
The significance of the CPI series depends on the climate series.  If using the 
combination of HDD15 and CDD18, a higher score on the Corruption Perceptions Index 
(meaning less corruption) is weakly correlated with decreased energy intensity.  In Model 
{1}, the relationship is significant at the 10% level; it is stronger if employing the other 
CDD series, but that results in a lower F-value for the regression, and poorer performance 
on the out-of-sample forecast tests.  The CPI score is more closely correlated with 
reduced energy intensity in Model {2}.  It is significant at the 5% level if using CDD18, 
at the 2% level if using Cw18, and at the 1% level if using CDD22. 
Model {4}, the log-log equation, has a much lower F-statistic, but does comparably well 
to the other models in the out-of-sample forecast.  It finds that GDP per capita, share of 
natural gas, and degree days are not significant predictors of energy intensity.  Only 
energy prices, shares of primary electricity and oil, and governance are significant.  If 
Cw18 is used, then HDD15 and Cw18 are significant at the 1% level, while CPI 
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significance falls to 10%.  If CDD22 is used, HDD remains not significant, and CDD22 is 
significant at the 10% level. 
3.6.3.  Comparison to Fixed Effects and Random Coefficients 
The preceding conclusions are drawn from the Pooled OLS calculations.  The R
2
 values 
and F statistics establish these to be robust results.  Results of the Chow (1960) tests 
require the use of the Fixed Effects model over Pooled OLS.  The Fixed Effects estimator 
employs country-specific intercepts instead of a single constant.  The U.S. might start at a 
higher level of energy intensity than Italy, but each would have the same response to 
given change in degree-days or electricity prices.  Fixed Effects ignores the “between 
group” differences in the variables, and is derived exclusively from “within group” 
variation.  Results are shown in Table 29, below.   
Cooling degree days cease to be statistically significant predictors of energy under Fixed 
Effects, and the share of energy provided by natural gas is only significant at the 10% 
level.  The price of electricity remains significant only in model {2}, and governance 
only in Models {4}.  HDD remains significant for {1} and {2}.   
The Fixed Effects model offers better capability for forecasting changes in energy 
intensity within individual countries.  It does not explain why the intercepts differ.  A 
wide range of unobserved variables can be incorporated into the intercepts; these might 
include transportation infrastructure, housing characteristics, average commute distance, 
capital-to-labor ratio, or industrial policy. 
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Table 29: Fixed Effects Results 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 4 
LNGDP   -4.56E-01 
GDP -2.16E-04 -2.40E-04  
LNPDIESEL  -9.08E-01 -3.00E-02 
PDIESEL -1.30E-02   
LNPELEC  6.48E-01 3.29E-03*** 
PELEC 1.73E-03***   
LNPRIMARY   -1.70E-01 
PRIMARY -3.07E-01 -3.63E-01  
LNOIL   -2.00E-01 
OIL -1.03E-01 -9.85E-02  
LNGAS   1.60E-02** 
GAS -2.53E-02** -2.68E-02**  
HDD15 7.73E-04 6.75E-04*  
LNHDD15   1.98E-02*** 
CDD18 2.17E-04*** -3.33E-04***  
LNCDD18   1.65E-03*** 
CPI 7.29E-02*** 1.19E-01***  
LNCPI   7.45E-02 
Centered R^2 .959 .959 .977 
SSR 264.2 268.6 1.978 
Regression F(40,471) 277.0 272.3 494.2 
Random Coeff SSR 7.982 8.014 .10828 
OLS vs. Random Coeff F(310,192) 117.2 118.1 145.8 
Fixed Effects vs. Random Coeff F(279, 192) 22.1 22.4 11.9 
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 10% level. 
*** Not significant 
The coefficients in Table 29 can be used to calculate the country-specific intercepts.  
Fixed Effects calculations remove the individual means for both the dependent and 
independent variables and perform a regression on the adjusted variables.  The 
coefficients derived are then applied to the original variables, as shown in Equations (23) 
through (25), in which i spans all of the independent variables. 
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The intercepts are shown in Table 30, ordered from smallest to largest.  The intercept 
accounts for the effects of unobserved variables.  The ranking of the countries may hint at 
what the unobserved variables might include.  
Table 30: Fixed Effects Intercepts 
Country Intercept 
India 12.22 
Poland 13.02 
Indonesia 13.58 
Turkey 13.71 
Pakistan 14.03 
China 15.22 
Colombia 15.48 
Thailand 16.05 
Mexico 16.18 
Chile 16.26 
Peru 16.28 
Argentina 16.53 
Romania 16.96 
United Kingdom 17.32 
Italy 17.41 
Germany 17.48 
Greece 17.64 
Portugal 18.27 
Japan 18.76 
Spain 18.98 
Taiwan 19.19 
Brazil 19.36 
Australia 19.71 
Korea 19.92 
Netherlands 20.04 
South Africa 21.44 
United States 21.70 
Venezuela 21.98 
France 22.15 
Russia 22.53 
Switzerland 23.46 
Canada 24.09 
Visual inspection suggests that income may play a role.  Higher-income countries tend to 
have higher intercepts, as shown in Figure 69, below.  The current model already 
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incorporates GDP in multiple ways.  Since it is a model of energy intensity, all 
independent variables have an effect on energy consumption per capita through their 
product with GDP per capita.  GDP per capita is also included as an independent 
variable.  The unobserved variables leading to higher intercepts for wealthier countries 
may include other GDP-correlated effects such as automobile ownership or house size. 
 
Figure 69: Fixed Effects Intercept vs. GDP per Capita 
A subsequent Chow test comparing Fixed Effects to Random Coefficients requires the 
selection of the latter model.  Under the Random Coefficients model, each country not 
only has its own intercept, but its own slopes for each of the independent variables.  Italy 
and the U.S. would therefore have different responses to an increase in heating degree-
days or a decrease in the price of diesel fuel.  The Random Coefficients model offers 
some predictive ability, since the coefficients for a particular variable are assumed to be 
normally distributed around a common mean.  These means can be used as estimated 
coefficients for an out-of-sample country.  Unfortunately, in this case the Random 
Coefficients model finds most independent variables to be not significantly related to 
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energy intensity.  This is due to the very low value of T relative to K.  There are nine 
independent variables considered, but only sixteen time periods for each country.  
Meaningful statistical relationships between most of the variables and energy intensity 
cannot be established.  Climate is not significant, nor is price, nor is governance.  The 
mean estimate for the coefficient is therefore not statistically different from zero for these 
variables.  The only significant variables are the GDP per capita and the share of primary 
electricity.  This is true for all models, as shown in Table 31, below.  
Table 31: Random Coefficients Results 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 11.55 12.84 41.82 6.09 
lnGDP   -3.17 -0.43 
GDP -2.02E-04 -2.00E-04   
lnpdiesel  -0.23*** -0.20*** -1.65E-02*** 
PDIESEL -3.77E-03***    
lnpelec  -0.13*** -0.24*** -4.04E-02*** 
PELEC -2.91E-03***    
lnprimary   -1.80 -0.23 
PRIMARY -0.41 -0.44*   
lnoil   -0.17*** 6.73E-02*** 
OIL -1.46E-02*** -1.40E-02***   
lngas   -0.25*** -3.13E-02*** 
GAS -4.42E-02*** -4.13E-02***   
lnhdd15   0.14*** 3.23E-02*** 
HDD15 0.41*** 0.39***   
lncdd18   6.88E-02*** 1.90E-02*** 
CDD18 8.44E-05*** 1.29E-04***   
lnCPI   1.30E-02*** 9.15E-03*** 
CPI 1.93E-02*** 1.66E-02***   
* Significant at 5% level. 
** Significant at 10% level. 
*** Not significant 
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Narrowing the list of independent variables can increase the statistical significance of the 
remaining variables.  I tested the following modifications: 
 Removing PELEC results in PDIESEL being significant at the 5% level for the 
linear model and at the 10% level for the price-log model, but not significant for 
the semi-log or log-log model; 
 Removing PDIESEL alone does not establish PELEC as significant for any 
model;  
 Combining the OIL and GAS terms into HYDROCARBONS does not make the 
combined term statistically significant in any model; and, 
 Removing PDIESEL, OIL, GAS, CPI, HDD15, and CDD18 brings PELEC to 
10% significance in the linear model and semi-log models and 5% significance in 
the log-log model.   
The following models find significance at the 5% level for PDIESEL or PELEC: 
Table 32: Random Coefficients Results with Variables Omitted 
 Model 1a (Linear) Model 4a (Log-Log) 
 Coefficient Significance Coefficient Significance 
Constant 12.65 0 7.29 0 
lnGDP   -0.481 0 
GDP -2.41E-04 8.76E-04   
lnpdiesel     
PDIESEL -5.38E-03 .030   
lnpelec   -0.0578 .042 
PELEC     
lnprimary   -0.249 1E-08 
PRIMARY -.405 .019   
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I also tested the addition of a term representing the square of per-capita GDP, GDP2, to 
capture higher-order effects.  This resulted in both GDPPERCAP and GDP2 having no 
statistical significance.   
Removing the individual means, as in Fixed Effects, did not establish significance of any 
additional variables under the Random Coefficients method.   
3.7.  Group Mean Regression 
The data set is insufficient for panel data techniques to identify the impact of climate on 
energy consumption.  In part, this is because climate differs much more “between group” 
than “within group.”  The standard deviation of HDD15 between all 32 countries in a 
year is never less than 950.  The standard deviation of HDD15 across all years within any 
country is never greater than 200.  GDP per capita likewise varies much more from 
country to country than from year to year.   
The Group Mean Regression is capable of utilizing variables with much greater “between 
group” than “within group” variation.  It is a regression on the average values across the 
study period for each country, and it excludes “within group” variation.  The Group Mean 
Regression required three determinations: the model, the climate series, and the variables.  
First, an out-of-sample forecast test was used to determine the appropriate model.  The 
Price-Log model gave a forecast accuracy never significantly worse than any other, and 
often superior to a statistically significant degree.  This held true no matter which 
combination of climate variables was used and no matter which other variables were 
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used.  Second, an out-of-sample forecast test was used to determine the appropriate 
climate series.  With the Price-Log model established, the combination of HDD15 and 
CDD18 proved to be at least equal to, and often superior to, all other combinations of 
heating and cooling degree days.  With the model and the climate variables established, I 
employed a backwards stepwise regression to eliminate non-significant variables, using 
10% significance as the threshold for retention.  The results are shown in Table 33: 
Table 33: Group Mean Regression Results 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error T-Stat Signif 
Constant 35.57 3.52 10.11 2.55E-10 
GDPPERCAP -1.52E-04 3.08E-05 -4.93 4.43E-05 
LNPELEC -5.16 0.77 -6.73 4.70E-07 
PRIMARY -0.145 0.056 -2.59 1.56E-02 
OIL -0.095 0.026 -3.64 1.24E-03 
HDD15 1.81E-03 4.41E-04 4.10 3.80E-04 
CDD18 1.45E-03 4.65E-04 3.11 4.61E-03 
Centered R
2
 0.846 
Regression 
F(6,25) 22.88 
Energy intensity tends to decrease with rising GDP, with higher electricity prices, and 
with shares of primary electricity and oil.  The impact of electricity prices on energy 
intensity exhibits diminishing returns.  Energy intensity tends to be higher in countries 
with more heating- or cooling-degree days.  The wet-bulb temperature series for cooling 
degree-days does not offer superior explanatory power in this regression.  While heating 
appears to have a greater effect than cooling, the two coefficients are within each others’ 
standard errors, and so this difference is not statistically significant.  Each additional 
degree-day increases energy intensity (measured in MJ per 2005 dollar of GDP) by about 
1.5*10
-3
, or 1.5 kJ per dollar of GDP.  It is important to recall that this is the variation 
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from country to country, not necessarily the change that will occur as a particular country 
experiences changes in HDD or CDD.   
The figures in Table 33 project average energy intensity for the U.S. from 1995 to 2010 
to be 8.2 MJ per dollar (actual 8.1), and the average energy intensity for Italy to be about 
5.4 MJ per dollar (actual 4.6).  The U.S. experiences about 290 more HDD15 per year, 
and about 170 more CDD18 per year, than does Italy.  The Group Mean Regression finds 
that Italy’s milder climate accounts for roughly 1.4 MJ per dollar of the modeled 2.8 MJ 
per dollar difference in energy intensity between these countries.  Italy’s energy intensity 
would be 1.7 MJ/dollar higher due to its lower GDP per capita, 5.4 MJ/dollar lower due 
to its higher electricity prices, and 2.3 MJ/dollar higher due to its fuel shares.  The total 
effect, with the 1.4 MJ/dollar decrease from climate, is the modeled difference of 2.8 
MJ/dollar.  Electricity prices are then the largest single source of modeled differences in 
energy intensity.  Climate accounts for a very small amount of the difference in energy 
intensity between the U.S. and China, because these countries have similar population-
weighted heating and cooling degree days, but it accounts for over a third of the 
difference in energy intensity between the U.S. and Russia.  The coefficients in Table 33  
show average industrial electricity prices to have a very significant result on average 
energy intensity.  The impact of this variable is not seen in the time series, as discussed in 
Section 3.6.3. 
Some of the effects identified in Group Mean Regression might be seen within time 
series if there were observations per country.  Other effects may only occur in response to 
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long-term changes in independent variables, not short-term year-to-year changes.  
Auffhammer and Mansur (2012) [199] note the differences in short-term and long-term 
responses to changes in climatic variables.  Industrial electricity prices may also have 
different short-term and long-term responses.  For example, a country may attract 
industries based on low average electricity prices.  A single year in which temporary 
shortages cause high electricity prices may see curtailment of certain operations, but not 
the loss of all of the industries. 
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3.8.  Determinants of Energy Intensity Conclusions 
The introduction of energy price series for non-OECD countries allows an expanded 
analysis over that presented in Richmond and Kaufmann (2006a).  The addition of 
climate series and governance indices attempts to identify other characteristics of a 
country that affect its patterns of energy intensity.  Four models are applied, with two 
different heating degree day series and three different cooling degree day series tested.  
The climate series developed for these calculations is straightforward, robust, and 
potentially useful in more refined statistical analyses.  Three models (linear, price-log, 
and log-log) are approximately equal in their ability to forecast energy intensity. 
The countries considered were selected to represent a wide range of climate and income 
levels.  Under Pooled OLS, the between-group variation of the independent variables was 
employed, and confirmed the expected relationships between energy intensity and prices, 
GDP, governance, and climate.  The hypothesis of equal coefficients and intercepts was 
rejected by the Chow test.  This required selection of Fixed Effects over Pooled OLS, and 
subsequently the equal coefficients hypothesis was rejected, leading to the selection of 
Random Coefficients over Fixed Effects.  The limited number of time periods, combined 
with the large number of independent variables considered, results in the Random 
Coefficients model being unable to establish a relationship between energy intensity and 
the climate variables.  Removing the climate variables and other non-significant variables 
allows GDP, price of commercial diesel fuel, and share of primary energy are significant 
predictors of energy intensity for the specific countries and years selected.   
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Group Mean Regression offers a means to partially explain the determinants of variations 
in energy intensity between countries, using each country’s time-averaged variables.  
This approach finds GDP per capita, industrial electricity price, and shares of primary 
electricity and petroleum to reduce energy intensity.  Heating and cooling degree days 
both increase energy intensity, in roughly equal amounts.  This conclusion applies to 
comparisons between countries’ averages over the period 1995-2010.  It is not applicable 
to climate-based changes in energy intensity within a country, as might be seen from 
climate change over a period of years. 
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4.  Energy Return on Investment for U.S. Oil and Gas Production and Oil Shale 
4.1.  Introduction 
Energy Return on Investment (EROI) is of fundamental importance in evaluating energy 
resources.  In order for an energy resource to be worth using, it must provide an energy 
surplus.  An energy resource with a high EROI offers a large energy surplus.  This means 
that a society using such resources a) can provide a high degree of energy services such 
as heating, cooling, lighting, and mechanical power, and b) can do so with a relatively 
small fraction of the workforce engaged in energy production.  Agriculture itself is a 
form of energy production; as agriculture improved and crop yields increased (EROI 
increased), societies freed up more workers to move to non-energy-producing tasks such 
as the development of knowledge, art, and amenities. 
4.1.1.  Fundamentals of Net Energy Analysis and EROI 
One technique for evaluating energy systems is net energy analysis, which seeks to 
compare the amount of energy delivered to society by a technology to the total energy 
required to find, extract, process, deliver, and otherwise upgrade that energy to a socially 
useful form.  Figure 70 depicts a hypothetical energy system and the types of energy 
inputs (energy costs) and energy outputs (energy production) associated with that system.  
Figure 70 could refer to a single oil well or coal mine, a nuclear power plant, a wind 
farm, or an oil shale facility.  The magnitude and timing of the energy production and 
energy costs are not intended to represent any particular energy system.  
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Figure 70: Net Energy from a hypothetical energy facility 
Source: Kubiszewski and Cleveland (2013) [200] 
Net energy analysis seeks to assess the direct and indirect energy required to produce a 
unit of energy.  In reference to Figure 70, net energy analysis attempts to quantify all the 
energy produced and all the energy costs.  Energy costs are the sum of direct and indirect 
energy costs.  Direct energy is the fuel or electricity used directly in the extraction or 
generation of a unit of energy.  An example is the natural gas burned in engines that 
pump oil to the surface.  Indirect energy is the energy used elsewhere in the economy to 
produce the goods and services used to extract or generate energy.  An example is the 
energy used to manufacture the drilling rig used to find oil.  The direct and indirect 
energy use is called embodied energy.  Both the energy product and the embodied energy 
can be expressed in common physical units of measurement, such as British Thermal 
Units (BTU) or megajoules (MJ). 
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Energy return on investment (EROI) is the ratio of energy produced to energy costs.  This 
entails the comparison of the energy content of the fuel produced to the amount of 
primary energy used in the manufacture, transport, construction, operation, 
decommissioning, and other stages of the an energy-producing facility’s life cycle.  
Comparing cumulative energy requirements with the amount of energy the technology 
produces over its lifetime yields a simple ratio for energy return on investment (EROI), 
as in Equation (26), below: 




n
i
c
ti
n
i
o
ti
t
E
E
EROI
1
,
1
,
  (26) 
E
o
 and E
c
 are the energy outputs and energy inputs (superscript c in the latter case for cost 
or consumption) of energy resources i at time t. 
EROI is a dimensionless number.  An EROI = 10 means that 10 units of energy are 
produced for each unit of direct plus indirect energy used in the production process. This 
is sometimes expressed as “10:1.”  An EROI = 1 is an absolute cutoff point for an energy 
source, the point at which as much energy is used to deliver a unit of energy as that unit 
yields. 
While simple in concept, implementation of net energy analysis requires a number of 
assumptions regarding the treatment of co-products, the calculation of indirect energy 
inputs, and in boundary conditions (discussed below).  A well-known example of a co-
product is “distillers grain” from the fermentation of corn to manufacture ethanol fuel.  
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Drymill ethanol production process uses only the starch portion of the corn, which is 
about 70% of the kernel.  All the remaining nutrients - protein, fat, minerals, and vitamins 
- are concentrated into distillers grain, a valuable feed for livestock.  Should the analysts 
credit the energy content of the distillers grain as an energy output (or, more accurately, 
the energy that would have been required to produce feed to replace the distillers grain), 
and thus include it in the numerator of the EROI for ethanol?  Energy analysts debate this 
point. 
These differences account for the well-publicized differences on ethanol EROI, with 
some studies finding an EROI above 1.0 (a positive net energy) and others finding an 
EROI below 1.0.  See Hammerschlag (2006) [201] or Farrell et al. (2006) [202] for a 
review of the literature and the EROI the various studies have found.  Many studies pay 
little heed to these assumptions, producing confusion when trying to compare results 
across studies.   
The choice about system boundaries is perhaps the most important decision made in most 
in net energy analyses.  This often boils down to what extent indirect energy costs are 
included in the analysis, and how “self energy use” or “internal energy” is accounted for.  
Murphy et al. (2011) [203] categorizes the various types of EROI analysis based on their 
system boundaries  
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4.2.  Methodology and Data Souces 
Cleveland (2005) [204] evaluated EROI for oil production using data from 1954 through 
1997.  The EROI for U.S. petroleum production was seen to have oscillated over the 
period considered, from around 18 in the mid-1950s, over 24 in the early 1970s, down to 
12 in 1982, and back up to 18 by the mid-1990s.  The paper noted that the Divisia index, 
which takes into account the energy quality (using expenditure shares as a proxy for 
quality), shows an overall decline from 1954 to 1997.  Cleveland’s findings are shown in 
Figure 71, below. 
 
Figure 71: Energy Return on Investment of Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas 
Source: Cleveland (2005) 
This study follows up on Cleveland (2005), adding data for 2002 and 2007, as well as 
introducing some refinements to the methodology.  It takes into consideration recent 
development in the field of EROI analysis, such as the “EER/NER” approach noted by 
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Brandt (2008) [205] and the preliminary EROI Protocol proposed by Murphy et al. 
(2011).  It attempts to define the indirect inputs so as to eliminate double-counting that 
would artificially lower the EROI.   
Direct energy inputs were obtained from the Census of Mineral Industries (Census years 
1954 through 1992) and the Economic Census (Census years 1997 through 2007) [206 
through 217].  These series are referred to as CMI in this analysis.  Indirect energy inputs 
were derived from CMI as well as BEA (2010) [218].  Direct energy outputs were 
derived from EIA (2010) [219].  CMI reports often contain a comparison to the previous 
CMI report, sometimes revising the earlier value.  For example, if a 1987 CMI report 
notes gasoline consumption for 1987, and revises the 1982 estimate, the revised figure 
report would be used.  If the earlier report contains a greater degree of precision, and its 
accuracy is not contradicted by the later report, then the earlier figure would be used.   
These values were then used in calculations to determine the Thermodynamic EROI, 
Price-weighted EROI, and Divisia EROI, as detailed below.  The same calculations are 
then applied to the external energy inputs, resulting in Thermodynamic, Price-weighted, 
and Divisia External Energy Return (EER) values.  These results are the EROI or EER at 
the wellhead; energy costs for transporting and refining the crude oil, as well as for 
distributing the refined products, are not included.   
The boundaries for an EROI analysis affect the precision of the results.  This is discussed 
in Murphy et al. (2011).  Expanding the boundary further leads to lower EROI, as more 
indirect energy costs are accounted for.  Expanding the boundary too far can result in an 
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analysis that does not accurately depict the economic benefit of having a high energy 
surplus.  In the terminology of Murphy et al. (2011), an EROIi,lc analysis incorporates 
“labor’s consumption” as an energy cost.  That is, the energy required to produce the 
consumer goods purchased by the workers in an energy industry should be counted as an 
energy cost for the energy industry itself.  This has the result that paying workers a better 
wage leads to a lower EROI, and it also conceals the fact that the existence of an energy 
surplus is what allows the workers to buy consumer goods in the first place.  There is a 
real difference between an economy in which all of the population is engaged in “energy 
production” (as in subsistence agriculture) and a more developed economy in which an 
energy surplus allows some of the population who are not engaged in energy production 
to produce consumer goods for the remainder, who are.  Treating “labor’s consumption” 
as an energy cost hides this difference.   
Current modeling is insufficient to translate externalities (such as pollution and water 
consumption) into energy terms, as in the EROIi,env of Murphy et al. (2011), so no 
attempt is made to do so.  Berndt (1978, 260) [220] cautions about the limits of EROI 
analysis, noting: 
[N]et energy analysis implicitly views all nonenergy commodities as transformed energy. 
In such an energy theory of value, energy is the only scarce input…the resource 
constraints faced by society at any point in time are not those of a single input, but of a 
host of inputs-capital, land, labor, raw materials, and energy, to name but a few.  
Brandt (2008) and others note the importance of deciding whether or not to include 
internal energy from a system.  Considering only the external (purchased) energy gives a 
clearer picture of the energy resource’s economic status.  The internal energy consumed 
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has not yet entered the economy, and in some cases its consumption does not even carry 
an opportunity cost.  Considering both the internal and external energy provides more 
information on environmental impacts and is technically more accurate, since it describes 
the physical energy required to produce a given unit of the energy resource. The main 
EROI values presented here use “Net Energy Return,” which includes both internal and 
external energy, but the “External Energy Return” (EER) value is also presented.   
The period covered is 1954-2007.  CMI data prior to 1954 is too sparse to allow a robust 
calculation, and CMI data for 2012 is not yet available. 
As noted by Murphy et al. (2011) and others, EROI studies will find different values 
depending on whether or not self-use is included.  The petroleum and natural gas sectors 
have a considerable amount of self-use of natural gas, and to a lesser degree petroleum.  
Self-use of natural gas accounted for over half of all direct energy inputs, and sometimes 
over three quarters, in the years considered.  Conducting an External Energy Return 
(EER) analysis shows a much higher EROI in the years in which direct energy is the 
dominant driver of EROI, such as the 1950s.  Because natural gas is an economic energy 
resource, and because most producing fields now have the ability to transport gas to 
market, I use Net Energy Return (NER) analysis for the primary values.  
This analysis does not use interpolations for the years between CMI data.  Because the 
outputs are known, but the inputs are not, interpolating the data could result in false 
identification of local maxima and minima.  
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4.2.1.  Direct Energy Inputs 
Direct energy includes that used to operate drilling rigs, pumping rigs, vehicles, and 
buildings.  The primary fuel for the crude petroleum and natural gas production industries 
is natural gas.  Natural gas accounts for 53-88% of the energy consumed over the years 
considered.  Self-use of natural gas (consumption of gas produced on-site) is very 
significant, accounting for 68-87% of gas consumption, and 39-73% of overall direct 
energy inputs. 
Other direct energy inputs include distillate and light fuel oil, residual and heavy fuel oil, 
gasoline, and purchased electricity.  Coal consumption is seen in 1954, though after that 
any coal consumption is included in “other” fuels.  Electricity generated by the oil and 
gas sector is not counted, as the primary energy used to generate it has already been 
included in the direct energy inputs.  The electricity generated and sold could be 
considered a co-product; adding this in as an energy output of the industry would result in 
a slightly higher EROI.  However, this information is not available for all years.  When it 
is, it generally accounts for about 1% of electricity purchased, but this is several orders of 
magnitude smaller than the hydrocarbon energy output.  The 42 million kWh generated 
and sold by the oil and gas industries in 1963 equal 0.14 trillion BTU, whereas the 
outputs of the oil and gas industries in that year equal 32 quadrillion BTU.  Direct energy 
consumption is shown in Table 34, below: 
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Table 34: Direct Energy Inputs for U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
Sources: Census of Mineral Industries (multiple years) 
 Distillate 
Oil 
Residual 
Oil 
Self 
Crude 
Purchased 
NG 
Self 
NG 
Electricity Gasoline Other Total 
Year 1,000 
bbl 
1,000 
bbl 
1,000 
bbl 
BCF BCF GWh MBbl $1,000 Quads 
1954 2,963 968 664 145 698 136 3,629 21,439 0.992 
1958 3,938 1,097 651 135 759 148 4,275 39,635 1.072 
1963 3,719 1,216 563 133 831 158 6,696 43,954 1.190 
1967 5,228 1,217 3,985 201 957 104 9,520 29,200 1.410 
1972 6,057 3,414 9,400 148 1,015 123 14,060 18,100 1.495 
1977 11,787 3,682 17,648 218 1,164 223 19,679 123,900 1.904 
1982 16,332 5,802 30,500 250 663 344 34,857 572,700 1.768 
1987 9,319 654 10,843 326 686 175 28,418 341,300 1.564 
1992 7,384 854 1,382 264 617 83 32,626 443,060 1.410 
1997 6,846 3,682 600 232 840 164 34,382 483,691 1.639 
2002 6,067 2,925 0 239 652 72 30,848 510,812 1.389 
2007 11,243 2,808 0 160 973 211 26,242 390,792 1.584 
These values contain several adjustments from the CMI data, as detailed in Section 4.2.8, 
below.  
4.2.2.  Treatment of Electricity 
The electricity purchased by the oil and gas production sectors is reported in million 
kilowatt-hours.  On a thermodynamic basis, one kilowatt-hour (1 kWh) is equal to 3,412 
BTU.  However, the amount of energy needed to generate 1 kWh is much greater.  
Primary energy (nuclear and renewables) are sometimes converted at the nominal rate of 
3,412 BTU per kWh, because their only economic use is as electricity.  Other fuels such 
as natural gas have other economic uses, and so it is meaningful that a larger quantity 
must be used to generate a given amount of electricity.  Based on the 2007 ratio, one 
might use conversions such as those found in Table 35.  This shows the generation of a 
single kilowatt-hour of electricity using the U.S. average fuel mix.  
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Table 35: Electricity Composition (2007) 
Source: EIA (2010) 
Fuel % of generation BTU/kWh BTU $/MMBTU $Total 
Coal 48.5% 10,375 5,032 $1.70 $0.009 
Petroleum 1.6% 10,794 173 $16.98 $0.003 
Gas 21.6% 8,403 1,815 $6.07 $0.011 
Primary 27.9% 3,412 952 
$18.73 (retail 
price of electricity) 
$0.018 
Total   7,972  $0.040 
Replacing electricity with its component energy resources would somewhat under-value 
it from an economic point of view.  Electricity requires not only direct energy inputs, but 
equipment, infrastructure, and expertise.  As a result, a kWh of electricity sold to an 
industrial customer for about $0.064 in 2007, whereas the average fuel cost in Table 35 is 
about $0.040.  Converting electricity on a thermodynamic basis of 3,412 BTU per kWh 
will underestimate the energy consumed by an industry that uses a large amount of 
electricity.  Decomposing electricity into its component energy resources will 
underestimate the economic value of the energy consumed, affecting calculations such as 
the Price-Weighted EROI.  I instead add a series “Electricity losses,” which carry a BTU 
cost but do not affect the economic analysis; their dollar cost is already included in the 
price of electricity.  The following conversions are used.  Note that in contrast to those 
used in Table 35, which are based on generation heat rates, the values in Table 36 take 
into account the energy losses of the entire electricity system, including transmission: 
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Table 36: U.S. Electricity Heat Rate, 1954-2007 
Source: EIA (2010) 
Year 
Industrial Electricity 
Retail Sales (B BTU) 
Industrial Electricity System 
Energy Losses (B BTU) 
Electricity Losses 
(Ratio) 
1954 711,282 2,129,303 2.99 
1958 977,708 2,530,878 2.59 
1963 1,287,790 3,076,136 2.39 
1967 1,654,872 3,948,064 2.39 
1972 2,187,017 5,233,258 2.39 
1977 2,681,959 6,431,907 2.40 
1982 2,541,766 6,039,236 2.38 
1987 2,928,291 6,538,274 2.23 
1992 3,318,900 7,555,670 2.28 
1997 3,542,328 8,024,026 2.27 
2002 3,378,691 7,529,148 2.23 
2007 3,506,963 7,561,502 2.16 
The “Electricity Loss” energy series mainly affects the Thermodynamic EROI; as it has 
no economic cost (it is already included in the price of electricity), it does not affect the 
Price-Weighted EROI, and has only a minimal effect on the Divisia EROI.  It modestly 
increases direct energy inputs, reducing Thermodynamic EROI by about 5-10% in most 
cases.  This factor is applied only to the electricity purchased as a direct energy input.  
Electricity in the indirect energy inputs already has been adjusted to take into account the 
energy used in generation.  The indirect energy intensity is developed by taking the entire 
energy used by the industrial sector—including the electricity system losses—and 
dividing that by the GNP of that sector.  The calculated BTU are then divided among the 
energy resources.   
4.2.3.  Other and Undistributed Energy 
The Census of Mineral Industries reports energy consumption of the major fuel 
categories.  Smaller firms do not report disaggregated energy consumption, instead 
reporting “undistributed” energy costs.  A moderate amount of energy is categorized as 
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either “other” or “undistributed”.  Taken together, these range from 6-16% of total energy 
expenditures over the years 1967-2007, and are even higher prior to that, largely due to 
the inclusion of gasoline with “other” in 1954 and 1958.  In certain years, CMI estimated 
the energy content of “other” and “undistributed” fuels in terms of BTU or kWh per 
dollar of expenditures.  Such a conversion factor is necessary when CMI wished to note 
the total energy consumption of the sector in a single number.  This is not done in all 
years; for 1992 and later, CMI reports the amounts in each category, and dollar 
expenditures for “other” and “undistributed,” but not a single number for total energy 
consumption.  Where the categories are given a conversion factor, “undistributed” is 
generally close to the cost per BTU of natural gas, which might seem reasonable since the 
vast majority of fuel use in the sector is natural gas.  However, natural gas does not 
represent the majority of fuel expenditures by dollar value, and the conversion factor is 
applied to convert dollar expenditures of unknown fuels into energy use.   
The “other” category has a cost closer to that of fuel oil, and may include petroleum coke, 
liquefied petroleum gas, and wood.  As there is no better information for “other,” I 
assume it to be equivalent to fuel oils; this gives it a price per BTU between natural gas 
(on the low end) and electricity on the high end.  I allocate “undistributed” energy costs 
among the major categories of fuel oils, gasoline, natural gas, electricity, and “other” 
according to their expenditure shares in that year.  Because the “undistributed” energy is 
reported in terms of expenditures, the allocation is not nearly as weighted towards natural 
gas as might be assumed, as that fuel’s consumption share is greatly affected by the 
considerable amount of self-use.  In fact, natural gas accounts for only 24% of direct 
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energy expenditures in 2007, though it represented 86% of energy inputs.  This correction 
reduces the energy of the “undistributed” category by about 75 trillion BTU in 1992, out 
of a total direct energy consumption of roughly 1410 trillion BTU.   
For 1954 and 1958, gasoline consumption has been estimated based on the 1963 ratio of 
gasoline consumption to total reported energy use.  The original “Other” expenditures 
reported in CMI have been reduced by an amount equal to the estimated gasoline 
expenditures, using the estimated quantity and the average prices of $0.2904 and $0.3038 
per gallon for those years (from EIA).  The “Other” category for 1954 and 1958 is now 
consistent with the types of fuels included in “Other” in all subsequent years. 
4.2.4.  Indirect Energy Inputs 
Indirect energy consumption results from the purchase of supplies and machinery for the 
oil and gas industries, as well as the construction of buildings.  To these known costs (in 
nominal dollars) I assign the energy intensity of the industrial sector, in BTU per nominal 
dollar.  Using both series in nominal dollars avoids the uncertainty arising from selecting 
a particular inflation index.   
The indirect energy consumption is shown in Table 37, below.  For the calculations of 
price-weighted and Divisia EROI, I have also calculated the indirect energy inputs by 
type of fuel. 
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Table 37: Indirect Energy Inputs for U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
Source: Census of Mineral Industries (multiple years) and BEA (2010) 
 
Capital 
Depreciation  
Supplies 
Used 
Indirect 
total 
Industrial 
Energy Use 
Industrial 
GNP 
Industrial 
Energy 
Intensity 
Total 
Indirect 
Energy 
Year Nominal $M 
Nominal 
$M 
Nominal 
$M Billion BTU Nominal $B 
BTU/ 
nominal $ BTU 
1954 1,242 1,121 2,363 14,716,733 147.3 99,910 2.36E+14 
1958 1,784 1,359 3,143 18,200,961 169.1 107,634 3.38E+14 
1963 2,033 1,511 3,544 19,306,571 214.5 90,007 3.19E+14 
1967 2,545 1,652 4,197 21,768,109 282.6 77,028 3.23E+14 
1972 3,433 1,984 5,417 26,615,564 384.4 69,239 3.75E+14 
1977 8,969 5,935 14,904 30,952,764 627.1 49,359 7.36E+14 
1982 27,141 20,488 47,629 32,306,559 927.7 34,824 1.66E+15 
1987 20,868 8,452 29,320 27,656,462 1185 23,339 6.84E+14 
1992 22,506 7,102 29,608 29,442,490 1422.8 20,693 6.13E+14 
1997 25,051 10,167 35,218 32,659,914 1827.2 17,874 6.30E+14 
2002 38,110 8,041 46,151 35,286,556 2053.7 17,182 7.93E+14 
2007 84,010 18,258 102,268 32,762,390 2755 11,892 1.22E+15 
4.2.5.  Capital 
The capital series was derived from series “National Economic Accounts” (BEA, 2010).  
From this database, I used the current-cost depreciation series for private nonresidential 
fixed assets: that for “Equipment and Software” and that for “Structures.”  Using 
depreciation produces a series that more closely corresponds to the actual use of the 
machinery purchased and the structures built; using an investment series produces higher 
peaks and lower valleys corresponding to the industry cycles.   
Two other series were considered.  These are the Census of Mineral Industries capital 
investment series, and the KLEMS model by Jorgenson (2007) [221].  The investment 
series from the Census of Mineral Industries shows much higher peaks, as would be 
expected.  Using the depreciation series “amortizes” the energy cost of a given piece of 
equipment.  The Jorgenson series is wildly different from the CMI series for capital 
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expenditures in the years in which the both have data, as shown in Table 38, below, along 
with the BEA series that was used.  All series are expressed in millions of current dollars. 
Table 38: Comparison of Capital Investment/Depreciation Series, 1963-2002 
Sources: CMI (multiple years), Jorgenson (2007), and BEA (2010) 
 CMI Jorgenson BEA 
2002 28,781 67,494 38,110 
1997 25,152 57,507 25,051 
1992 12,520 60,064 22,506 
1987 11,717 67,433 20,868 
1982 42,216 60,765 27,141 
1977 12,944 35,124 8,969 
1972 3,456 30,736 3,433 
1963 2,552 25,609 2,033 
4.2.6.  Supplies 
The data series for supplies was derived from the Census of Mineral Industries.  In some 
tables, CMI includes numerous items as “supplies” that, for this analysis, should not be 
included as indirect energy inputs.  These include the following: 
 Fuels and electric energy purchased are already considered as direct energy 
inputs; 
 Resales have no associated energy cost; 
 Minerals received for preparation (feedstocks) already have the energy cost of 
their production accounted for; 
 Contract work may already have its energy cost counted through reports from 
other companies in the sector; and, 
 Purchased machinery installed may already be counted under the Capital 
Depreciation series. 
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Removing all of these items greatly reduces the supplies cost, and so reduces the indirect 
energy cost. 
Resales: Using a series such as “Supplies Consumed by Type” or “Cost of Supplies 
Used” excludes resales.  These are the series that I used.  
Minerals received for preparation: The natural gas liquids extraction sub-sector 
purchases large amounts of natural gas (and some petroleum) as a feedstock, not as a 
fuel; it extracts the liquids and then sells all of the products.  Because the energy involved 
in producing the gas has already been accounted for in the “direct energy inputs” of the 
crude petroleum and natural gas sub-sector, it is not appropriate to include it as a material 
expenditure for calculating indirect energy inputs.  Therefore, I subtracted the known cost 
of hydrocarbon feedstocks from the cost of supplies. 
Contract work: If a company within the oil and gas production sector outsources work to 
another company within the sector, the energy use of the contractor is already included in 
the direct energy consumed by the sector.  It would then be inappropriate to apply the 
indirect emissions factor of that year to the contract work.  On the other hand, if the 
contracting company does not report to CMI in the oil and gas production sector (perhaps 
it is a general engineering firm, an engine manufacturer, a road-building firm, or some 
other sort of company), then it is appropriate to apply the indirect emissions factor to that 
expenditure.  I have not identified a means to separate the Contract Work into work done 
by companies in this sector and work done by companies not in this sector.  The analysis 
at present does not include contract work, and so slightly understates this indirect energy 
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cost.  Contract work in 2007 represented $14.6 billion in expenditures.  If all of this went 
to out-of-sector companies, and was assigned the same indirect energy cost at the 
industrial ratio of 11,892 BTU/$, then the result would be to increase total energy inputs 
by about 0.17 quads, or about 6.2%, reducing EROI in that year from 12.64 to 11.87. 
Machinery: The Bureau of Economic Analysis includes “Equipment and Software” in its 
depreciation series.  Although I do not attempt to isolate every “supplies” purchase that 
might fall into this category, the sub-category “Purchased Machinery Installed” is large 
and well-defined enough that I have chosen to remove it from the supplies data series.  
Such expenditures are better handled through the depreciation series as capital 
investments.  Depending on the year and the sub-sector, “Supplies” might still include 
certain kinds of equipment that overlaps with the capital series, but the majority is 
removed with the “Purchased Machinery Installed” sub-category.   
4.2.7.  Energy Outputs 
The outputs of the U.S. oil and gas industry are taken from EIA (2010, Table 5.10).  For 
natural gas and natural gas liquids, the heat content appropriate for each year is used (EIA 
2010, Table A4 and Table A2).  The energy outputs of domestic petroleum and natural 
gas production are shown in Table 39, below.  
 
 
243 
 
Table 39: Energy Outputs of U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
Source: EIA (2010) 
 
Oil 
Production 
Natural Gas 
Production 
NG 
Heat 
Content 
NGL 
Production 
NGL Heat 
Content Total 
 Million bbl BCF BTU/cf Million bbl MMBTU/bbl BTU 
1954 2315 8,388 1035 252.133 4.415 2.32E+16 
1958 2449 10,572 1035 294.749 4.366 2.64E+16 
1963 2753 14,076 1031 400.886 4.264 3.22E+16 
1967 3216 17,387 1032 514.455 4.232 3.88E+16 
1972 3455 21,624 1027 638.216 4.070 4.48E+16 
1977 3009 19,163 1021 590.455 3.941 3.93E+16 
1982 3157 17,820 1028 565.876 3.872 3.88E+16 
1987 3054 16,621 1031 582.291 3.804 3.71E+16 
1992 2625 17,840 1030 621.178 3.804 3.60E+16 
1997 2355 18,902 1026 663.266 3.762 3.55E+16 
2002 2097 18,928 1027 686.288 3.729 3.42E+16 
2007 1848 19,266 1029 650.794 3.701 3.30E+16 
4.2.8.  Inferences for Missing Values 
At times, the CMI omitted values for direct energy consumption in order to avoid 
disclosing proprietary information.  In some cases, CMI stated energy expenditures for 
specific fuels, in others CMI stated total energy expenditures, and in a few cases no 
inference from expenditures was possible.   
As noted in Section 4.2.2, gasoline was included with “other fuels” in 1954 and 1958, 
and its consumption was estimated based on its share of overall fuel use in 1963. 
Where CMI gave direct energy use in both dollars and amounts for specific fuels within 
some sub-sectors, I used the implied costs to derive the amounts consumed in the sub-
sectors for which only dollar expenditures were reported.  These values are shown in 
Table 40, below: 
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Table 40: Inferred Energy Input Quantities from Sector Prices 
Year Sub-Sector Fuel Expenditures 
($1,000) 
Sector 
Price 
Quantity 
1967 Crude 
Petroleum & 
Natural Gas 
Gasoline 12,400 $0.29/gallon 42.35 Mgal 
1967 Crude 
Petroleum & 
Natural Gas 
Natural Gas 14,200 $139/mcf 102.04 bcf 
1992 Drilling Natural Gas 
(purchased) 
1,394* $1671/mcf 0.83 bcf 
2002 Drilling Distillate & Light Diesel 37,355 $29.59/bbl 1.262 Mbbl 
2002 NGL Extraction Distillate & Light Diesel 1,250 $29.59/bbl .042 Mbbl 
2002 Support Distillate & Light Diesel 30,946 $29.59/bbl 1.046 Mbbl 
2002 Drilling Natural Gas 
(purchased) 
311 $3335/mcf 0.09 bcf 
2002 Support Natural Gas 
(purchased) 
48,963* $3335/mcf 14.68 bcf 
Where no sub-sector had quantities reported, I used EIA price series (annual averages) to 
determine the quantities consumed.  These are shown in Table 41, below: 
Table 41: Inferred Energy Input Quantities from EIA Prices 
Year Fuel EIA Price Expenditures  
($1,000, all Sub-
Sectors) 
Consumption 
(all Sub-
Sectors) 
2002 Residual & Heavy 
Diesel 
$24.86/bbl 72,728 2.925 Mbbl 
2002 Gasoline $1.386/gal 99,541 71.82 Mgal 
2007 Distillate & Light Diesel $95.47/bbl 1,073,367 11.243 Mbbl 
2007 Residual & Heavy 
Diesel 
$58.51/bbl 164,276 2.807 Mbbl 
2007 Gasoline $2.843/gal 600,088 211.08 Mgal 
2007 Natural Gas 
(purchased) 
$7.68/1000 
cf 
1,266,244 159.66 bcf 
In some cases, only total fuel oil was reported, not divided into distillate/light diesel and 
residual/heavy diesel.  Because these have slightly different energy content, I estimated a 
division of the fuel oil based on the next available year’s division.  These calculations are 
shown in Table 42, below. 
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Table 42: Division of Fuel Oil Energy Inputs 
Year Sub-Sector Total (1,000 
bbl) 
Comparison Allocation (1,000 bbl) 
1954 Drilling 2108 1963 Distillate 1,711; Residual 397 
1954 Crude 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas  
1542 1963 Distillate 1,006; Residual 536 
1954 NGL Extraction 7 1963 Distillate 4; Residual 3 
1954 Support 274 1963 Distillate 242; Residual 32 
1958 Drilling 3314 1963 Distillate 2,689; Residual 625 
1958 Crude 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas  
1089 1963 Distillate 710; Residual 379 
1958 NGL Extraction 68 1963 Distillate 41; Residual 27 
1958 Support 564 1963 Distillate 498; Residual 66 
1967 Crude 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
3015.3 1972 Distillate 1966.9; Residual 1048.4 
1977 Crude 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 
6826.9 1982 Distillate 4080.6; Residual 2746.3 
1977 NGL Extraction 898.3 1987 Distillate 898.3; Residual 0 
1982 NGL Extraction 28.9 1987 Distillate 28.9; Residual 0 
1992 NGL Extraction 21.8 1997 Distillate 11.0; Residual 10.8 
1992 Exploration 
(part of 
Support) 
176.7 1997 Distillate 102.5; Residual 74.2 
Neither expenditures nor quantities were available for self-use of natural gas, so other 
estimates were made.  Self-use of natural gas in the NGL Extraction sub-sector in 2007 
was estimated to be proportional to the electricity consumption in that sector, at the same 
ratio as in 2002.  Therefore, because electricity use decreased 14.5% from 2002 to 2007, 
the amount of natural gas for “self-use” was estimated to be 14.5% below 2002 levels.  
At 339.3 bcf, this is a fairly large value, accounting for 30% of the gas consumed in that 
year, and it is relatively uncertain.  Since it is self-use, no cost information is available to 
make a better estimate.  Self-use of crude petroleum is seen in the Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Extraction sub-sector for 1992 and 1997, but no values are reported for 2002 or 
2007.  This is a small fraction of energy use, accounting for less than 1% of overall 
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energy use in 1992 and 1997.  Therefore, I have not attempted to estimate self-use of 
crude petroleum.   
Where energy expenditures for specific fuels were unknown, but the total energy 
expenditures were known, I distributed the unaccounted-for energy expenditures among 
the unknown categories based on the distribution in nearby years; the next later year was 
used, unless that year also had missing values in the relevant categories.  The energy 
expenditures so allocated never exceeded 7% of total energy expenditures.  In each case, 
I then used price data from EIA or from other sectors to determine the quantities of those 
fuels consumed.  The entries interpolated by that method are shown in Table 43: 
Table 43: Inferred Energy Inputs from Expenditures not Accounted for 
Year Sub-Sector Unaccounted 
For ($1,000) 
Basis Year Allocation ($1,000) 
1992 Drilling 75,726 1997 Natural Gas 1,394;  
Other 2,837;  
Undistributed 71,496 
1997 NGL Extraction 22,277 1992 Other 8,959; 
 Undistributed 13,318 
2002 NGL Extraction 15,398 2007 Residual & Heavy Diesel 666; 
Gasoline 8,353;  
Other 6,380 
2002 Support 93,311 2007 Residual & Heavy Diesel 44,348; 
Natural Gas 48,963 
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4.3.  EROI Calculation 
EROI is the net energy output E
o
 divided by the energy cost of recovery, E
c
.  A related 
quantity used in some analyses is efficiency of energy recovery, which is net energy 
output divided by the original energy in place.  With an accounting approach such that 
the external energy used for production is “deducted” from the energy in place, the 
original energy in place E
i
 is equal to E
o
 + E
c
.  The efficiency of recovery ε is shown in 
Equation (27): 
1



EROI
EROI
EE
E
co
o
 , and 




1
EROI .  (27) 
The “efficiency of recovery” approach is used by Wang (2001) [222], based on Delucchi 
(1993) [223].  Efficiency is more often used in a step-wise approach, as it is easy to 
perceive the effect of various steps in a process.  If resource recovery is 98% efficient, 
feedstock transport is 99% efficient, and refining is 90% efficient, then the energy 
recovery through those three stages is 0.98*0.99*0.9 = 87.3% efficient.  Were EROI to 
be applied to individual steps, which is not normally done, the EROI would be 49 for the 
first step, 99 for the second, and 9 for the third.  To determine the EROI of the three steps 
together, the EROI values would basically be converted back to ε, multiplied together, 
and converted back to EROI, for a total of 6.9. 
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4.3.1.  Thermodynamic EROI 
This analysis corresponds to EROIstnd in Murphy et al. (2011).  Direct and indirect energy 
inputs are included, but the energy is not quality-corrected.  Only the actual energy 
content is considered.  No co-products are included.  EROI is defined in Equation (26), 
above.  
4.3.2.  Price-Weighted EROI 
The price-weighted EROI takes into account energy quality, as represented by the price 
of an energy resource.  Energy is expressed in Equation (28): 


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n
i
titit EE
1
,,
*    (28) 
In Equation (28), 
ti , is a weighting factor representing quality.  A simple way to 
determine the weighting factor is to use 
t
ti
ti
P
P
,1
,
,  where P is the price of an energy 
resource and energy source 1 (with price P1,t) is the reference fuel.  Therefore, ti ,  is the 
ratio of the price of a given fuel to the price of fuel 1.  Equation (26) then becomes 
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The price-weighted EROI is roughly the dollar value of energy outputs divided by the 
dollar value of energy inputs, although the model is based on the average prices for the 
energy resources in question (both inputs and outputs) and not necessarily the exact 
prices paid and received by the industry.  The price-weighted EROI would be one version 
of EROI2,i in Murphy et al. (2011). 
4.3.3.  Divisia EROI 
Like the price-weighted EROI, the Divisia EROI takes into account energy quality, but it 
goes further to account for the fact that fuels are not perfectly substitutable even on a 
dollar-for-dollar basis.  As Berndt (1978, 245) notes, the price-weighted EROI above 
assumes that “one unit of energy type Ei is specified to be perfectly equivalent or 
perfectly substitutable with Pi/P1 units of E1.”  Berndt suggests using an indexing formula 
in which perfect substitutability is not assumed, and the degree of substitutability is not 
required to be held constant.   
The change in the energy quality index E* is the sum of the weighted changes in the 
individual inputs, shown in the discrete Divisia index approximation in Equation (30).   
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The first term in parentheses is the average expenditure share of input i at times t and t-1.  
This equation does not specify a degree of substitutability, but rather infers it from 
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observed trends.  If the industry responds to increases in the price of some inputs by 
switching to other inputs, then E* will decline even if E does not.  Consider Table 44 as a 
simple example.  An industry relies on two energy inputs E1 and E2, which start at prices 
of $10 and $15.  The next year, the price for E2 increases, so the industry reacts by 
shifting much of its consumption to E1, which sees flat prices despite this increased 
demand.  The energy expenditures are unchanged, and the energy consumption is 
unchanged, but E* declines, as the industry has shifted to lower-quality fuel. The Divisia 
approach does not tell us what E* should be in any absolute terms; as it is an index, one 
year is the starting value, and all subsequent values are relative to that.   
Table 44: Divisia Index Example 
Time E1 E2 P1 P2 Energy Expenditures E* 
t-1 100 100 10 15 200 2500 1 
t 150 50 10 20 200 2500 0.87 
The energy quality index E* is also applied to the outputs, oil and gas.  E*(out) is 
generated the same way, and the Divisia EROI is then calculated as E*(out)/E*(in).  Of 
course, outputs of energy production are not as substitutable as inputs; gas wells cannot 
be converted to oil wells, whereas electric power plants can be converted from oil to gas.   
I do not have annual data for energy inputs.  Applying a linear interpolation would result 
in an energy input series that is artificially smooth and shows less variability than may 
have actually occurred; this would in turn diminish changes in Divisia index.  Instead, I 
have calculated the Divisia index with the data at hand, meaning that it is not annual.  In 
this case, t-1 is not one year before t, but one CMI period (generally 5 years, though in 
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some cases 4) before t.  The direction of changes in the Divisia index is unaltered by this 
change, although the magnitude may be affected. 
The Divisia EROI would be another version of EROI2,i in Murphy et al. (2011) as both 
are quality-corrected EROI analyses using direct and indirect energy, but their methods 
of quality correction differ. 
4.4.  EROI Results and Discussion 
The results of the calculations are shown in Table 45, below.   
Table 45: EROI of U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
Year Direct 
Inputs 
(EJ) 
Indirect 
Inputs 
(EJ) 
Total 
Inputs 
(EJ) 
Output 
(EJ) 
Thermal 
EROI 
Price-
Weighted 
EROI 
Divisia 
EROI 
1954 1.047 0.249 1.296 24.500 18.90 15.40 18.90 
1958 1.131 0.357 1.487 27.889 18.75 13.58 15.84 
1963 1.255 0.337 1.592 33.960 21.34 14.42 17.71 
1967 1.487 0.341 1.828 40.906 22.37 14.14 17.87 
1972 1.578 0.396 1.973 47.315 23.98 12.57 16.95 
1977 2.009 0.776 2.785 41.512 14.91 7.92 9.61 
1982 1.865 1.750 3.615 40.956 11.33 8.00 6.46 
1987 1.651 0.722 2.373 39.102 16.48 9.51 10.57 
1992 1.487 0.646 2.134 37.941 17.78 10.31 11.18 
1997 1.729 0.664 2.393 37.504 15.67 9.36 9.53 
2002 1.466 0.837 2.302 36.042 15.66 10.86 9.54 
2007 1.671 1.283 2.954 34.769 11.77 9.92 6.82 
As can be seen in Figure 72, the thermal EROI of U.S. oil and gas production shows a 
decline over the period 1954-2007.  There is a rise over the period 1954-1972, followed 
by a steep decline until 1982, a partial recovery until 1992, and a decline since then.   
The price-weighted EROI is lower than the thermal EROI in all cases.  This is due to the 
fact that the energy inputs are more expensive per BTU than the outputs, since the inputs 
are refined and processed.  Over the period surveyed, electricity averages five times as 
252 
 
expensive per BTU as the wellhead price of oil, and gasoline nearly four times.  On the 
other hand, crude oil at the wellhead in most years is more expensive per BTU than the 
industrial retail price of natural gas.  Purchasing solely natural gas to produce crude oil 
would then show a price-weighted EROI usually greater than the thermal EROI, although 
in practice the oil and gas production industry requires liquid fuels and electricity, and 
co-produces natural gas along with oil in oil wells. 
 
Figure 72: EROI of U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
As seen in Figure 73, direct energy represents over 80% of overall energy in 1954 and 
1967, but only 50-70% in the period 1977-2007. 
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Figure 73: Energy Inputs for U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
The EER analysis excludes self-use of natural gas.  This leads to a dramatically higher 
EROI in the 1950s and 1960s, which are the years in which direct energy inputs dominate 
the overall energy inputs.  After that point, indirect energy embodied in steel, concrete, 
and supplies becomes much more significant, and so the exclusion of a major direct 
energy source does not change the EROI as much.  Figure 74 shows the EER, and Figure 
75 shows the energy inputs, with the self-use of natural gas and petroleum excluded.  
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Figure 74: EER of U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
 
 
Figure 75: External Energy Inputs for U.S. Oil and Gas Production, 1954-2007 
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The revisions in the methodology do not substantially change the findings of Cleveland 
(2005) or similar analyses.  Some adjustments to the supply series result in moderate 
changes to the indirect energy consumption, but the general trends remain the same.  
Extension of the series to 2007 shows that the EROI for oil and gas production in the 
United States is nearing the nadir seen in 1982.  This is true whether one uses the 
thermodynamic or Divisia EROI.  The recent decline is not as dramatic for the price-
weighted EROI, as the dramatic increase in natural gas prices in 2007, combined with 
increased production of natural gas, improved that metric.   
Rising oil prices in recent years have stimulated more investment in the industry, which 
led to greater indirect energy costs; in 2007, indirect energy costs comprised nearly half 
of all energy costs, their largest share since 1982.  Since this model uses depreciation and 
not investment for capital expenditures, the indirect costs in that year are the result of 
investments over several prior years, reflecting the equipment “used up” in that year.  
External Energy Return shows a much steeper decline, as the oil and gas industries have 
generally reduced internal energy as a share of overall energy and as indirect energy has 
become a larger share of overall energy use.  Internal energy represented 70% of direct 
energy inputs through 1977, but around 50% after that.  The estimate for self-use in 2007 
is very uncertain and does not provide a basis for concluding that this trend has reversed.  
Self-use of petroleum, which accounted for a majority of fuel oil use in some years, is 
now negligible.   
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Figure 76: EROI and Real Price of Oil 
Scarcity of easily-accessible oil has made the remaining oil more difficult to extract.  It 
requires more fuel for exploration vehicles, more steel for drilling rigs, and more concrete 
for wells.  Improving technology is competing with decreasing supplies, and the price of 
oil shows that scarcity is the stronger force at the moment.  As seen in Figure 76, the 
price of oil generally tracks inversely with the EROI.  If oil takes little effort to extract, it 
is inexpensive, and if it takes a great deal of effort, it will be more expensive.  There is 
also the effect that high prices stimulate investment in production technology that can, 
over time, reduce the energy needed to produce oil.  As was seen in the 1990s, 
improvements in technology can temporarily reverse a decline in EROI. 
The high EROI of oil and natural gas production led to increases in productivity in 
sectors from manufacturing to agriculture; the high EROI and associated low cost of 
petroleum led to the development of transportation systems highly dependent on that 
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resource.  While this analysis does not declare that the high EROI of previous eras is 
forever gone, it does demonstrate that the pre-Oil-Crisis levels have not been reached 
since 1972, the gains of the 1990s have been reversed, and the most recent EROI is about 
as low as has been seen in the U.S.  Considering thermodynamic energy only, EROI is 
about half of the post-war peak, and considering the substitutability of resources, the 
Divisia index is roughly a third of its prior peak.  Given the volatility of the oil market 
since 2007, the expansion of hydraulic fracturing, and other developments in the industry, 
it will be interesting to see what trends are evident in the 2012 Economic Census.   
4.5.  EROI of Oil Shale 
The vast shale resources of the Western United States have long been known to contain 
kerogen, a combination of chemical compounds that can be converted into petroleum.  A 
large portion of these resources existed on Federal lands in the early 20th century, and 
these were set aside as the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves.  Divestment in the 
1980s and 1990s transferred ownership of some oil shale resources to the Northern Ute 
Indian Tribe, while others were transferred to the Department of the Interior and private 
ownership.  The main U.S. oil shale formation of interest is the Eocene Green River 
Formation, spanning parts of Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah. 
Some shale formations contain actual petroleum.  This resource is generally referred to as 
“tight oil,” and is not the same as the “oil shale” discussed here.  The Bakken shale 
formation in North Dakota contains extensive reserves of tight oil, which is now 
economically accessed through horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.  Oil shale is 
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also distinct from shale gas, which is similar to “tight oil” except that it is primarily light 
hydrocarbons such as methane.  
The kerogen in oil shale can be transformed into petroleum through one of two primary 
processes.  In surface retorting, the shale is mined, extracted, and processed.  For in-situ 
extraction, energy is applied to the shale while it is underground, with the kerogen 
converted into a liquid synthetic crude oil, pumped out, and refined.  Both processes 
require considerable direct energy inputs, as well as water, capital and material inputs.   
World production of oil from shale was about 684,000 tons in 2005 (Dyni, 2007) [224], 
equivalent to about 5 million barrels, or 13,700 barrels per day. By way of comparison, 
global crude oil production in 2005 averaged 84.6 million barrels per day.  A 
considerable amount of oil shale is also used as a fuel rather than as a feedstock.  Estonia, 
which has for decades led the world in the production of oil shale, mined 14.6 million 
tons in 2005.  Of this, 10.9 million tons were used for electricity generation.   
Interest in oil shale has waxed and waned.  During the oil crises of the 1970s, the U.S. 
Government funded efforts to develop liquid fuels from oil shale.  When oil prices 
dropped in the 1980s, projects were abandoned and companies saw their investments 
become worthless.  Oil prices remained low most of the 1990s.  As oil prices began to 
rise again in the 2000s, some energy companies expressed a modest level of renewed 
interest in the resource.  Smith et al. (2006) [225] illustrates the trends in oil shale 
research and development over time as a barometer of this interest in oil shale. 
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 included a number of provisions related to the 
development of oil shale.  Among these, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) was to begin leasing its oil shale properties for development.  BLM 
requested proposals in 2005.  Winning applicants received leases to develop oil shale 
research and development projects on BLM properties in the Western United States; the 
initial leases were for 640 acres each, with options to expand if the sites and processes 
proved commercially viable.  Crawford and Knaus (2007) [226] provide an overview of 
27 companies that are major participants in the U.S. oil shale industry, including many of 
those who had submitted applications through this process.  The overview illustrates the 
fairly limited experience in actual development of oil from shale resources. 
The Energy Policy Act also provided for the creation of a Strategic Unconventional Fuels 
Task Force.  In 2007 this Task Force produced a report on the technological and 
economic aspects of oil shale production (DOE, 2007a) [227], but the report did not 
contain any specific information on the EROI for oil shale. 
4.5.1.  EROI Methodology Applied in Studies 
Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 explain EROI methodology and concepts.  Some of the recent 
analyses for oil shale assess only direct energy costs, such as the energy used to heat the 
shale or to pump fluids. Other studies also include indirect energy in the form of energy 
embodied in materials and capital equipment, although they vary in the extent and 
method with which they calculate such costs.  The studies reviewed here would be 
EROIstnd or EROI1,d under the framework of Murphy, et al. (2011).  It is noted in the 
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description of each study whether or not it addresses indirect energy.  In several cases, 
the environmental impacts are quantified, but they are not translated into energy 
equivalents. 
Self-use or internal energy is an important issue in the assessment of the EROI for oil 
shale.  The Shell method of in situ retorting of kerogen produces significant quantities of 
hydrocarbon (HC) gas, which is burned to generate the electricity used by the process 
(Brandt, 2008). Similarly, the Alberta Taciuk Processor (ATP) above-ground oil shale 
retort method produces HC gases and a solid char substance that are burned as fuels.  One 
could argue that these internally generated fuels should not be counted as an energy cost 
because they do not have an opportunity cost—society did not give something up to 
create them, unlike the electricity an oil shale facility purchases from the grid.  On the 
other hand, the char or gas generated by the process literally is used up to perform useful 
work, and thus is a necessary expenditure of energy to produce the desire liquid fuel. This 
argues for including the self or internal energy in the calculation of the EROI. As Brandt 
(2008) notes, the internal energy is essential to account for in the assessment of the 
greenhouse gas emissions from oil shale.  Under the EROI Protocol from Murphy et al. 
(2011), internal energy consumed is designated Irec, “recycled energy,” and is normally 
considered in an EROI analysis but not in an External Energy Ratio (EER) analysis. 
Energy systems have external costs as well, most notably environmental and human 
health costs, although these are more difficult to assess in energy terms.  Energy systems 
also require inputs that are difficult to quantify in energy terms, such as the use of land 
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and water.  Oil shale production methods requires significant inputs of water and releases 
solid waste and greenhouse gases.  Mulder and Hagens (2008) [228] argue for the use of 
a multicriteria EROI in which additional metrics are added to the analysis, such as energy 
yield per unit land or per unit water consumed. 
4.5.2.  Oil Shale Conversion Processes 
The two main processing options for oil shale are surface retorting and in-situ extraction.  
In surface retorting, the shale is mined and brought to the surface, with the material then 
heated in a retort to extract the compounds that are processed into synthetic crude oil.  In-
situ extraction involves heating the material underground and pumping liquids to the 
surface, where they then undergo further processing.  Shell conducted research on an in-
situ extraction at its Mahogany Research Project, in Rio Blanco County, Colorado.  The 
small number and small scale of existing facilities limits the assessments that can be 
done.  These and a few other projects form the basis of most recent analyses. 
4.5.3.  Review of Existing Studies 
This section reviews several existing studies that report data on the EROI for oil shale.  
Note that these studies vary widely in their scope, method of assessment, and the degree 
to which the veracity of their conclusions can be objectively assessed.  We exclude most 
references to the EROI for oil shale that lacked sufficient explanation of assumptions and 
methods.  We also exclude studies prior to 2000 because they reflect technologies and 
resource assessments that are outdated and/or inaccurate. 
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4.5.3.1. Brandt (2008) and Brandt (2009) [229] 
The most thorough work on the energy and carbon balance of oil shale is by Brandt 
(2008, 2009) in which he models current technologies for in situ and surface oil shale 
operations. Brandt’s analysis defines two different measures of EROI based on a 
distinction between what he calls “external energy” and “net energy.” The external 
energy ratio (EER) compares the energy produced to the direct and indirect energy 
purchased by the oil shale facility. This method excludes the internal or self energy use as 
an “energy cost.” 
The net energy ratio (NER) includes purchased energy plus primary energy input from 
the feedstock resource itself (e.g., coproduced HC gas consumed for electricity 
generation).  That is, the NER approach counts self or internal energy as an energy cost 
of producing liquid fuel.   
Brandt (2008) models the Shell in situ conversion process that utilizes electricity to heat 
the underground shale over a period of 2 years. Hydrocarbons are produced using 
conventional oil production techniques. The Shell process co-produces HC gas that 
powers a combined-cycle gas turbine, which in turn meets some of the project’s 
electricity needs. External energy is needed for construction, drilling, refining, and 
product transport, and possibly as supplemental heating power.   
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The resulting External Energy Ratio ranges from 2.4 - 15.8:1, depending on assumptions. 
The Net Energy Ratio, which takes into account the internal energy consumed is much 
lower, in the range of 1.2 - 1.6:1.  
The resulting greenhouse gas emissions are projected to be about 20-50% higher than 
those of conventional oil (range of 30.6 to 37.1 grams C per megajoule (MJ) of fuel, 
compared to 25.3 for the average of gasoline and diesel).  These values are comparable to 
oil sands (29-36) and lower than those of coal-derived liquids (42-49).  This analysis does 
include fugitive greenhouse gas emissions. 
Brandt (2009) assesses the surface retorting method for producing liquid fuel from Green 
River oil shale using the Alberta Taciuk Processor (ATP).  The ATP is an above-ground 
oil shale retort method that combusts the coke or “char” deposited on the shale during 
retorting to fuel the retorting process.  As with the in-situ method, much of the energy 
input comes from the shale itself.  Mining and refining account for about 1/3 of the 
overall energy demand; the energy used to operate the retort accounts for most of the 
remainder.  Mining and refining are major external energy demands, and in some cases 
use external electric power for the retort.  Systems that generate on-site using co-
produced natural gas will count electricity as internal. 
The External Energy Ratio ranges from 2.6 - 6.9:1.  The lower range of uncertainty 
compared to the in situ method is probably due to the greater experience with actual 
systems. Variations in mining energy requirements and upgrading energy requirements 
account for more than half of the variation between the “low” and “high” cases.  The Net 
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Energy Ratio ranges from 1.1 - 1.8:1. Energy requirements for materials such as steel and 
cement are included in this analysis, though the magnitude of this impact is relatively 
small according to the study’s supporting materials. 
Brandt (2009) conservatively estimates that the resulting greenhouse gas emissions are 
about 50-75% higher than those of conventional oil, and that is without considering 
fugitive emissions.   
4.5.3.2. The RAND Study (Bartis et al. 2005) [230] 
This study provides an overview of the land use, conventional pollutants, greenhouse gas 
emissions, water quality, and water consumption associated with oil shale development. 
The RAND report is not a specialized EROI analysis per se, and it does not contain a full 
calculation of indirect energy inputs or a quantitative assessment of all externalities.  
However, it does provide data on certain direct energy inputs, as well as a qualitative 
description of externalities. 
The report provides a detailed description of both surface retorting and in-situ extraction 
technologies.  Surface retorting involves crushing the oil shale and heating it to 900-
1,000°F for over half an hour.  The report also mentions the challenges encountered by 
the Unocal plant in the Piceance Basin, which closed in 1991 after producing at only half 
of its design output.  Exxon’s surface retorting Colony project was abandoned before 
completion.  International experience in Estonia, China, Brazil, and Russia is seen as not 
illustrative for U.S. applications due to the plants’ size and regulatory conditions. 
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The primary in-situ process considered is the thermally conductive in-situ extraction 
process demonstrated by Shell. This involves slowly heating the shale to a lower 
temperature (650-700°F) over a period of three years.  Fluids (oil and gas) are then 
pumped out of the formation.  The principal direct energy inputs are the electricity used 
to heat the shale and the energy used to create the “freeze wall” that protects the local 
groundwater and prevents the valuable hydrocarbons from escaping the project 
boundaries. 
The report states that “the heating energy required for this process equals about one-sixth 
the energy value of the extracted product.”  This by itself would suggest an EROItherm of 
6:1, but as noted, there are additional energy demands for the freeze wall, and indirect 
energy inputs in materials and capital.  More importantly, the heating energy is electricity 
that must be generated by burning a fuel.  Specifically, the energy inputs are 250-300 
kWh per barrel of extracted product.  A value of 300 kWh equals about 1 GJ, and a barrel 
of oil contains about 6 GJ.  However, if the electricity was produced from coal converted 
at an efficiency of 40%, then the actual primary energy inputs are 2.5 times as great as 
the nominal heating energy, or 2.5 GJ.  Thus, the EROIelec would be 2.4:1.  The size of a 
generating plant would be considerable, accounting for a significant share of the water 
demands.  An in-situ process capable of producing 100,000 barrels per day would require 
a generating capacity of 1.2 GW.  Along with EROI impacts, the use of coal for 
generation would produce a significant greenhouse gas impact.  Every 6 GJ of synthetic 
crude would produce, in addition to the emissions from its own combustion, the 
emissions from 2.5 GJ of coal.  Another fuel source that might be utilized is the natural 
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gas that is co-produced with the synthetic crude.  RAND suggested this option would be 
less economical than using coal, due to the anticipated higher value of natural gas. 
Water consumption is specified as about three barrels of water per barrel of oil produced.  
RAND notes that earlier studies found water as a limiting factor for oil shale 
development.  
4.5.3.3. Bunger et al. (2004) [231] 
Bunger et al (2004) authored a report for the Department of Energy entitled “Strategic 
Significance of America’s Oil Shale Resource.”  Volume 2 of this report focused on the 
economic and technological aspects of oil shale development.  This report characterizes 
the processing of oil shale through the Alberta Taciuk Processor (a surface retort) as 
“energy self-sufficient” for the purposes of heating.  This means that the combustion of 
some of the compounds present in the shale provide the thermal energy required to 
extract the remaining compounds.  External energy inputs (electricity) are only required 
for mechanical energy in the process, and amount to about 12-15 kWh per metric ton of 
ore.  At 25 gallons of synthetic crude per ton, and a heat rate of 10,000 BTU per kWh 
(34% generation efficiency), this would be about 5% of the energy content in the shale.  
However, that does not include energy for mining and ore transport. 
Bunger et al. (2004) is not a specialized EROI analysis per se, and it does not contain a 
full calculation of indirect energy inputs or a quantitative assessment of all externalities.  
It also does not discuss the energy inputs required for in-situ oil shale production.  It 
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provides a qualitative discussion of environmental impacts, with particular attention to 
how these compare to the impacts of production of petroleum from oil sands.   
A subsequent Department of Energy fact sheet on the EROI of various unconventional oil 
resources cited Bunger’s work to provide a value of over 10:1 for surface retorting, 
roughly 7:1 for non-electric heating in-situ extraction, and 2.5:1 for electric heating in-
situ extraction (DOE, 2007b) [232].  The fact sheet provides no methodological detail, so 
it is impossible to judge the veracity of its conclusions.  It appears to consider only the 
external energy supplied to the process—the energy used for electricity generation for 
electric heating is excluded, as are indirect energy costs. Thus, the EROI reported in the 
DOE fact sheet is certainly too high, although the margin of error is impossible to 
ascertain due to the lack of documentation. 
4.5.3.4. Backer and Duff et al. (2007) [233] 
“Peak Oil Production and the Implications to the State of Connecticut” was submitted to 
Connecticut’s legislative leaders and Governor in November 2007 by the Legislative 
Peak Oil and Natural Gas Caucus.  The lead members were Representative Terry Backer 
and Senator Bob Duff, with support from Paul Sankowski and Steve Andrews.  A 
December 2007 addendum on tar sands and oil shale also assessed the impacts of these 
resources.  The report also cites EROI of 3:1 for surface retorting, though not specifying 
a source.  There is no documentation for this result, so little confidence can be placed in 
its accuracy. Water demand is stated as 1 to 3 barrels of water per barrel of oil for 
industrial operations.  The municipal and industrial growth required to support the 
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production of 2.5 million barrels per day would require another 50 million gallons per 
day, in addition to the 100-300 million gallons of industrial water demand.  The long 
timeframe for power plant construction is noted as a hurdle to development, and the 
water-related issues are given particular attention. 
4.5.3.5. House Committee on Resources (2005) [234] 
The House of Representatives Committee on Natural Resources held hearings on the oil 
shale resource in June 2005.  One of the speakers was Jack Savage, President and CEO of 
Oil-Tech, Inc.  This company produced synthetic crude from oil shale in a surface 
retorting process at a small facility in Utah.  Mr. Savage discussed the operation, 
including the thermal energy self-sufficiency of the process.  Mr. Savage also described 
his company’s operations as requiring relatively low capital investment, which would 
argue for low indirect energy inputs in materials. 
The representative from Shell, Mr. Terry O’Connor, discussed in-situ production.  Some 
specific practical challenges were identified, such as developing heaters that would last 
for the multi-year duration of the process. 
Mark Maddox, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Fossil Energy, 
answered a number of questions on oil shale.  Citing Shell’s work, he quoted an EROI 
value of 3:1 for in-situ extraction, or 6:1 if the natural gas co-produced with the synthetic 
crude is used to provide the necessary heat.  Mr. Maddox notes the connection between 
EROI and greenhouse gas emissions for oil shale development.  Mr. Maddox also noted 
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an additional source of CO2 emissions: beyond that from the combustion of the resulting 
product and that of the energy used for heating, some process CO2 emissions result when 
the carbonate compounds in the shale are heated in a retort.  Finally, Maddox cites a 
figure of 1 to 2 barrels of water per barrel of oil produced. 
The wording of Mr. Maddox’s response to the energy balance question suggests that the 
answer refers to direct energy consumption.  The values cited line up with the downhole 
heating energy demands in the RAND study, which are “one-sixth the energy value of the 
extracted product,” or a 6:1 EROI if natural gas provides the heat.  With 50% efficient 
generation, the EROI would be 3:1 for electric heating in-situ production.  Other indirect 
energy costs and indirect energy costs are excluded. 
4.5.3.6. Cleveland (2005) 
Cleveland (2005) offers an extensive discussion of EROI methodology.  The values 
reported for the EROI for oil shale are above and below the break-even point, with the 
median estimate around 5:1 or less. These findings are based on Cleveland et al. (1984) 
[235], which assessed the EROI of a range of energy resources based on the then-current 
literature.  The studies referenced by Cleveland et al. (1984) via Lind and Mitsch (1981) 
[236] date from the mid-1970s.  They show EROI ranging from 0.7:1 to 13.3:1. This 
wide range is partly due to very limited experience with actual projects, and partly due to 
the less-developed state of EROI analysis at the time.  The range cited by Cleveland 
(2005), based as it is on these earlier studies, is not representative of the current state of 
technology and resource assessment.   
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4.5.3.7. Burnham et al. (2010) [237] 
American Shale Oil LLC (AMSO) has proposed a new method of producing synthetic 
crude from an oil shale source rock.  This method relies on heating an illitic shale layer 
under pressure to fracture it, increase permeability, and perform in-situ retorting, while a 
nahcolitic shale oil layer above serves to insulate the producing layer from groundwater.  
The process is still under development and has not yet been field-tested.  AMSO projects 
water consumption of less than one barrel per barrel of oil produced, CO2 emissions from 
downhole heating of 50 kg per barrel of oil (roughly 10% of the CO2 from burning that 
oil), and an EROI of possibly 5:1 (considering all energy uses) to 8:1 (considering direct 
energy only). 
4.5.3.8. Bunger and Russell (2010) [238] 
Bunger and Russell (2010) analyze the thermal efficiency of oil shale production, 
modeling a surface retort.  The study notes the increasing energy cost of petroleum 
recovery, and states that oil shale production will soon be “thermodynamically 
competitive” with petroleum.  Bunger and Russell use an “efficiency of conversion” 
approach, where the energy required for each step gives an efficiency value for that point 
in the process.  For example, mining and ore preparation require approximately 4% of the 
energy content in the shale (96% efficiency), while upgrading requires about 2.5% of the 
energy in the feedstock (97.5% efficiency).  The analysis also notes that the internal 
energy consumed has no other economic use.  The overall energy efficiency is seen to be 
81%, corresponding to an EROI of 4.3:1.  Applying Equation (27), from above: 
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If ε = 0.81, then EROI = 4.3.  For 100 units of energy present in the oil shale, 81 units are 
delivered as fuel, with 19 units consumed in production.  EROI is 81/19, or 4.3.  The 
analysis does not included embodied energy in materials or other indirect energy.  Direct 
energy is considered, as is the energy required for electricity generation (40% generation 
efficiency is assumed). 
4.5.4.  Comparison with Conventional Oil Production 
Most of the world’s liquid fuels are derived from conventional extraction and processing 
of crude oil.  How does the EROI for shale oil compare with that for conventional oil?  
Delucchi (1991) [239], Delucchi (1993), and Delucchi (2003) [240] estimate the amount 
of energy used in various fuel cycles related to the use of alternative transportation fuels. 
This work is used in the GREET (Greenhouse gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy 
use in Transportation) model sponsored by the Argonne National Laboratory. GREET 
evaluates the fuel cycle from well to wheel and for various fuel and vehicle technologies. 
Delucchi (1991) indicates an EROI of about 43:1 for crude oil at the wellhead (Figure 4).  
Delucchi (2003) finds an EROI of about 20:1 for crude oil at the wellhead by 2015.  The 
decline from 43:1 to 20:1 from 1991 to 2015 is due in part to the assumption that an 
increasing share of production will come from energy-intensive offshore drilling, heavy 
oil, and enhanced recovery. 
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Figure 77: Estimates of EROI at the wellhead 
Sources: Delucchi (1991), Delucchi (2003), Cleveland (2005), Brandt (2008), and 
Brandt (2009) 
Cleveland (2005) estimates EROI for oil and gas production at the wellhead of about 23:1 
in 1997 when only direct energy is included, and about 18:1 when indirect energy is 
included.  These figures are for combined oil and gas production.  Cleveland uses a more 
comprehensive definition of indirect energy use than does Delucchi’s (1991), and 
consequently finds lower EROI.  
Brandt’s work can be used as the basis for calculating the EROI for shale oil at a stage of 
processing similar to crude oil at the wellhead. Both the in situ and surface retorting 
methods produce a “crude” product that must be refined into a useful fuel.  Brandt’s data 
indicate an EROI of around 2:1 for the extraction of the crude product from the shale.  
These estimates are shown in Figure 77 and are the average of Brandt’s “high” and “low” 
scenarios prior to the energy costs of refining.  
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Figure 78 compares EROI of oil shale to conventional petroleum at the pump, after 
accounting for the energy costs of refining.  The EROI is the energy content of the 
refined fuel compared to the energy required to extract, process, and refine the crude 
product into a finished fuel that is ready for end use. Delucchi (1991, 2003) suggests an 
EROI of about 4.7 for motor gasoline refined from conventional crude oil.  Brandt’s 
(2008, 2009) indicates an EROI of about 1.4 for liquid fuel refined from shale oil. 
 
Figure 78: Estimates of EROI at the pump 
Sources: Delucchi (1991), Delucchi (2003), Brandt (2008), and Brandt (2009) 
The drop in EROI from the wellhead to the pump seems very large for refined petroleum 
because EROI is a ratio.  Delucchi (1991), Table 3, indicates that for every 100 MJ of 
reformulated gasoline sold to a consumer, roughly 2.5 MJ are expended in extracting the 
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crude, 1.2 MJ in transporting the crude, 18.5 MJ in refining it, and 0.8 MJ in distributing 
it.  For the 2003 revision, the costs are 4.8 MJ for extraction, 1.1 MJ for transport, 17.0 
MJ for refining, and 0.95 MJ for distribution.  The refining costs for shale oil are not 
greatly different (around 11 MJ for in-situ or 15 MJ for surface retorting), but because 
EROI is already so low, the costs have a lesser impact on the EROI for shale oil.  An 
added energy cost equal to 15% of final energy will reduce an EROI of 40 down to 5.7, 
but it will only reduce an EROI of 4 down to 2.5.   
4.5.5.  Oil Shale EROI Conclusions  
The discussion surrounding the net energy balance of oil shale is characterized by data 
and conclusions that that lack rigorous analysis and review.  Among those studies that 
apply some type of formal analysis, most focus on the assessment of a portion of direct 
energy use, ignoring other direct energy use and indirect energy use. 
By a wide margin, Brandt (2008, 2009) are the most credible studies.  Brandt’s work 
suggests that the EROI for oil shale falls between 1:1 and 2:1 when internal or self-use 
energy is included as an energy cost.  This choice of system boundary is consistent with 
method used to calculate the EROI for conventional oil and coal extraction (Cleveland, 
2005).  In the case of conventional oil extraction, for example, considerable co-produced 
natural gas is burned as a fuel to power field operations. Cleveland (2005) includes so 
called “captive “ fuel use as an energy cost of oil because it is energy that is literally used 
up to produce oil. The gaseous and char fuels generated and then burned in the oil shale 
production process should be viewed in the same way.  As noted above, one could argue 
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that these fuels should not be counted as an energy cost because they do not have an 
economic opportunity cost.  Of course, the environmental impact from the combustion of 
those fuels occurs regardless of the accounting scheme. 
The EROI for oil shale is considerably below the EROI for conventional crude oil.  This 
conclusion holds for both the crude product and refined fuel stages of processing. Even in 
its depleted state—smaller and deeper fields, depleted natural drive mechanisms, etc.—
conventional crude oil generates a significantly larger energy surplus than oil shale.  This 
is not a surprising result considering the nature of the natural resource exploited in each 
process.  The kerogen in oil shale is solid organic material that has not been subject to the 
temperature, pressure, and other geologic conditions required to convert it to liquid form. 
In effect, humans must supply the additional energy required to “upgrade” the oil shale 
resource to the functional equivalent of conventional crude oil.  This extra effort carries a 
large energy penalty, producing a much lower EROI for oil shale. 
Their remains considerable uncertainty surrounding the technological characterization, 
resource characterization, and choice of the system boundary for oil shale operations.  
Even the most thorough analyses (Brandt, 2008, 2009) exclude some energy costs.  Based 
on Brandt’s analysis, it is likely that oil shale is still a net energy producer, but it does not 
appear to carry a large energy surplus.  
An important caveat is in order here:  the EROI of 1-2 reported by Brandt includes self 
energy use, i.e., energy released by the oil shale conversion process that is used to power 
that operation.  For example, most of the retorting energy in the ATP process is provided 
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by the combustion of char and produced gas, significantly reducing energy needs from 
the point of view of the operator. From a net energy perspective, how should this internal 
use of energy be treated? The answer depends on the question being asked. One could 
argue that the char and gas produced and consumed within the shale conversion process 
has zero opportunity cost—i.e., that energy would not, or could not, be used somewhere 
else in the economy, so it should not be treated as a “cost.”  The EROI calculated using 
this perspective is in the range of 2 to 16.  On the other hand, the internal energy is an 
essential expenditure of work necessary to produce the liquid fuel.  The internal energy is 
absolutely necessary to accurately assess greenhouse gas emissions. 
Another issue is energy quality.  Society willingly sacrifices 3 BTUs of coal to generate 1 
BTU of electricity in thermal power plants. This makes economic sense because a BTU 
of electricity is more valuable than a BTU of coal.  Oil shale operations consume large 
quantities of electricity to upgrade a low quality resource (oil shale) to a higher quality 
form (liquid fuel).  But liquid fuel is still a lower quality form of energy than electricity, 
at least from a macroeconomic perspective. Accounting for these differences can 
dramatically alter the results of EROI analyses (Cleveland, 1992) [241].  The Shell in situ 
process is very electricity-intensive, and accounting for energy quality would, ceteris 
paribus, lower the reported EROI. Note, however, that one could argue against 
accounting for quality because if that electricity is self-generated, it may have zero 
opportunity cost.  Future work should address these issues. 
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The low EROI for oil shale is closely connected to a significant release of greenhouse 
gases. The large quantities of energy needed to process oil shale, combined with the 
thermochemistry of the retorting process, produce carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gas emissions.  Oil shale unambiguously emits more greenhouse gases than conventional 
liquid fuels from crude oil feedstocks by a factor of 1.2 to 1.75 (Brandt, 2008, 2009).  
Brandt (2010) [242] provides greater discussion of CO2 emissions from oil shale, 
including those from carbonate decomposition. 
A fuel with a modest EROI that emitted few greenhouse gases could be a candidate for an 
alternative source of energy.  However, a very low EROI combined with very high 
carbon intensity should remove an energy system from serious consideration as an 
alternative to conventional crude oil extraction and refining.  Oil shale in the western 
United States appears to fall into this category.  A fuel with high EROI and high carbon 
emissions per unit of net energy delivered, such as coal, enables a considerable expansion 
of economic activity at the cost of environmental impact.  A fuel with low EROI but 
relatively low carbon emissions per unit of net energy delivered does not allow much 
expansion of economic activity, but has a reduced adverse effect on climate.  A fuel that 
has both low EROI and high carbon emissions offers neither the potential for economic 
gain nor the potential of mitigating environmental impact. 
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5.  Overall Conclusions 
This dissertation examines numerous aspects of energy transitions in societies.  An 
interdisciplinary approach is well suited to studies of patterns of energy use, and these 
analyses employ numerous distinct methodologies and approaches.  
An examination of the energy consumption of the United States over the years 1780-2010 
employs the tools of economic history.  Contemporary accounts, Census reports, and 
more recent estimates are combined to provide a more complete picture of energy use in 
the United States.  Price series illustrate that one of the most important fuel shifts, the rise 
of coal, was driven by price reductions.  As found by Grubler (2012), end-use 
technologies were critical for driving transitions, as they directly provided energy 
services.  While mechanical power has been an energy service of particular interest in 
prior studies, this analysis also examined the nineteenth-century resources used for 
lighting and cooling.  These applications had great economic importance and led to 
lasting cultural changes.  Technological progress shows a general, but not inevitable, 
increase in the economic output per unit of energy consumed.  The inclusion of 
traditional energy results in energy intensity having a declining trend over time, as found 
by Kander et al. (2007) for several European countries.  An increase in energy intensity 
over the period 1890-1920 is the result of inefficient application of steam power, with the 
millwork system encountering diminishing returns to scale.  Electrification of industry 
reversed this trend, as described in Devine (1983). 
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The vast gains in efficiency created by technological progress allow societies to employ 
higher-cost energy resources with a net reduction in cost per unit of energy service 
delivered.  This approach is implicitly or explicitly used in energy policy.  Improved 
energy efficiency by itself cannot solve environmental problems such as air pollution or 
climate change.  Rather, efficiency allows the solutions to be painless (or nearly so), by 
redirecting a portion of the economic gains from efficiency to installing pollution controls 
or developing cleaner or more abundant energy resources.   
The recognition of environmental externalities and the recognition that fossil energy 
resources are finite on a human timescale represent changes in the way the United States 
thinks about energy.  Improving efficiency coupled with pollution standards since 1970 
mark this as the beginning of an energy transition.  Energy consumption per capita has 
plateaued and slightly declined.  Vehicle fuel economy has improved.  Air pollution has 
declined, and the policy tools have been put into place to deal with it and with other 
environmental problems.  Research and development on renewable energy technologies 
had led to remarkable declines in costs and increases in deployment.  An energy 
transition is ongoing. 
Despite the reductions in energy intensity over time, the U.S. still uses considerably more 
energy per unit of GDP than most countries of comparable income levels.  Since climate 
could be one driver of higher energy intensity, several series of population-weighted 
heating and cooling degree days were developed.  This draws on existing climate 
reanalyses and employs geospatial analysis to derive annual values for 231 countries and 
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territories over the period 1995-2010.  A subsequent analysis uses these series to compare 
thirty-two of the largest economies in the world with the statistical tools of econometrics, 
with the goal of identifying the driving factors behind differences in energy consumption.   
Although the effect of climate cannot be isolated in panel data, it is clearly seen in the 
Group Mean Regression.  Climate partially explains differences in energy intensity 
between the U.S. and countries with more moderate or more extreme conditions.  
Electricity prices, fuel shares, and GDP per capita also influence energy intensity. 
The final section evaluates the energy return on investment from conventional oil 
production in the U.S.  This draws on economic data from the Census of Mineral 
Industries and other sources, and applies several different types of EROI analysis.  The 
EROI of domestic oil production is seen to fluctuate over 1954-2007, with oil in the late 
1960s having a much greater External Energy Return due to the use of co-produced 
natural gas to power oil production in that era.  The EROI of U.S. oil production in 2007 
was nearly identical to the prior nadir of EROI in 1982.  A review of the literature for oil 
shale establishes that even the diminished EROI of U.S. conventional oil production is far 
greater than that likely to be obtained from oil shale.   
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Appendix 1-1: Human Labor 
Workforce Numbers 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) offers workforce numbers back to 1820.  I use these 
numbers and Dewhurst’s 1850 value for weekly hours worked, as well as his 4% 
unemployment number.  For 1780-1810, I assume the non-agricultural worker share 
rising from an assumed 12% in 1780 to the known 28% for 1820, and follow Dewhurst’s 
assumption for 1850 that agricultural workers worked 72 hours a week, and non-
agricultural worked 65.7.  The first Census was taken in 1790; population estimates for 
1780 come from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).  Dewhurst’s values apply from 1850 
through 1950, in which year human labor represents 1% of work output and about 1.5% 
of energy inputs.  After 1950, worker numbers and hours are from Springsteen and 
Epstein (1983) and BEA (2013). 
Springsteen and Epstein’s Handbook of Labor Statistics, for the Department of Labor, 
does not include proprietors’ employment.  Bureau of Economic Analysis (2013) does.  
Handbook of Labor Statistics finds 1970 employment to be 80,796,000; BEA found a 
total of 91,277,600, with proprietors’ employment of 12,484,600.  This illustrates that the 
Handbook series needs to be corrected for proprietors’ employment.   
Proprietors’ employment equaled 15.6% of all other workers in 1969, at 12.3 million 
compared to 78.8 million non-proprietors.  This share is seen to increase over time, such 
that by 2009 proprietors employment is 27% of the non-proprietors total.  I apply a 
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correction to the Handbook series alone, ramping up proprietors numbers from 0% of all 
other jobs in 1950 to 15.6% in 1969.  Prior to 1950, Dewhurst’s numbers are used 
unchanged.  This correction makes little difference from the point of view of energy 
utilization, but serves to smooth out what would otherwise be a large jump in human 
labor input when switching from one series to the other. 
Per Capita Calorie Consumption 
Duffey and Popkin (2011) [243] offer a value of 2,374 kcal/day for the U.S. over the 
period 2003-2006, up from 1,803 kcal/day over the period 1977-1978.  However, a large 
amount of food is wasted, with Lundqvist et al. (2008) [244] finding that food waste in 
the U.S. is around 25%, possibly higher. This may explain why the U.N. Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO 2010) [245] finds U.S. food consumption to be 3,777 
kcal/day over the period 2003-2005.  If the FAO includes food wasted as food 
“consumed,” and the actual wastage level was 37%, then 2,374 kcal/day would have been 
eaten by consumers.  Similarly, by relying on FAO accounts, Kander et al. (2005) finds 
Spain to have a food consumption reaching 3,400 calories per capita per day in the late 
twentieth century.   
McMahon (1985) [246] detailed the grain and meat allowances provided to widows in 
wills.  For the period from 1808 to 1830, the average yearly allowances of 12.1 bushels 
of corn, 5.6 bushels of rye, and 201.8 pounds of pork and beef would equal about 2,910 
calories per day, following the calculations used by Purvis and Balkin (1999) [247].  
Furthermore, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) estimates an average intake of over 2,700 
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calories per day in the Revolutionary era for population groups as varied as slaves, 
prisoners of war, militia, and both the British Army and the Continental Army. 
Key Uncertainties 
The energy history of the early U.S. is uncertain, and most references contain 
approximations, estimates, and inferences.  An ideal series would include food wastage 
and indirect calories (food that is fed to animals that are later consumed).  This would 
reflect “energy extracted from the environment” in a manner similar to that used for other 
energy resources.  However, most historical sources look at the direct calorie intake.  
This itself is somewhat uncertain, but the variance in accounts of calories consumed are 
nowhere near the difference in this analysis between food consumed and other energy 
inputs.  
Indirect calories are significant for animals that are fed crops specifically grown for that 
purpose.  Grain-fed cattle require about 50 calories of feed per calorie of cooked edible 
beef.  Pork requires about 20 calories per calorie of meat (and pigs traditionally were 
often fed food waste or scraps), and chicken requires about 14 (Smil 2008).  Livestock 
that is left to forage (such as grass-fed beef) has only an opportunity cost in the food that 
could have been produced on the pasture land, and not an actual cost of food energy 
extracted from the environment.  
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Appendix 1-2: Draft Animal Populations 
The population of draft animals (both on farms and off) is particularly uncertain prior to 
1850.  Falconer and Bidwell (1925) offer a few point estimates for specific counties and 
states.  Three counties in Massachusetts had about 0.09 horses per capita and 0.13 oxen 
per capita in 1800.  Connecticut had 0.151 oxen per capita and 0.1465 horses per capita 
in 1796.  Pennsylvania had 0.215 horses per capita in 1810. 
The 1850 Census begins noting draft animal populations, and includes estimates for 
1840.  A comparison to Falconer and Bidwell’s earlier data shows relatively little change 
in horse ownership.  In 1840, Connecticut had 0.11 horses per capita (down from 0.15 in 
1796), Pennsylvania had 0.212 (down from 0.215 in 1810), and Massachusetts had 0.08 
(down from the 0.09 for three counties in 1800).  Oxen ownership declined by nearly half 
in Massachusetts, increased slightly in Connecticut, and was not reported for the earlier 
Pennsylvania survey.   
Variation in livestock ownership between states in 1840 is generally greater than the 
variation within states over time from 1800 to 1840.  Based on this observation, I assign 
each state its per-capita ownership rates from 1840 for the period 1780-1839. 
For much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there are three main data 
sources: 
1. From 1849 through 1923, Daugherty (1928) provides draft animal populations, 
citing a Kinsman (1925).  Daugherty presents the Census values as reflecting the 
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population of the prior year, so his value for 1849 is that of the 1850 Census.  It is 
not clear why this is done, as the Census reflects the statistics of June 1 of 1850.  
As well, Daugherty cites Kinsman as the source for non-farm animals, but the 
Kinsman report does not appear to contain this information.   
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) presents both total and working populations of 
horses and mules on farms for the years from 1867 to 1960, citing reports of the 
Commissioner of Agriculture as well as Agricultural Statistics; it does not include 
oxen or non-farm animals.  The data was collected at annual intervals, as annual 
percentage changes were determined by field agents, and applied to decadal 
census figures.  It is therefore used as the resource of choice for the years in 
which it exists.  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) provides the latest data, 
extending through 1960 (with some estimates for the years from 1961 to 1970), 
but no more recent numbers were found, and the pertinent tables were not 
included in the latest edition of that resource.   
3. Dewhurst (1955) provides the working-age populations of horses, mules, and 
oxen both on farms and not on farms, for the years from 1850 to 1950; sources are 
given as direct communications with Department of Agriculture personnel.   
Dewhurst (1955) specifically tracks working-age populations, as do Kinsman (1925) and 
Daugherty (1928).  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) tracks total population; working 
stock is only tracked from 1920.  Dewhurst assumes that 70% of all horses and mules 
were workstock over the period 1850-1900.   
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Combining these resources, draft animal populations are then estimated as follows: 
 From 1780 to 1839, the per-capita farm animal ownership rates by state for 1840 
(from the 1850 Census) are applied to the populations for those states. 
 From 1780 to 1849, non-farm animals per non-farm worker are assumed to be 
constant at Daugherty’s 1850 rate.  Non-farm workers are assumed to be 12% of 
all workers in 1780, increasing linearly to the 28% value for 1820 given in U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (1975).  The level of 20% for 1800 is close to that given by 
Weiss (1985) [248]. 
 For 1840 and 1850, farm animal numbers are taken from U.S. Census Bureau 
(1854), with linear interpolation to fill the years from 1841 to 1849 and from 1851 
to 1866.  For 1840, oxen are estimated according to their 1850 proportion of total 
cattle in each state, and mules are estimated to have their 1850 share of 11% of 
total horses and mules. 
 From 1867 to 1960, U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) annual values are used for 
farm horses and mules.   
 From 1850 to 1950, Dewhurst’s decadal estimates, with linear interpolations, are 
used for non-farm animals, as well as working oxen.  Daugherty’s values for oxen 
are used from 1900 to 1923, and they are omitted thereafter, having declined to 
0.5% of all draft animals in that year. 
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 From 1961 to 2010, draft animal populations are assumed to decline by 9% per 
year, as that was the decline in draft animal populations from 1945 to 1960 
according to U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975).  
 The fraction of working stock in on-farm populations of horses and mules prior to 
1920 is as given in Dewhurst (1955), being 70% prior to 1900, 74% in 1910, and 
79% in 1920.  From 1920 to 1960, values from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
are used, and after 1960 that year’s value of 93% is used.  Non-farm horses and 
mules are assumed to be working stock, as are all oxen.  Non-working animals 
contribute to the energy inputs required but do not result in work output. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) includes unpublished estimates by John A. Waring of 
total prime mover horsepower 1960-1970.  Waring’s estimates suggest stabilization of 
draft animal power at around 1.5 million HP in 1970.  Assuming a 9% annual decline 
since 1960 results in 1.1 million HP in 1970.  I found no statistics for the number of draft 
animals on farms after 1970, and so assumed a continuation of the 9% annual decline.  It 
is possible that virtually all farms inclined to replace animals with tractors had done so by 
1970, and that the remaining ones continue to use animals due to cultural values or other 
reasons of preference.  In this case, draft animal populations after 1970 would be the 
same as those in 1970. 
Animal power is estimated at 0.6 horsepower (HP) for oxen, 1 HP for horses, and 0.8 HP 
for mules, based on Kinsman (1925) and Smil (1991).  Kinsman shows that, in 1918, 
horses and mules averaged 1207 lbs and 951 lbs, respectively.  Using Smil’s assumption 
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of 1 HP for a 1200-lb animal, these would be 1 HP and 0.8 HP.  Kinsman (1925) also 
estimated cattle, burros, or buffalo to be around 0.4 HP each, although I use a larger value 
based on Smil (1991).  Dewhurst (1955) uses a figure of 1 HP for all animals.   
Ayres and Warr (2003) conclude that the effective conversion efficiency for draft animals 
is around 4%, in which case the primary energy consumed by draft animals would be 25 
GJ for every GJ of work performed.  The approach used in their paper is to calculate the 
energy input for the draft animals as: 
/oi WW   
This calculation only applies to animals performing work.  As Smil (1991) notes, “their 
total annual feeding costs must be charged against the hours actually worked; a horse 
then costs about 30 MJ/h, an ox 25 MJ/h.”  Similarly, Kander (2002) notes, “All fodder 
consumed by the animal, also the energy needed for rest, is from the human perspective a 
necessary cost for the draught work of the animal.”  Non-working animals, such as those 
too young to work, must also be fed.  The food energy required to obtain mechanical 
work from draft animals is then the entire amount of food supplied to all draft animals 
(whether working animals or not) at all times.   
For this analysis, I estimate that a farm animal requires seven times the food of a person.  
Kander (2002) adjusted values from Hansson (1928) to account for the smaller size of 
horses and oxen in early Sweden.  The values in Table 46 are given as “fodder units,” 
which are almost equivalent to the 2700 calories assumed for human consumption; each 
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represents 1 kg of barley, which has 3000 digestible calories.  A daily feeding of 6.3 
fodder units equals seven times the assumed human consumption, and roughly 
corresponds to, for example, a 500-kg horse having three days of subsistence feeding, 
three days of average work feeding, and one day of hard work feeding each week.  Smil 
(1991) estimates that in 1910 draft animals required about 800 PJ (50 million metric tons, 
at 16 MJ per kg) for 24.2 million horses and mules.  This equals about 91 MJ per animal 
per day, whereas the working horse average is 140-170 MJ per day.  Smil’s feed total 
equates to 21,632 calories per day, or 8 times the human food consumption.  Smil also 
notes that the land required to support a horse could, at the maximum, support six people.  
Even considering the need to feed nonworking horses, the productivity and power of the 
animals resulted in a net gain of available energy. 
Table 46: Animal Daily Feeding Requirements (in Fodder Units) 
Source: Kander (2002), based on Hansson (1928) 
Animal Subsistence Average Work Hard Work 
600-kg horse 5.4 8-10 10-12 
500-kg horse 4.5 7-8.5 8.5-10 
500-kg ox 3.3 7 8 
350-kg horse 3.7 6.5-7.5 7.5-8.5 
350-kg ox 2.5 6 7 
300-kg horse 3.4 6-7 7-8 
Kinsman (1925) provides state-level data for animal size and working hours, from the 
Department of Agriculture Yearbook for 1918.  At that time, the average mature U.S. 
farm horse weighed approximately 550 kg and worked 465 hours per year. 
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Appendix 1-3: Wind 
Dewhurst’s series for windmill energy input and work output covers the period 1850-
1950.  I assume a 10% increase per year leading up to 1850.  The energy input is 
generally very small compared to the wind energy harnessed from sailing vessels, until 
1900.  I also assume a 10% annual decline in mechanical windmills after 1950.  
Dewhurst provides numbers for efficiency, rising from 18% in 1850 to 36% in 1910.   
Wind turbines reappear in the early 1980s and are attributed mechanical work based on 
the share of electricity used for that purpose.  The efficiency of wind turbines is assumed 
to be the same as that for mechanical windmills in 1950, which is 36%.  Coincidentally, 
this results in nearly the same energy input as the EIA method, in which electricity 
produced by wind is converted to primary energy supply using the fossil-fuel heat rate.  
The history of shipping is well documented.  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) provides 
a record of the tonnage involved in foreign trade, as well as that involved in whaling, 
fishing, or coastal shipping.  The data is shown in Table 47 and Table 48, with one 
adjustment. Figures for 1789 are only those vessels paying tonnage duties in the last five 
months of that year, and so a large jump is seen in 1790.  The 1789 tonnage is 42% of the 
1790 total, or just about 5/12.  This would correspond to other vessels paying their duties 
in the seven months of 1789 that were not reported to the Department of the Treasury.  I 
assume that the 1789 tonnage was in fact equal to the 1790 tonnage; this avoids the 
implausible situation of the registered tonnage more than doubling in a single year.   
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Table 47: U.S. Sailing Tonnage 1789-1878 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
1789 478,000 1819 1,243,000 1849 2,872,000 
1790 478,000 1820 1,258,000 1850 3,010,000 
1791 502,000 1821 1,276,000 1851 3,189,000 
1792 564,000 1822 1,304,000 1852 3,495,000 
1793 521,000 1823 1,312,000 1853 3,802,000 
1794 629,000 1824 1,368,000 1854 4,126,000 
1795 748,000 1825 1,400,000 1855 4,442,000 
1796 832,000 1826 1,500,000 1856 4,199,000 
1797 877,000 1827 1,580,000 1857 4,235,000 
1798 898,000 1828 1,702,000 1858 4,320,000 
1799 939,000 1829 1,207,000 1859 4,376,000 
1800 972,000 1830 1,127,000 1860 4,486,000 
1801 948,000 1831 1,198,000 1861 4,663,000 
1802 892,000 1832 1,349,000 1862 4,402,000 
1803 949,000 1833 1,504,000 1863 4,580,000 
1804 1,042,000 1834 1,636,000 1864 4,008,000 
1805 1,140,000 1835 1,702,000 1865 4,030,000 
1806 1,209,000 1836 1,737,000 1866 3,227,000 
1807 1,268,000 1837 1,742,000 1867 3,113,000 
1808 1,242,000 1838 1,802,000 1868 2,509,000 
1809 1,350,000 1839 1,901,000 1869 2,400,000 
1810 1,424,000 1840 1,978,000 1870 2,363,000 
1811 1,231,000 1841 1,956,000 1871 2,286,000 
1812 1,268,000 1842 1,863,000 1872 2,325,000 
1813 1,164,000 1843 1,922,000 1873 2,383,000 
1814 1,156,000 1844 2,008,000 1874 2,474,000 
1815 1,365,000 1845 2,091,000 1875 2,585,000 
1816 1,366,000 1846 2,214,000 1876 2,609,000 
1817 1,391,000 1847 2,434,000 1877 2,580,000 
1818 1,213,000 1848 2,726,000 1878 2,521,000 
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Table 48: U.S. Sailing Tonnage 1879-1970 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
Year Sailing 
Tonnage 
1879 2,423,000 1910 1,655,000 1941 182,000 
1880 2,366,000 1911 1,598,000 1942 166,000 
1881 2,350,000 1912 1,539,000 1943 142,000 
1882 2,361,000 1913 1,508,000 1944 129,000 
1883 2,387,000 1914 1,433,000 1945 115,000 
1884 2,414,000 1915 1,384,000 1946 98,000 
1885 2,374,000 1916 1,311,000 1947 95,000 
1886 2,210,000 1917 1,278,000 1948 87,000 
1887 2,170,000 1918 1,210,000 1949 87,000 
1888 2,124,000 1919 1,200,000 1950 82,000 
1889 2,099,000 1920 1,272,000 1951 71,000 
1890 2,109,000 1921 1,294,000 1952 66,000 
1891 2,172,000 1922 1,288,000 1953 55,000 
1892 2,178,000 1923 1,254,000 1954 46,000 
1893 2,118,000 1924 1,185,000 1955 40,000 
1894 2,023,000 1925 1,125,000 1956 34,000 
1895 1,965,000 1926 1,092,000 1957 24,000 
1896 1,928,000 1927 989,000 1958 23,000 
1897 1,904,000 1928 915,000 1959 23,000 
1898 1,836,000 1929 825,000 1960 23,000 
1899 1,825,000 1930 757,000 1961 18,000 
1900 1,885,000 1931 673,000 1962 18,000 
1901 1,933,000 1932 625,000 1963 18,000 
1902 1,942,000 1933 563,000 1964 17,000 
1903 1,966,000 1934 500,000 1965 8,000 
1904 1,945,000 1935 441,000 1966 7,000 
1905 1,962,000 1936 379,000 1967 7,000 
1906 1,899,000 1937 312,000 1968 6,000 
1907 1,814,000 1938 261,000 1969 6,000 
1908 1,761,000 1939 221,000 1970 6,000 
1909 1,711,000 1940 200,000   
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Appendix 1-4: Water 
Hunter’s estimate of 7,500 mills in 1790 seems low.  Numerous citations from Hunter 
(1979) suggest a higher value.  In 1796, William Winterbotham estimated the number of 
mills at between 10,000 and 20,000.  The Domesday survey of England in 1086 found 
6,000 waterwheels for a population of around 2 million, or roughly one mill for every 
350 people.  A 1793 survey of Worcester, MA found one mill for every 250 inhabitants 
(grist, saw, and fulling mills) and a survey for New Jersey found one mill for every 175 
inhabitants.  Based on the Domesday rate, the U.S. would have had about 10,000 mills in 
1790; based on the New Jersey 1793 rate, it would have had about 20,000.   
Hunter (1979) notes that the 1840 Census found 66,000 mills, of which 55,000 were 
gristmills and sawmills.  This would be one watermill for every 245 people.  An estimate 
of 13,000 mills for 1790 is plausible, based on a rate of one mill for every 300 
inhabitants.  This is reasonable given the surveys for England, Worcester, and New 
Jersey.  A number of surveys taken in the early 1820s show the increasing prevalence of 
watermills in the Northeast, as seen in Table 49: 
Table 49: U.S. Watermills, 1820-1825 
Source: Hunter (1979) 
Type Maine VT NH NY 
Grist 524 373 697 2140 
Saw 746 786 964 4321 
Fulling 149 252 262 993 
Carding 210 216 251 1235 
Tanneries 248 275 330 1000 
Total 1877 1902 2504 9689 
Population 298335 235981 244161 1372812 
Inhabitants per mill 160 124 98 142 
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Dewhurst applies two different efficiencies to waterpower.  The efficiency from falling 
water to the wheel shaft was about 72% in 1880, so the energy extracted from the 
environment is assumed to be (1/.72) = 1.39 times the actual energy generated by the 
waterwheel.  The efficiency from the shaft to the work bench was about 74% in 1880, so 
the useful work output obtained was 0.74 times the energy generated. The values for 
mechanical waterwheels are shown in Table 50. 
Table 50: U.S. Direct Drive Water Wheels, 1780-2010. 
Water Mills (Direct Drive) 
    Capita 
per 
mill 
    
Eff. to 
Shaft 
Eff. to 
Work 
Billion HP-hr   
Year Number 
Size 
(HP) Total HP Input Production Output Output PJ 
  N Pop./N S T=N*S ηi ηo I=P/ηi P=T*2200 O=P*η 
OPJ= 
O*2.6845 
1780 9,000 300 5 46,339 60% 65% 0.17 0.10 0.07 0.18 
1790 13,000 300 5 65,487 60% 65% 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.25 
1800 25,000 215 5 123,390 60% 65% 0.45 0.27 0.18 0.47 
1810 36,000 200 5 181,292 60% 65% 0.66 0.40 0.26 0.70 
1820 48,000 201 5 239,195 60% 65% 0.88 0.53 0.34 0.92 
1830 59,000 216 5 297,097 60% 65% 1.09 0.65 0.42 1.14 
1840 71,000 240 5 355,000 60% 65% 1.30 0.78 0.51 1.36 
1850 64,000 360 10 613,477 60% 65% 2.25 1.35 0.88 2.36 
1860 58,000 545 15 871,954 64% 68% 3.00 1.92 1.30 3.50 
1870 51,000 756 22 1,130,431 68% 71% 3.66 2.49 1.77 4.74 
1880 55,000 905 22 1,225,379 72% 74% 3.76 2.71 2.01 5.38 
1890 
a a a 
1,188,301 76% 77% 3.46 2.63 2.02 5.43 
1900 
a
 
a
 
a
 1,181,519 80% 80% 3.27 2.61 2.09 5.61 
1910 
a
 
a
 
a
 1,332,995 84% 81% 3.51 2.95 2.39 6.41 
1920 
a
 
a
 
a
 1,908,607 87% 82% 4.85 4.22 3.46 9.29 
1930 
a
 
a
 
a
 666,498 88% 83% 1.68 1.47 1.22 3.28 
1940 
a
 
a
 
a
 393,840 89% 84% 0.98 0.87 0.73 1.96 
1950 
a
 
a
 
a
 302,953 90% 85% 0.74 0.67 0.57 1.53 
1960 
a
 
a
 
a
 105,633 90% 85% 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.53 
1970 
a
 
a
 
a
 36,832 90% 85% 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.19 
1980 
a
 
a
 
a
 12,843 90% 85% 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.06 
1990 
a
 
a
 
a
 4,478 90% 85% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 
2000 
a
 
a
 
a
 1,561 90% 85% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
2010 
a
 
a
 
a
 544 90% 85% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
a
 Not recorded and not used in calculations. 
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The central number in the calculations is P; N and S are used to derive P, and so it is not 
necessary to estimate N or S after 1880, since Dewhurst supplies P.  Sources for Table 50 
are: 
1780 
N estimated on per-capita basis, based on Hunter; S based on Smil 
1790 
N estimated on per-capita basis, based on Hunter; S based on Smil 
1800 N linearly interpolated over 1790-1840 
1810 N linearly interpolated over 1790-1840 
1820 N linearly interpolated over 1790-1840 
1830 N linearly interpolated over 1790-1840 
1840 
N from Hunter 
1850 N, T linearly interpolated over 1840-1870; resulting P agrees with Dewhurst; S derived 
1860 N, T linearly interpolated over 1840-1870; resulting P agrees with Dewhurst; S derived 
1870 
N, T  from Census, P from Dewhurst 
1880 N, T  from Census, P from Dewhurst 
1890 
P from Dewhurst, T derived based on 2200 hours/year 
1900 P from Dewhurst, T derived 
1910 P from Dewhurst, T derived  
1920 P from Dewhurst, T derived  
1930 P from Dewhurst, T derived  
1940 P from Dewhurst, T derived  
1950 P from Dewhurst, T derived  
1960 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
1970 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
1980 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
1990 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
2000 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
2010 10% annual decline in P and T estimated 
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Appendix 1-5: Fuel Wood 
Reynolds and Pierson (1942) are the principal sources for statistics of fuel wood 
consumption in the early U.S.  They present decadal averages of per-capita consumption, 
shown in Table 51, which I take to be representative of the fifth year of a decade.   
Table 51: U.S. Fuel Wood Consumption (Million Cords), 1630-1929 
Source: Reynolds and Pierson (1942) 
 Decade New England Middle Atlantic Lake Central Prairie South Atlantic 
1630-39 40 165 
a 
  25 
1640-49 90 440    75 
1650-59 195 905    140 
1660-69 605 1,380    330 
1670-79 1,150 1,725    655 
1680-89 1,725 2,000    1,010 
1690-99 2,450 2,880    1,480 
1700-09 4,300 4,675    2,110 
1710-19 7,550 7,815    2,895 
1720-29 11,450 12,480    4,165 
1730-39 16,050 17,940    6,020 
1740-49 21,250 24,440  40  10,060 
1750-59 27,400 32,040  200  17,040 
1760-69 33,800 39,500  600  24,750 
1770-79 39,550 47,375  1,420 10 34,375 
1780-89 45,365 57,295 15 2,890 20 46,140 
1790-99 53,565 73,970 40 7,240 20 59,940 
1800-09 64,360 100,630 85 18,205 30 74,135 
1810-19 74,580 133,175 175 38,820 50 87,515 
1820-29 84,455 170,410 580 79,390 155 102,480 
1830-39 94,045 207,905 5,225 158,825 775 110,615 
1840-49 105,060 251,610 21,370 257,730 3,830 117,670 
1850-59 106,390 301,680 57,180 359,465 17,110 130,535 
1860-69 91,640 307,890 103,785 441,470 41,420 137,655 
1870-79 63,325 256,280 136,250 450,255 63,600 153,520 
1880-89 42,935 173,525 148,110 363,925 67,640 164,515 
1890-99 42,775 104,570 136,460 254,825 53,140 147,955 
1900-09 43,015 70,245 107,705 212,470 37,065 124,630 
1910-19 39,010 59,620 131,815 220,205 28,870 122,100 
1920-29 33,010 58,470 68,935 177,305 20,400 112,360 
Total 1,151,135 2,523,035 917,730 3,045,280 334,135 1,796,895 
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 Decade East Gulf 
Lower 
Mississippi 
North 
Pacific 
South 
Pacific 
N. Rocky 
Mountains 
S. Rocky 
Mountains Total 
1630-39       230 
1640-49       605 
1650-59       1,240 
1660-69       2,315 
1670-79       3,530 
1680-89  5     4,740 
1690-99 5 10     6,825 
1700-09 15 10     11,110 
1710-19 30 10     18,300 
1720-29 90 15     28,200 
1730-39 215 20     40,245 
1740-49 370 30  5   56,195 
1750-59 595 80  10   77,365 
1760-69 930 220  10  10 99,820 
1770-79 1,385 460  10  20 124,605 
1780-89 2,360 815  20  20 154,940 
1790-99 4,775 1,380  40  25 200,995 
1800-09 8,630 2,155  70  40 268,340 
1810-19 15,650 7,005 15 125 10 65 357,185 
1820-29 29,605 12,485 40 210 30 105 479,945 
1830-39 49,405 24,635 105 505 65 160 652,265 
1840-49 69,665 48,680 250 1,650 145 875 878,535 
1850-59 88,110 82,490 1,050 7,510 330 2,910 1,154,760 
1860-69 99,745 106,960 2,575 16,005 770 5,405 1,355,320 
1870-79 114,410 132,690 6,595 19,745 1,960 8,355 1,406,985 
1880-89 125,595 165,310 15,820 19,240 6,550 10,590 1,303,755 
1890-99 116,450 168,370 24,660 16,780 11,115 10,340 1,087,440 
1900-09 102,830 157,645 25,375 16,005 8,405 10,755 916,145 
1910-19 104,345 149,785 22,265 17,190 5,585 12,145 912,935 
1920-29 88,740 137,000 19,620 16,200 5,670 8,690 746,400 
Total 1,023,950 1,198,265 118,370 131,330 40,635 70,510 12,351,270 
 
a
 Negligible U.S. population. 
Reynolds and Pierson group states by geographical regions in a manner not fully 
explained in the paper.  However, examination of the populations by region enables 
identification of which states are included in which regions, as shown in Table 52. 
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Table 52: Regional Definitions for Reynolds and Pierson 
Region States Included 
New England Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut 
Mid-Atlantic New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, District of 
Columbia 
Lake Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin 
Central Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Tennessee, West Virginia 
Prairie Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota 
South Atlantic Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina 
East Gulf Alabama, Florida, Georgia 
Lower Mississippi Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Oklahoma 
North Pacific Oregon, Washington 
South Pacific California, Nevada 
North Rocky Mountains Montana, Idaho  
South Rocky 
Mountains 
New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming  
These definitions enable derivation of the per-capita consumption in region in each 
decade, as seen in Table 53: 
Table 53: U.S. fuel wood consumption, cords per capita, 1780-1929 
Decade New England Middle Atlantic Lake Central Prairie S. Atlantic 
1780-89 5.27 4.97 
a 
2.62 
a
 3.97 
1790-99 4.78 4.69 
a
 2.33 
a
 4.04 
1800-09 4.76 4.68 3.57 2.40 
a
 4.26 
1810-19 4.76 4.68 2.56 2.56 
a
 4.46 
1820-29 4.67 4.64 2.86 3.11 
a
 4.61 
1830-39 4.49 4.50 3.80 3.96 3.60 4.67 
1840-49 4.23 4.29 4.49 4.41 3.25 4.68 
1850-59 3.63 4.03 4.75 4.49 3.39 4.68 
1860-69 2.77 3.39 4.74 4.23 3.30 4.65 
1870-79 1.69 2.37 4.25 3.48 2.59 4.44 
1880-89 0.99 1.34 3.35 2.35 1.66 3.95 
1890-99 0.83 0.67 2.41 1.40 1.02 3.11 
1900-09 0.71 0.37 1.60 1.02 0.63 2.29 
1910-19 0.56 0.26 1.66 0.94 0.44 1.98 
1920-29 0.42 0.22 0.72 0.67 0.29 1.62 
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Decade East 
Gulf 
Lower 
Mississippi 
N. 
Pacific 
S. Pacific N. Rocky 
Mountains 
S. Rocky 
Mountains 
Total 
1780-89 3.41 
a a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.62 
1790-99 3.87 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.35 
1800-09 4.06 3.70 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.28 
1810-19 4.29 3.98 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.23 
1820-29 4.45 3.99 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.27 
1830-39 4.50 4.08 
a
 
a
 
a
 
a
 4.36 
1840-49 4.49 4.10 3.76 3.56 
a
 2.40 4.36 
1850-59 4.49 4.04 2.71 3.13 
a
 2.42 4.23 
1860-69 4.40 3.96 2.88 3.23 4.33 2.67 3.87 
1870-79 4.20 3.62 3.62 2.58 3.65 2.21 3.17 
1880-89 3.69 3.15 3.42 1.76 4.32 1.46 2.31 
1890-99 2.80 2.39 3.07 1.20 3.49 0.96 1.57 
1900-09 2.04 1.69 1.85 0.80 1.52 0.70 1.09 
1910-19 1.78 1.32 1.13 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.92 
1920-29 1.34 1.05 0.84 0.35 0.58 0.35 0.65 
a
 Negligible U.S. population. 
These rates are applied to the fifth year of every decade, with linear interpolation to fill in 
the other years.  This is the approach used by Schurr and Netschert (1960, 491-494).  
Dewhurst (1955) uses a conversion of 1.25 cords of wood as equal to one ton of coal 
equivalent prior to 1900, 1.30 cords in 1900, and 1.35 cords after 1900, the declining 
energy content due to a larger proportion of softwood used.  Dewhurst also uses 10,297 
horsepower-hour per ton of coal equivalent, which results in one cord of wood having the 
energy content show in Table 54.  EIA assumes 20 million BTU per cord, also shown in 
Table 54.  I use the Dewhurst values in this analysis. 
Table 54: Cord of Wood Energy Content 
Year Dewhurst EIA 
Pre-1900 8238 HP-hr 22.1 GJ 20 MMBTU 21.1 GJ 
1900 7921 HP-hr 21.3 GJ 20 MMBTU 21.1 GJ 
Post-1900 7627 HP-hr 20.5 GJ 20 MMBTU 21.1 GJ 
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Appendix 1-6: Other Biomass 
Tallow took the form of about 58 million pounds of candles (1 PJ); whale oil 
consumption was likely around 4.5 million gallons (0.57 PJ), and lard oil consumption 
2.7 million gallons (0.34 PJ); fuel alcohol consumption was about 13 million gallons (1.1 
PJ).  For comparison, oil was 3 PJ in 1860 (its first full year), and wind and water energy 
inputs were about 11 and 8 PJ respectively.  The total of “other biomass” is three orders 
of magnitude less than fuel wood (2800 PJ) in energy terms, but in economic terms it is 
probably about one order of magnitude less.  The total of “other biomass” reported in the 
1860 Census is roughly $20 million; consumption of 125 million cords of wood 
represents perhaps 200 million worker-days, valued at about $200 million.  Lighting fuels 
were roughly two orders of magnitude more valuable per unit of energy than heating 
fuels; this is borne out by price series. A wholesale price of $0.95/gallon for lard oil in 
1860 represents $7.20 per GJ, at a time when heating fuels were commanding prices of 
about $0.10-$0.25 per GJ.  
Whale oil products could be stored, so it is not necessarily true that consumption was the 
difference between Production and Exports in each year.  In fact, in 1818, exports 
equalled production, and it is not plausible that domestic consumption suddenly fell to 
zero in that year.  Instead, I take a 3-year average of the production and a 3-year average 
of the exports; the difference is assumed to be the 3-year average of domestic 
consumption.   
301 
 
The high price for whale oil led to the development of many alternatives, such as lard oil, 
camphene, coal oil, and petroleum.  Petroleum produced more oil in its first full year 
(500,000 barrels in 1860) than whalers had ever obtained in one year.  When the whaling 
ship Nile returned to harbor in 1869 (Mawer, 2000) [249], it came back to a very different 
country than the one it had left in 1858.   
The rapid rise of petroleum led numerous commentators both at the time and since to 
surmise that the discovery of oil saved the whales, including Freese (2004), Levitt and 
Dubner (2009) [250], and others.  That claim entirely ignores the tremendous increase in 
whaling carried out by other countries.  As Ellis (1991, 497) [251] notes, “Did the 
discovery of petroleum save the whales?  Hardly.  In fact, it provided the impetus for the 
whalers to mechanize and modernize their industry…The great rorquals, long considered 
too fast and powerful for the whalers, were now in firing range.”  Davis et al. (1997) 
notes that modern whaling killed over one million whales between 1904 and 1978, 
compared to about 300,000 during the nineteenth century.  Baker and Clapham (2004) 
[252] put the twentieth century total as two million for the Southern Hemisphere alone.  It 
was ultimately environmentalism, and not petroleum or the free market, that saved the 
whales.  The role of petroleum is not insignificant, as it lowered the value of whale oil 
enough that societies would allow the conservation movement to place limitations on 
whaling.  But that there remained any continued demand  for whale oil for a century after 
the discovery of petroleum is a testament to another attribute of energy resources: as long 
as they have a significant energy return on investment, markets will find some use for 
them.    
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Appendix 1-7: Ice 
The ice harvest series is incomplete, both for volume and for prices.  It is not always clear 
which statistics for export are shipments to foreign ports, and which are simply coastwise 
exports.  Weatherell (1864) notes that coastwise shipments were possibly significantly 
under-reported, as those shipments were not required to obtain custom-house clearance.  
Cummings (1949) notes that the Federal Census vastly underestimated the ice industry, 
as the Federal Census for 1859-1860 reported the industry’s value in Massachusetts to be 
under $100,000, whereas state reports had found it to be over $600,000 in 1855 and over 
$700,000 in 1865. 
Hall (1883) found the total value of ice sold in the 25 large cities to be about $22 million, 
and the U.S. market would have been about $28 million if customers in small cities paid 
the same price for ice.  By comparison, U.S. crude oil production was about $25 million 
in 1880.   
Consumption for the Boston region is seen in Figure 79, based on limited data points.  
Figures for New York exist but are even sparser and some significant contradictions exist 
between sources.  Hall (1883) estimates the New York area to have consumed around 1.5 
million tons in 1879, and Weightman (2003) notes that consumption in 1906 was 4 
million tons, of which manufactured ice supplied only 700,000 tons. 
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Figure 79: Boston Ice Consumption, 1842-1880 
Sources: Anderson (1972), Weatherell (1864), and Hall (1883) 
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Appendix 1-8: Coal 
Data on U.S. coal production and consumption prior to 1800 is very sparse.  Eavenson 
(1942) noted the quantities of coal landed at Colonial American ports for 1758-1772, and 
also estimated the production from the Richmond, VA field over 1748-1764.  Receipts in 
port peaked at 8,773 tons in 1769, and production from the Richmond field peaked at 
1,400 tons in 1764.  Neither imports nor Richmond production approached the Pittsburgh 
production level, which began in 1783 and reached 30,000 tons by 1790.  I estimate that 
coal consumption grew by 9% per year over the period 1780-1800, reaching 19,300 tons 
in 1780 and 45,600 tons in 1790.  The former figure is roughly double the 1772 imports 
from Great Britain, and the latter figure results in Pittsburgh providing 2/3 of all coal in 
1790.  Both of these seem plausible, but in neither case is the coal a significant fraction of 
energy consumption.   
Coal reached 1% of energy inputs around 1820, 5% around 1845, 25% around 1870, and 
50% around 1890.  Annual consumption data between 1800 and 1900 is not available.  
Production values U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) are used.  The existing consumption 
data (at five-year intervals) is not significantly different than production, as seen in Table 
55.  After 1900, Schurr and Netschert (1960, 508-509) provide annual consumption data 
until 1950, and EIA after that.  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975), as well as Schurr and 
Netschert (1960) and Eliasberg (1966) [253], incorporate corrections from Eavenson 
(1942) to the bituminous production series.   
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Table 55: U.S. Coal Production vs. Consumption 1850-1880 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (1975) 
Year 
Production 
Bituminous 
Consumption 
Bituminous 
Difference Production 
Anthracite 
Consumption 
Anthracite 
Difference 
1850 4029 4215 4.6% 4327 4292 -0.8% 
1855 7543 7823 3.7% 8607 8523 -1.0% 
1860 9057 9258 2.2% 10984 10842 -1.3% 
1865 12349 12534 1.5% 12077 11988 -0.7% 
1870 20471 20817 1.7% 19958 19822 -0.7% 
1875 32657 32919 0.8% 23121 22770 -1.5% 
1880 50757 51036 0.5% 28650 28210 -1.5% 
1885 71773 71868 0.1% 38336 37689 -1.7% 
1890 111302 110785 -0.5% 46469 45614 -1.8% 
1895 135118 133998 -0.8% 57999 56667 -2.3% 
1900 212316 207275 -2.4% 57368 55515 -3.2% 
My estimates for the share of coal devoted to work output are taken from Dewhurst 
(1955).  After 1949, I use data from EIA (2012).  Coal devoted to work is assumed to be 
all coal used in the transportation sector, as well as the fraction of coal used for electricity 
generation times the share of electricity used for work.  In 1950, 12.67% of coal was used 
for transportation, 17.81% was used for electricity generation, and 42% of electricity was 
used for mechanical work.  Therefore, the share of coal used for work was 
(0.1267+0.1781*0.42) = 20.15%.  This is close to Dewhurst’s estimate that 25% of all 
bituminous coal, and 10% of all anthracite, was used for mechanical work in 1950, 
resulting in a total of 23.8% of all coal.  The share of coal devoted to work performance 
is multiplied by an efficiency factor to determine the work output resulting from coal.  
For 2010, the vast majority of coal was used for electricity generation (92%), it was 
converted into electricity at about 31% efficiency (after considering transmission losses), 
and about 16.6% of that electricity was used for mechanical work.  Therefore, from the 
22,000 PJ of coal energy consumed, about 1,000 PJ of mechanical work was performed. 
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Appendix 1-9: Oil 
The consumption series from Schurr and Netschert (1960, 508) shows an unusual drop, 
from 17.2 million barrels in 1880 to 7.2 million barrels in 1885, then back up to 27.7 
million barrels in 1890.  Production falls from 26.3 million barrels in 1880 to 21.9 million 
barrels in 1885, then rises to 45.8 million barrels in 1890.  The industry seems to have 
been increasing exports even as domestic production was falling from 1880 to 1885.  
Export values from Williamson and Daum (1959a, 490) support this, showing exports of 
over 12 million barrels in 1884.  Therefore, the production values, which are available 
annually, are not adequate proxies for consumption; there really is a significant difference 
between the two.   
Schurr and Netschert (1960) find a much higher share of oil production exported over the 
period 1870-1900 than does Dewhurst (1955).  As a result, Dewhurst’s values for 
consumption exceed Schurr and Netschert’s by 50-100% over this interval.  I use the 
Schurr and Netschert values for oil consumption, which lead to oil consumption and work 
done by oil being considerably lower than those found in Dewhurst.  I use Dewhurst’s 
values for efficiency and for the share of oil devoted to the performance of physical work. 
Average automobile fuel efficiency was 12.8 miles per gallon in 1950.  Dewhurst 
estimated that oil conversion efficiency was 9% at this time, implying that 100% 
efficiency would represent 142 mpg for a vehicle of that size and weight.  Oil efficiency 
for all subsequent years is based on the 1950 efficiency-mpg ratio.  Ayres and Warr 
(2003) offer a number of alternative calculations to relate fuel economy to efficiency.  
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Appendix 2-1: Climate Series Results for Selected Countries 
Table 56: Brazil Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 23 51 21 26 37 43 23 23 30 36 23 26 36 33 44 32 
CPC 16 44 20 25 32 36 17 17 22 28 16 18 30 22 35 23 
CPC/NCAR 16 44 20 25 32 36 17 17 22 28 16 18 31 22 35 24 
Delaware 35 67 32 44 56 54 32 34 43 50 29 40 50 37 48 36 
Del/NCAR 35 67 31 44 55 54 32 34 43 50 30 40 50 37 49 37 
HDD18                 
NCAR 114 172 112 116 146 143 102 85 123 148 105 113 118 131 139 132 
CPC 77 132 90 101 124 118 78 69 91 111 74 85 101 94 111 95 
CPC/NCAR 78 133 90 102 125 119 78 69 92 112 74 86 101 95 112 96 
Delaware 141 198 134 154 185 166 125 120 149 174 122 151 149 143 151 136 
Del/NCAR 140 195 132 152 183 164 124 119 148 171 121 148 148 142 150 136 
CDD18                 
NCAR 1487 1450 1600 1702 1484 1511 1568 1691 1573 1500 1632 1616 1647 1510 1596 1633 
CPC 2066 2043 2032 2145 1958 2000 2095 2210 2123 1996 2113 2100 2105 2007 2160 2143 
CPC/NCAR 2059 2035 2025 2137 1951 1993 2088 2203 2115 1988 2105 2093 2098 1999 2153 2136 
Delaware 1746 1712 1775 1897 1693 1723 1827 1885 1813 1707 1806 1783 1854 1716 1843 1893 
Del/NCAR 1757 1724 1794 1915 1708 1735 1835 1890 1824 1722 1824 1801 1864 1731 1852 1904 
CDD22                 
NCAR 477 463 565 637 488 486 513 571 533 506 584 569 570 503 534 592 
CPC 886 892 872 979 839 845 911 981 950 861 932 933 923 852 975 977 
CPC/NCAR 881 888 868 974 835 840 906 976 945 856 928 928 918 848 970 972 
Delaware 688 677 706 817 666 659 729 759 735 673 729 718 750 664 746 806 
Del/NCAR 692 681 718 828 672 664 731 758 740 680 739 728 754 671 748 811 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 910 915 927 1044 880 887 899 942 911 843 900 924 939 896 1062 998 
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Table 57: China Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 2001 2106 1932 1786 1835 2044 1944 1798 1935 1854 2078 1857 1809 2032 1968 2008 
CPC 1697 1812 1655 1544 1580 1758 1668 1513 1642 1540 1764 1570 1492 1680 1645 1669 
CPC/NCAR 1696 1811 1654 1543 1579 1757 1667 1512 1641 1539 1763 1569 1491 1680 1644 1668 
Delaware 1751 1869 1710 1595 1626 1817 1734 1572 1703 1610 1826 1640 1553 1742 1705 1736 
Del/NCAR 1731 1846 1688 1573 1605 1793 1710 1549 1679 1588 1802 1616 1530 1719 1681 1711 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2626 2742 2545 2360 2435 2651 2539 2400 2542 2459 2675 2435 2404 2636 2563 2627 
CPC 2279 2402 2219 2074 2139 2318 2217 2064 2204 2090 2310 2097 2032 2229 2186 2234 
CPC/NCAR 2277 2401 2218 2072 2138 2317 2215 2063 2202 2089 2308 2096 2030 2228 2185 2233 
Delaware 2334 2461 2278 2124 2186 2381 2287 2128 2269 2167 2376 2173 2101 2296 2252 2310 
Del/NCAR 2310 2434 2251 2098 2160 2352 2259 2101 2241 2140 2347 2145 2073 2267 2222 2279 
CDD18                 
NCAR 693 666 741 769 727 762 782 722 738 700 780 783 773 741 772 740 
CPC 935 916 965 1037 947 1015 1017 968 977 963 1055 1072 1042 1006 1042 997 
CPC/NCAR 935 916 965 1038 948 1016 1018 968 977 963 1056 1073 1042 1007 1042 998 
Delaware 937 916 973 1048 961 1017 1005 964 971 948 1046 1060 1028 993 1030 988 
Del/NCAR 943 923 980 1056 969 1024 1025 973 981 957 1053 1068 1036 1002 1039 996 
CDD22                 
NCAR 253 239 286 284 261 294 302 268 280 249 305 298 294 275 300 290 
CPC 422 411 435 471 411 471 467 435 447 424 497 500 481 453 484 468 
CPC/NCAR 423 411 435 472 412 471 467 435 447 425 497 500 481 453 484 468 
Delaware 422 408 444 478 421 472 469 434 442 414 489 493 472 442 475 463 
Del/NCAR 423 410 445 481 423 474 471 437 446 417 491 495 474 446 478 466 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 474 455 437 532 474 490 468 460 486 436 514 503 473 481 475 493 
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Table 58: France Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 1652 1930 1554 1677 1610 1558 1707 1409 1636 1684 1713 1622 1476 1658 1636 1974 
CPC 1625 1910 1573 1694 1619 1501 1661 1432 1646 1696 1723 1633 1474 1641 1648 1955 
CPC/NCAR 1624 1909 1572 1693 1618 1501 1661 1431 1645 1694 1721 1632 1473 1640 1647 1954 
Delaware 1752 2049 1686 1830 1749 1670 1816 1591 1815 1868 1899 1812 1649 1820 1807 2112 
Del/NCAR 1711 2001 1642 1784 1708 1633 1772 1551 1769 1821 1854 1765 1606 1775 1764 2065 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2467 2808 2361 2520 2411 2394 2524 2256 2399 2497 2501 2385 2330 2506 2432 2815 
CPC 2408 2746 2341 2491 2372 2280 2435 2234 2379 2472 2466 2356 2264 2441 2398 2754 
CPC/NCAR 2408 2746 2341 2490 2372 2280 2435 2233 2379 2471 2465 2355 2264 2441 2397 2754 
Delaware 2556 2904 2477 2643 2531 2484 2623 2429 2570 2677 2679 2571 2481 2653 2589 2937 
Del/NCAR 2512 2853 2429 2595 2488 2444 2575 2385 2523 2626 2631 2520 2433 2606 2543 2887 
CDD18                 
NCAR 188 103 182 128 168 131 157 112 323 161 175 240 94 115 183 154 
CPC 271 168 263 201 268 210 234 180 445 238 270 363 176 195 288 244 
CPC/NCAR 270 168 263 200 267 210 233 179 444 237 269 362 175 194 288 243 
Delaware 236 142 227 174 219 165 185 134 384 186 213 305 127 150 232 201 
Del/NCAR 236 144 229 177 222 168 189 138 385 191 217 306 130 153 236 203 
CDD22                 
NCAR 28 10 26 16 21 14 21 11 85 20 22 45 8 12 28 22 
CPC 60 26 55 38 52 33 43 26 145 43 52 99 25 32 64 54 
CPC/NCAR 60 26 55 38 51 33 42 26 144 43 52 98 25 32 64 54 
Delaware 47 18 42 26 35 21 28 14 112 27 34 77 13 19 43 38 
Del/NCAR 47 18 42 27 36 22 30 16 113 28 35 77 14 20 44 38 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 38 16 48 20 42 29 34 22 71 33 38 70 19 23 38 37 
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Table 59: Germany Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 2584 3133 2583 2460 2400 2226 2545 2351 2571 2541 2456 2458 2190 2398 2474 2994 
CPC 2406 2861 2388 2268 2204 2002 2342 2197 2381 2362 2302 2280 2022 2168 2296 2770 
CPC/NCAR 2406 2861 2388 2267 2204 2002 2342 2197 2381 2362 2302 2280 2022 2168 2296 2770 
Delaware 2550 3013 2523 2412 2338 2135 2483 2318 2499 2471 2415 2397 2125 2306 2405 2888 
Del/NCAR 2548 3012 2522 2410 2336 2134 2482 2317 2498 2469 2413 2395 2123 2304 2403 2886 
HDD18                 
NCAR 3475 4096 3483 3389 3277 3150 3446 3243 3405 3459 3356 3311 3105 3307 3363 3904 
CPC 3267 3787 3251 3151 3031 2869 3200 3050 3185 3243 3163 3091 2883 3023 3135 3647 
CPC/NCAR 3267 3787 3251 3151 3031 2869 3200 3050 3185 3243 3163 3091 2882 3023 3135 3647 
Delaware 3435 3962 3409 3324 3195 3030 3367 3197 3317 3377 3301 3230 3012 3186 3272 3783 
Del/NCAR 3433 3961 3407 3323 3193 3029 3366 3196 3316 3375 3299 3228 3010 3184 3270 3782 
CDD18                 
NCAR 132 53 115 56 106 60 95 95 191 74 78 176 61 75 97 117 
CPC 175 82 157 96 163 107 145 145 260 119 116 242 112 131 155 166 
CPC/NCAR 175 82 157 96 163 107 145 145 260 119 116 242 112 131 155 166 
Delaware 143 62 124 71 125 83 114 109 224 90 94 214 85 102 118 138 
Del/NCAR 143 62 124 70 125 82 114 109 224 90 93 214 85 102 118 137 
CDD22                 
NCAR 20 5 16 3 10 4 9 9 32 6 6 34 4 5 10 19 
CPC 31 8 25 9 21 10 20 19 57 14 12 59 10 14 22 32 
CPC/NCAR 31 8 25 9 21 10 20 19 57 14 12 59 10 14 22 32 
Delaware 23 5 17 5 13 7 13 11 42 9 9 49 6 9 13 23 
Del/NCAR 23 5 17 5 13 7 13 11 42 9 9 49 6 9 13 23 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 28 12 35 11 23 13 23 30 39 20 17 55 18 17 25 31 
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Table 60: India Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 174 158 172 145 143 169 145 149 157 149 162 130 147 151 133 126 
CPC 93 92 102 96 84 86 85 81 108 88 92 73 86 86 76 99 
CPC/NCAR 93 92 102 95 84 86 85 81 108 88 92 73 86 86 75 99 
Delaware 84 80 93 80 72 77 73 68 95 76 83 66 79 78 67 91 
Del/NCAR 82 77 90 78 69 74 71 66 91 73 80 63 76 75 65 88 
HDD18                 
NCAR 281 255 278 229 229 267 232 239 247 235 260 209 237 241 212 207 
CPC 174 169 194 179 158 165 161 151 195 165 170 132 162 162 136 182 
CPC/NCAR 174 169 194 178 158 165 161 150 195 164 170 132 162 162 136 182 
Delaware 172 165 190 165 146 161 151 138 184 156 168 129 161 158 132 179 
Del/NCAR 166 159 184 159 141 156 145 134 178 150 162 125 155 153 128 174 
CDD18                 
NCAR 2643 2731 2603 2842 2766 2691 2738 2813 2721 2783 2724 2822 2784 2755 2915 2926 
CPC 3045 3041 2903 3110 3067 3040 3063 3152 3094 3086 3061 3110 3063 3001 3220 3264 
CPC/NCAR 3046 3041 2903 3111 3068 3040 3063 3152 3094 3087 3061 3110 3064 3001 3220 3264 
Delaware 2944 2937 2829 3044 2999 2923 2938 3063 2985 2966 2949 2971 2938 2870 3097 3135 
Del/NCAR 2953 2946 2842 3057 3006 2932 2949 3073 2998 2978 2960 2983 2951 2883 3109 3142 
CDD22                 
NCAR 1453 1519 1417 1606 1540 1481 1501 1583 1498 1548 1510 1564 1554 1518 1654 1682 
CPC 1816 1796 1685 1878 1817 1802 1813 1897 1859 1840 1827 1830 1822 1757 1949 2017 
CPC/NCAR 1816 1796 1686 1879 1817 1802 1813 1897 1859 1840 1827 1830 1822 1757 1949 2017 
Delaware 1736 1716 1627 1826 1760 1702 1703 1822 1764 1738 1736 1714 1718 1645 1847 1907 
Del/NCAR 1737 1717 1633 1830 1760 1704 1706 1825 1770 1741 1740 1719 1723 1651 1852 1907 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 1049 1031 1087 1211 1069 1067 1141 1062 1089 1099 1132 1169 1139 1140 1107 1243 
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Table 61: Italy Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 1440 1496 1252 1418 1463 1327 1379 1283 1470 1466 1613 1399 1228 1346 1403 1581 
CPC 1411 1435 1248 1386 1390 1241 1297 1216 1405 1361 1525 1339 1216 1284 1354 1456 
CPC/NCAR 1404 1428 1242 1379 1384 1235 1291 1210 1398 1355 1518 1332 1209 1278 1347 1449 
Delaware 1568 1603 1427 1574 1568 1429 1477 1376 1554 1538 1714 1515 1373 1426 1472 1614 
Del/NCAR 1443 1476 1306 1446 1447 1315 1355 1264 1435 1417 1582 1390 1250 1309 1354 1485 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2152 2224 1923 2103 2142 1993 2047 1971 2105 2155 2308 2057 1890 2020 2055 2283 
CPC 2080 2105 1879 2021 2003 1838 1902 1842 2013 2000 2156 1949 1834 1910 1961 2103 
CPC/NCAR 2072 2097 1871 2014 1996 1831 1894 1836 2006 1993 2149 1942 1826 1902 1953 2095 
Delaware 2274 2312 2091 2245 2214 2066 2121 2040 2187 2206 2376 2160 2023 2083 2098 2290 
Del/NCAR 2130 2168 1951 2102 2079 1935 1982 1911 2051 2070 2229 2015 1880 1948 1965 2145 
CDD18                 
NCAR 401 348 441 476 475 468 472 392 682 447 432 499 473 472 532 436 
CPC 539 508 603 685 705 678 677 590 881 609 634 656 638 636 733 607 
CPC/NCAR 539 508 603 685 705 678 676 590 881 609 634 657 639 637 733 607 
Delaware 462 436 530 609 600 593 591 514 850 561 555 579 558 574 695 567 
Del/NCAR 483 449 546 615 615 607 603 525 857 576 566 603 582 594 703 577 
CDD22                 
NCAR 115 88 114 148 141 135 136 96 263 128 119 150 145 144 174 132 
CPC 186 158 195 265 258 233 242 194 400 204 214 229 224 222 280 218 
CPC/NCAR 185 157 194 264 257 233 241 193 399 204 214 229 224 222 279 218 
Delaware 149 123 157 223 199 191 201 156 391 183 175 192 181 193 258 201 
Del/NCAR 154 126 159 221 202 193 201 155 386 185 176 198 190 198 258 201 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 139 104 140 147 187 147 161 173 294 172 174 205 154 183 214 175 
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Table 62: Japan Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 1558 1581 1383 1264 1410 1462 1503 1405 1422 1291 1591 1443 1322 1449 1362 1466 
CPC 1619 1658 1459 1399 1500 1546 1580 1458 1502 1374 1641 1519 1393 1501 1405 1497 
CPC/NCAR 1617 1656 1457 1397 1498 1544 1578 1456 1500 1372 1639 1517 1391 1499 1403 1495 
Delaware 1686 1716 1521 1449 1528 1592 1640 1516 1563 1424 1699 1571 1441 1549 1449 1539 
Del/NCAR 1661 1693 1497 1420 1509 1571 1617 1498 1539 1403 1680 1548 1422 1532 1436 1529 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2201 2228 2004 1827 2015 2071 2113 2029 2038 1878 2200 2054 1938 2069 1977 2086 
CPC 2246 2299 2070 1965 2093 2147 2184 2065 2112 1958 2241 2119 1990 2108 2003 2102 
CPC/NCAR 2243 2296 2067 1963 2091 2144 2181 2063 2110 1956 2239 2117 1987 2105 2000 2100 
Delaware 2322 2367 2144 2024 2127 2203 2252 2134 2184 2019 2310 2180 2049 2165 2055 2151 
Del/NCAR 2299 2342 2120 1993 2110 2182 2229 2116 2158 1996 2290 2157 2030 2148 2044 2143 
CDD18                 
NCAR 633 592 618 734 684 702 689 638 580 725 697 677 678 667 596 747 
CPC 783 724 752 852 868 889 838 829 711 918 871 817 863 826 772 957 
CPC/NCAR 783 725 753 854 869 889 839 830 712 918 871 818 864 827 772 958 
Delaware 759 693 732 829 852 858 789 801 677 879 834 784 830 792 744 929 
Del/NCAR 735 677 711 813 822 830 791 771 661 851 811 767 804 770 718 896 
CDD22                 
NCAR 234 193 200 250 230 249 248 215 174 254 244 239 239 236 182 287 
CPC 347 292 295 348 372 399 364 366 264 412 378 341 373 357 302 458 
CPC/NCAR 347 292 295 348 373 399 365 366 265 412 378 342 373 357 302 458 
Delaware 333 273 289 333 364 381 349 350 242 388 354 320 352 335 285 440 
Del/NCAR 315 260 273 319 340 358 331 325 231 364 335 307 333 318 267 412 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 410 396 379 511 482 473 455 437 392 492 485 471 467 460 379 540 
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Table 63: Russia Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 4063 4660 4471 4544 4276 4238 4314 4270 4336 4226 4162 4350 3992 3927 4223 4371 
CPC 3859 4545 4351 4453 4147 4078 4170 4093 4158 4039 4001 4261 3831 3749 4090 4284 
CPC/NCAR 3859 4544 4350 4452 4146 4077 4170 4092 4157 4038 4001 4260 3830 3748 4090 4284 
Delaware 3957 4656 4428 4534 4231 4166 4281 4202 4272 4160 4127 4375 3946 3862 4189 4390 
Del/NCAR 3955 4650 4424 4528 4227 4162 4277 4198 4267 4155 4122 4370 3942 3858 4183 4383 
HDD18                 
NCAR 4936 5552 5374 5411 5156 5138 5199 5149 5223 5115 5029 5214 4841 4814 5099 5183 
CPC 4720 5429 5248 5314 5021 4966 5046 4976 5037 4916 4857 5127 4674 4631 4964 5097 
CPC/NCAR 4720 5428 5247 5313 5020 4966 5045 4975 5036 4915 4857 5126 4674 4630 4964 5096 
Delaware 4822 5544 5326 5397 5106 5059 5164 5088 5156 5042 4986 5246 4793 4745 5065 5201 
Del/NCAR 4821 5537 5321 5391 5103 5055 5160 5084 5151 5037 4982 5240 4789 4741 5059 5194 
CDD18                 
NCAR 198 194 151 251 237 180 220 229 180 172 195 229 263 195 202 435 
CPC 201 197 161 249 239 186 220 206 185 182 205 215 259 196 190 412 
CPC/NCAR 201 197 161 249 239 186 220 206 185 182 205 215 259 196 190 412 
Delaware 204 198 163 255 243 189 216 206 180 179 207 219 262 200 194 428 
Del/NCAR 204 198 163 255 243 189 217 206 181 179 208 220 263 201 194 428 
CDD22                 
NCAR 50 53 31 78 71 47 70 70 43 38 47 67 82 52 55 180 
CPC 47 51 35 74 69 46 66 58 43 40 49 61 76 51 48 164 
CPC/NCAR 47 51 35 74 69 46 66 58 43 40 49 61 76 51 48 164 
Delaware 50 53 36 79 73 50 65 59 41 40 51 64 79 54 50 173 
Del/NCAR 50 53 36 79 73 50 66 59 42 40 52 64 80 55 51 173 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 51 51 48 68 66 55 73 50 60 61 69 79 73 61 48 105 
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Table 64: United Kingdom Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 1924 2289 1849 1887 1886 1952 1993 1764 1796 1808 1817 1802 1670 1896 1870 2218 
CPC 1975 2327 1890 1904 1857 1923 2057 1789 1894 1865 1894 1879 1782 2002 1966 2387 
CPC/NCAR 1976 2327 1891 1905 1859 1925 2058 1790 1894 1866 1895 1880 1783 2003 1966 2387 
Delaware 2103 2454 2025 2047 1978 2068 2210 1931 2047 2000 2018 1990 1898 2116 2081 2506 
Del/NCAR 2087 2437 2008 2032 1969 2058 2191 1918 2027 1985 2002 1974 1879 2097 2062 2480 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2859 3302 2811 2893 2855 2950 2964 2757 2728 2778 2766 2707 2666 2890 2844 3201 
CPC 2874 3288 2812 2867 2779 2873 2986 2738 2791 2793 2815 2747 2748 2957 2899 3330 
CPC/NCAR 2875 3289 2814 2869 2781 2875 2988 2740 2792 2794 2816 2748 2749 2958 2900 3330 
Delaware 3016 3431 2968 3031 2920 3041 3162 2902 2963 2952 2961 2874 2880 3088 3033 3463 
Del/NCAR 3003 3416 2953 3018 2914 3034 3146 2891 2945 2939 2946 2862 2863 3072 3016 3439 
CDD18                 
NCAR 57 16 39 14 30 19 29 19 50 29 35 68 16 19 26 25 
CPC 102 44 77 33 61 43 59 43 90 58 55 118 29 38 51 57 
CPC/NCAR 101 44 77 33 60 43 59 42 89 57 55 118 29 38 51 57 
Delaware 88 34 59 24 48 31 44 31 72 42 42 101 23 32 40 47 
Del/NCAR 85 33 58 23 46 29 42 29 70 40 41 98 22 30 39 45 
CDD22                 
NCAR 3 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 1 4 0 0 1 1 
CPC 11 2 7 1 4 2 4 2 8 3 3 14 1 2 3 4 
CPC/NCAR 11 2 7 1 4 2 4 2 8 3 3 14 1 2 3 4 
Delaware 8 2 4 1 2 1 2 1 5 2 2 10 1 1 2 3 
Del/NCAR 8 1 4 1 2 1 2 1 5 2 2 10 0 1 2 3 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 11 4 8 3 5 6 7 5 8 7 6 16 4 5 6 6 
  
3
1
5
 
316 
 
Table 65: United States of America Heating and Cooling Degree Days, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
HDD15                 
NCAR 1944 2027 1877 1589 1676 1843 1709 1775 1860 1779 1759 1568 1737 1846 1817 1838 
CPC 1718 1829 1722 1437 1541 1702 1569 1616 1709 1634 1627 1439 1598 1692 1665 1663 
CPC/NCAR 1717 1827 1721 1436 1539 1700 1567 1614 1708 1633 1626 1438 1596 1690 1663 1661 
Delaware 1765 1873 1761 1479 1583 1753 1619 1670 1770 1691 1681 1498 1663 1760 1734 1746 
Del/NCAR 1736 1840 1730 1455 1558 1724 1592 1641 1741 1663 1652 1472 1634 1727 1703 1717 
HDD18                 
NCAR 2592 2689 2522 2209 2299 2481 2339 2412 2497 2407 2382 2193 2340 2482 2463 2470 
CPC 2328 2453 2344 2028 2141 2310 2167 2221 2319 2224 2223 2036 2166 2298 2274 2255 
CPC/NCAR 2326 2450 2342 2026 2139 2308 2165 2219 2317 2222 2221 2034 2164 2295 2271 2253 
Delaware 2382 2503 2388 2078 2192 2372 2229 2285 2393 2295 2291 2112 2249 2384 2364 2358 
Del/NCAR 2346 2465 2350 2048 2161 2337 2197 2251 2359 2262 2256 2079 2215 2344 2327 2324 
CDD18                 
NCAR 647 595 618 746 686 651 651 685 650 614 737 711 713 660 628 747 
CPC 820 745 733 870 809 779 793 862 801 778 869 852 887 821 781 935 
CPC/NCAR 820 746 734 871 810 780 794 863 802 779 870 853 888 821 781 936 
Delaware 789 720 710 832 776 744 749 816 750 721 815 790 807 750 710 852 
Del/NCAR 798 729 722 840 784 753 758 824 761 734 825 802 818 761 722 860 
CDD22                 
NCAR 253 221 228 309 265 257 246 262 246 215 300 284 273 251 245 320 
CPC 362 307 297 387 347 329 330 381 345 310 390 377 385 352 335 446 
CPC/NCAR 362 307 297 387 347 329 330 381 346 310 390 378 385 352 336 446 
Delaware 340 290 283 362 325 309 303 350 313 275 354 339 333 307 294 391 
Del/NCAR 343 294 287 364 327 312 306 352 317 281 358 343 337 311 299 394 
                 
Cw18 NCAR 338 285 283 338 289 269 293 345 319 301 356 321 350 300 296 393 
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Appendix 2-2: Panel Data Inputs 
The inputs to the panel data models include the following series: 
The climate series HDD15, HDD18, CDD18, CDD22, and Cw18 (wet-bulb CDD18) are 
shown in Table 67 through Table 71.  These use the hybrid raster maps based on the CPC 
series, with the NCEP-NCAR series used to patch the missing coastal areas. 
Energy consumption per capita, EPERCAP, is shown in Table 72.  It is derived from the 
total energy consumption shown in Table 73.  For Table 73, note that an exajoule (EJ, 
10
18
 J) is approximately the same as a quad (quadrillion BTU, 10
15
 BTU). 
Gross Domestic Product per capita, using year 2005 international dollars, is referred to as 
GDP in the models and is shown in Table 74.  The table uses thousands of dollars for 
reasons of space, but the variable used in the regressions is dollars, not thousands. 
The energy shares series PRIMARY, OIL, and GAS are developed as described in 
Section 3.4.4.  They are shown in Table 75, Table 76, and Table 77. 
The prices for commercial diesel fuel (PDIESEL) and industrial electricity (PELEC) are 
in constant (2005) international (PPP) dollars.  These series can be found in IEA (1997-
2012). 
The series used to convert current exchange-rate dollars to constant (2005) international 
dollars is shown in Table 78.  
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Table 66: Annual Data Points in IEA Energy Prices and Taxes, 1995-2010 
County Industrial 
Heavy 
Fuel Oil 
Commercial 
Diesel 
Non-
Commercial 
Diesel 
Regular 
Unleaded 
Gasoline 
Premium 
Unleaded 
Gasoline 
Industrial 
Electricity 
Household 
Electricity 
Argentina 13 14 13 13 9 12 12 
Australia 0 1 16 16 6 10 10 
Brazil 10 14 11 15 6 15 15 
Canada 16 16 0 16 16 16 16 
Chile 11 12 13 14 14 11 13 
China 3 16 10 16 5 2 3 
Colombia 14 15 15 15 10 15 15 
France 15 16 16 0 16 16 16 
Germany 0 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Greece 4 16 16 0 16 14 14 
India 16 16 0 10 0 6 10 
Indonesia 15 16 15 8 9 16 16 
Italy 8 16 16 0 16 16 16 
Japan 14 16 16 16 0 16 16 
Mexico 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 
Netherlands 16 16 16 0 16 11 16 
Pakistan 8 0 8 8 0 0 0 
Peru 13 15 15 15 10 13 13 
Poland 2 16 16 0 16 16 16 
Portugal 16 16 16 0 16 16 16 
Romania 4 4 16 0 16 14 14 
Russia 9 9 10 9 13 16 0 
S. Africa 13 16 4 4 15 12 10 
S. Korea 8 5 16 14 4 15 16 
Spain 9 16 16 0 16 15 15 
Switzerland 0 16 16 0 16 16 16 
Taiwan 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Thailand 16 16 0 16 16 16 16 
Turkey 16 16 16 0 16 16 16 
UK 8 16 16 0 16 16 16 
USA 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Venezuela 12 12 11 11 8 12 12 
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Table 67: HDD15 by Country, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 691 701 524 572 682 732 610 647 642 630 640 575 874 627 632 707 
Australia 557 527 553 498 447 499 272 456 487 475 412 500 435 486 410 505 
Brazil 16 44 20 25 32 36 17 17 22 28 16 18 31 22 35 24 
Canada 3839 4052 3860 3253 3408 3731 3422 3644 3824 3730 3603 3284 3669 3730 3754 3313 
Chile 1922 1953 1679 1815 1923 1956 1904 1928 1815 1852 1853 1738 2152 1807 1779 1982 
China 1696 1811 1654 1543 1579 1757 1667 1512 1641 1539 1763 1569 1491 1680 1644 1668 
Colombia 113 135 104 99 122 133 118 100 110 106 113 118 128 140 81 86 
France 1624 1909 1572 1693 1618 1501 1661 1431 1645 1694 1721 1632 1473 1640 1647 1954 
Germany 2406 2861 2388 2267 2204 2002 2342 2197 2381 2362 2302 2280 2022 2168 2296 2770 
Greece 1169 1286 1251 1178 1053 1098 1027 1027 1188 1064 1128 1172 1005 966 946 840 
India 93 92 102 95 84 86 85 81 108 88 92 73 86 86 75 99 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 1404 1428 1242 1379 1384 1235 1291 1210 1398 1355 1518 1332 1209 1278 1347 1449 
Japan 1617 1656 1457 1397 1498 1544 1578 1456 1500 1372 1639 1517 1391 1499 1403 1495 
Korea 2149 2209 2007 1782 1989 2121 2121 1972 1974 1890 2247 1954 1864 2001 1970 2244 
Mexico 170 194 186 163 221 178 194 225 206 209 158 183 184 198 173 242 
Netherlands 2049 2570 2089 1900 1835 1738 1987 1845 2009 1966 1843 1872 1668 1923 1969 2476 
Pakistan 340 322 361 319 252 327 276 271 320 256 346 326 299 326 287 298 
Peru 553 642 551 521 651 636 603 574 615 556 620 593 688 583 543 558 
Poland 2852 3294 2911 2725 2587 2288 2794 2605 2853 2714 2757 2740 2434 2371 2675 3121 
Portugal 513 755 536 647 743 723 702 579 689 738 786 690 663 695 676 753 
Romania 2613 2791 2755 2642 2448 2400 2546 2411 2890 2595 2723 2650 2331 2352 2402 2596 
Russia 3859 4544 4350 4452 4146 4077 4170 4092 4157 4038 4001 4260 3830 3748 4090 4284 
South Africa 414 482 441 383 362 442 388 391 386 373 291 390 361 316 370 314 
Spain 844 1000 815 956 1037 972 975 872 957 1023 1125 943 970 993 947 1089 
Switzerland 2678 2902 2561 2659 2699 2443 2623 2409 2669 2658 2769 2616 2431 2591 2620 2887 
Taiwan 199 170 153 118 121 101 83 79 102 105 145 77 81 130 102 87 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 1809 1794 1902 1698 1565 1872 1544 1779 1833 1747 1728 1798 1706 1707 1568 1311 
UK 1976 2327 1891 1905 1859 1925 2058 1790 1894 1866 1895 1880 1783 2003 1966 2387 
U.S.A. 1717 1827 1721 1436 1539 1700 1567 1614 1708 1633 1626 1438 1596 1690 1663 1661 
Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 68: HDD18 by Country, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 1199 1192 991 1076 1206 1253 1098 1127 1132 1122 1160 1052 1387 1112 1099 1223 
Australia 1082 1052 1047 976 934 966 611 923 961 952 862 970 860 969 845 970 
Brazil 78 133 90 102 125 119 78 69 92 112 74 86 101 95 112 96 
Canada 4718 4943 4756 4093 4260 4633 4282 4510 4690 4620 4455 4149 4527 4613 4643 4173 
Chile 2859 2897 2585 2728 2859 2902 2829 2863 2737 2774 2774 2662 3093 2690 2675 2915 
China 2277 2401 2218 2072 2138 2317 2215 2063 2202 2089 2308 2096 2030 2228 2185 2233 
Colombia 307 358 290 276 338 348 312 282 297 285 302 316 332 360 243 260 
France 2408 2746 2341 2490 2372 2280 2435 2233 2379 2471 2465 2355 2264 2441 2397 2754 
Germany 3267 3787 3251 3151 3031 2869 3200 3050 3185 3243 3163 3091 2882 3023 3135 3647 
Greece 1784 1898 1869 1749 1593 1647 1568 1596 1750 1636 1713 1747 1564 1514 1501 1362 
India 174 169 194 178 158 165 161 150 195 164 170 132 162 162 136 182 
Indonesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 2072 2097 1871 2014 1996 1831 1894 1836 2006 1993 2149 1942 1826 1902 1953 2095 
Japan 2243 2296 2067 1963 2091 2144 2181 2063 2110 1956 2239 2117 1987 2105 2000 2100 
Korea 2817 2866 2661 2379 2627 2774 2734 2621 2617 2528 2881 2579 2502 2629 2593 2894 
Mexico 477 518 492 438 547 485 528 557 525 529 445 494 498 530 466 578 
Netherlands 2902 3507 2959 2802 2673 2623 2841 2705 2837 2841 2705 2670 2539 2794 2818 3364 
Pakistan 585 563 623 553 451 559 479 481 559 457 595 569 527 555 516 517 
Peru 1058 1205 962 979 1186 1181 1134 1075 1133 1057 1166 1081 1252 1082 1003 1055 
Poland 3728 4207 3797 3616 3437 3167 3665 3419 3683 3606 3627 3566 3273 3237 3533 3978 
Portugal 1046 1393 1060 1249 1350 1328 1289 1179 1258 1335 1359 1216 1251 1314 1233 1330 
Romania 3409 3582 3572 3426 3219 3168 3323 3171 3651 3405 3523 3434 3080 3130 3152 3364 
Russia 4720 5428 5247 5313 5020 4966 5045 4975 5036 4915 4857 5126 4674 4630 4964 5096 
South Africa 860 950 912 813 774 923 822 809 782 782 666 818 759 708 767 678 
Spain 1425 1645 1385 1569 1636 1577 1561 1487 1534 1629 1713 1485 1581 1620 1516 1704 
Switzerland 3561 3817 3435 3526 3551 3301 3484 3279 3477 3528 3621 3452 3299 3463 3448 3767 
Taiwan 445 396 356 295 312 284 168 225 278 282 357 233 237 321 272 254 
Thailand 3 3 2 1 5 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 3 2 1 
Turkey 2506 2490 2621 2358 2225 2550 2196 2451 2500 2424 2413 2459 2341 2350 2230 1930 
UK 2875 3289 2814 2869 2781 2875 2988 2740 2792 2794 2816 2748 2749 2958 2900 3330 
U.S.A. 2326 2450 2342 2026 2139 2308 2165 2219 2317 2222 2221 2034 2164 2295 2271 2253 
Venezuela 5 6 6 4 12 12 4 3 3 5 5 6 6 6 3 3 
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Table 69: CDD18 by Country, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 724 764 739 606 667 706 800 736 743 771 710 781 734 834 851 790 
Australia 630 608 732 775 695 743 756 728 742 763 779 759 820 699 839 795 
Brazil 2059 2035 2025 2137 1951 1993 2088 2203 2115 1988 2105 2093 2098 1999 2153 2136 
Canada 203 163 152 208 229 142 210 235 204 152 269 206 210 176 145 224 
Chile 53 49 66 68 53 51 66 58 63 66 62 63 58 99 86 65 
China 935 916 965 1038 948 1016 1018 968 977 963 1056 1073 1042 1007 1042 998 
Colombia 1712 1567 1782 1821 1545 1599 1759 1830 1836 1822 1799 1731 1709 1607 1935 1864 
France 270 168 263 200 267 210 233 179 444 237 269 362 175 194 288 243 
Germany 175 82 157 96 163 107 145 145 260 119 116 242 112 131 155 166 
Greece 785 780 742 941 999 952 986 894 1025 865 869 890 1009 975 858 1003 
India 3046 3041 2903 3111 3068 3040 3063 3152 3094 3087 3061 3110 3064 3001 3220 3264 
Indonesia 3093 3132 3132 3308 3094 3147 3145 3200 3272 3283 3291 3234 3247 3167 3283 3293 
Italy 539 508 603 685 705 678 676 590 881 609 634 657 639 637 733 607 
Japan 783 725 753 854 869 889 839 830 712 918 871 818 864 827 772 958 
Korea 650 687 710 720 718 742 797 636 578 719 740 690 696 717 683 802 
Mexico 1239 1192 1225 1365 1195 1212 1163 1201 1252 1216 1290 1237 1197 1183 1293 1208 
Netherlands 157 62 138 58 125 70 115 105 164 104 89 218 80 93 118 122 
Pakistan 2610 2596 2409 2783 2899 2856 2864 2916 2694 2854 2685 2646 2821 2775 2841 2928 
Peru 689 556 909 918 633 634 654 731 692 713 647 714 656 706 795 806 
Poland 144 96 119 98 152 99 154 224 190 115 131 225 161 134 146 199 
Portugal 474 366 451 413 395 427 408 344 527 485 539 587 400 370 496 551 
Romania 317 312 244 326 358 357 358 379 410 251 253 299 462 346 370 388 
Russia 201 197 161 249 239 186 220 206 185 182 205 215 259 196 190 412 
South Africa 619 574 563 626 691 524 607 646 796 720 723 678 730 711 694 786 
Spain 630 514 600 646 672 616 649 552 812 711 724 785 606 605 760 692 
Switzerland 159 98 137 147 155 141 156 142 343 142 154 231 121 140 199 164 
Taiwan 1790 1813 1780 2048 1854 1873 1912 2058 2019 1909 1969 1998 1962 1951 2011 1965 
Thailand 3405 3314 3490 3690 3248 3333 3434 3497 3450 3444 3515 3487 3426 3288 3424 3646 
Turkey 549 564 473 655 647 635 698 628 651 581 619 678 777 712 618 790 
UK 101 44 77 33 60 43 59 42 89 57 55 118 29 38 51 57 
U.S.A. 820 746 734 871 810 780 794 863 802 779 870 853 888 821 781 936 
Venezuela 2510 2483 2608 2792 2329 2350 2698 2677 2773 2672 2684 2567 2585 2740 3075 2891 
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Table 70: CDD22 by Country, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 222 229 225 147 189 220 267 212 221 240 220 251 235 277 283 273 
Australia 183 177 227 261 210 215 250 221 228 249 250 238 245 210 266 257 
Brazil 881 888 868 974 835 840 906 976 945 856 928 928 918 848 970 972 
Canada 52 34 30 43 60 27 51 65 49 29 81 50 50 37 26 59 
Chile 4 3 5 6 4 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 11 9 6 
China 423 411 435 472 412 471 467 435 447 425 497 500 481 453 484 468 
Colombia 791 710 838 861 683 717 818 864 873 851 851 811 800 733 938 894 
France 60 26 55 38 51 33 42 26 144 43 52 98 25 32 64 54 
Germany 31 8 25 9 21 10 20 19 57 14 12 59 10 14 22 32 
Greece 329 317 291 435 454 431 455 395 485 367 380 391 484 452 356 462 
India 1816 1796 1686 1879 1817 1802 1813 1897 1859 1840 1827 1830 1822 1757 1949 2017 
Indonesia 1637 1671 1677 1850 1637 1686 1688 1744 1814 1821 1833 1777 1790 1707 1826 1835 
Italy 185 157 194 264 257 233 241 193 399 204 214 229 224 222 279 218 
Japan 347 292 295 348 373 399 365 366 265 412 378 342 373 357 302 458 
Korea 259 262 284 258 269 310 324 220 175 276 289 259 258 275 237 347 
Mexico 534 510 530 597 500 510 500 518 547 523 556 531 505 502 567 521 
Netherlands 22 4 19 3 11 4 10 8 19 9 6 43 4 6 11 16 
Pakistan 1647 1616 1474 1797 1863 1855 1825 1891 1717 1815 1707 1685 1818 1759 1847 1897 
Peru 243 180 322 375 213 220 228 266 248 254 235 242 241 244 284 312 
Poland 22 12 15 10 21 10 25 41 32 14 18 52 21 16 21 40 
Portugal 95 67 78 86 74 87 72 52 128 112 133 146 69 65 110 153 
Romania 87 82 53 91 101 102 111 112 124 54 54 74 154 97 100 121 
Russia 47 51 35 74 69 46 66 58 43 40 49 61 76 51 48 164 
South Africa 138 117 119 135 163 100 123 141 213 177 166 162 179 162 154 190 
Spain 211 160 175 237 243 204 219 169 339 271 273 295 203 216 293 276 
Switzerland 30 11 19 21 22 18 25 19 101 20 22 57 13 19 36 31 
Taiwan 894 904 832 1041 897 912 939 1028 1031 940 1014 989 966 977 1021 989 
Thailand 1977 1883 2051 2243 1827 1886 1994 2055 2019 2008 2075 2045 1991 1859 1992 2198 
Turkey 199 214 163 268 256 263 291 249 262 216 248 281 335 299 235 345 
UK 11 2 7 1 4 2 4 2 8 3 3 14 1 2 3 4 
U.S.A.  362 307 297 387 347 329 330 381 346 310 390 378 385 352 336 446 
Venezuela 1142 1114 1235 1385 1019 1025 1300 1278 1365 1284 1299 1192 1207 1355 1660 1479 
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Table 71: Cw18 by Country, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 138 160 174 127 131 149 220 182 148 152 139 184 189 200 186 196 
Australia 124 123 156 174 147 138 149 130 129 150 135 151 163 138 164 185 
Brazil 910 915 927 1044 880 887 899 942 911 843 900 924 939 896 1062 998 
Canada 76 50 40 53 59 36 50 63 62 45 91 61 55 57 41 76 
Chile 20 16 26 26 18 18 23 25 23 26 24 26 20 25 23 21 
China 474 455 437 532 474 490 468 460 486 436 514 503 473 481 475 493 
Colombia 1133 1118 1231 1340 1057 1080 1140 1205 1201 1172 1228 1208 1181 1115 1215 1252 
France 38 16 48 20 42 29 34 22 71 33 38 70 19 23 38 37 
Germany 28 12 35 11 23 13 23 30 39 20 17 55 18 17 25 31 
Greece 195 161 148 214 277 185 210 247 249 194 232 236 266 225 233 270 
India 1049 1031 1087 1211 1069 1067 1141 1062 1089 1099 1132 1169 1139 1140 1107 1243 
Indonesia 2184 2173 2102 2425 2180 2230 2225 2209 2199 2184 2273 2151 2200 2163 2257 2386 
Italy 139 104 140 147 187 147 161 173 294 172 174 205 154 183 214 175 
Japan 410 396 379 511 482 473 455 437 392 492 485 471 467 460 379 540 
Korea 379 373 407 443 432 461 472 350 329 406 443 402 433 393 323 473 
Mexico 420 392 434 456 359 368 375 398 409 400 413 429 416 401 433 409 
Netherlands 20 9 25 8 17 9 17 20 19 15 11 30 9 12 14 16 
Pakistan 625 585 643 688 650 632 698 652 672 649 710 766 761 780 686 778 
Peru 305 219 383 448 241 226 305 334 320 297 290 325 294 309 348 357 
Poland 28 24 34 21 36 19 52 58 42 26 27 65 42 23 40 63 
Portugal 106 83 116 104 100 78 88 70 118 109 106 142 72 74 102 99 
Romania 53 42 38 53 90 40 77 77 92 50 67 72 84 65 66 109 
Russia 51 51 48 68 66 55 73 50 60 61 69 79 73 61 48 105 
South Africa 95 96 91 126 128 107 103 96 112 122 121 143 100 127 125 140 
Spain 67 51 71 76 80 58 74 52 99 86 83 108 63 69 97 101 
Switzerland 13 3 15 6 14 9 13 9 44 11 12 39 8 9 20 20 
Taiwan 1086 1103 1073 1299 1138 1175 1166 1183 1148 1063 1165 1223 1179 1198 1137 1125 
Thailand 1791 1745 1808 1988 1754 1756 1812 1796 1796 1699 1861 1877 1775 1701 1776 1944 
Turkey 85 79 69 94 127 78 93 93 61 60 94 97 113 86 76 144 
UK 11 4 8 3 5 6 7 5 8 7 6 16 4 5 6 6 
U.S.A. 338 285 283 338 289 269 293 345 319 301 356 321 350 300 296 393 
Venezuela 1539 1463 1465 1697 1413 1308 1377 1430 1492 1472 1661 1530 1503 1376 1412 1680 
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Table 72: Energy Consumption per Capita (GJ = 10
9
 J), 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 61.9 64.4 64.6 67.5 68.6 68.4 64.4 60.8 65.3 68.4 71.9 74.9 79.2 80.3 77.6 78.8 
Australia 230.2 237.7 253.8 253.2 262.4 261.1 266.8 267.5 266.4 279.4 287.8 287.6 295.5 281.1 280.6 278.9 
Brazil 35.1 36.8 38.4 39.0 39.1 39.8 39.3 39.1 38.1 39.6 40.6 41.7 43.2 43.5 44.5 47.8 
Canada 325.1 329.6 335.3 329.4 343.6 349.5 334.9 337.7 351.5 366.1 360.1 347.2 350.1 315.5 316.8 314.1 
Chile 46.9 51.4 58.9 58.5 62.7 60.8 61.1 61.4 64.6 69.2 72.2 73.1 59.9 76.8 70.7 74.4 
China 27.6 28.9 31.4 32.2 31.5 32.8 33.7 37.3 41.7 46.5 52.8 57.5 61.1 64.3 71.7 75.8 
Colombia 25.2 26.8 28.4 28.5 25.9 25.8 25.3 24.6 25.0 24.5 25.6 26.1 26.1 25.8 26.4 26.9 
France 127.6 134.2 131.1 135.8 135.3 137.1 136.9 134.5 135.4 138.8 137.7 137.1 136.0 123.7 128.6 129.4 
Germany 170.8 169.8 168.3 168.6 164.8 167.8 171.5 167.5 170.6 171.3 166.9 169.6 164.6 153.6 155.7 160.0 
Greece 110.9 112.2 117.7 125.1 123.5 130.8 133.1 132.8 138.7 137.5 138.5 141.9 146.1 133.8 133.0 125.5 
India 12.5 11.7 12.0 12.3 13.0 13.3 13.6 13.2 13.4 14.3 15.0 15.9 16.7 17.7 18.7 18.8 
Indonesia 16.8 18.0 18.4 17.3 18.8 18.5 18.5 19.0 18.9 20.2 20.9 22.7 23.4 23.4 24.9 25.6 
Italy 124.5 124.1 125.9 129.5 131.0 132.2 132.1 133.3 138.2 141.9 140.8 139.3 140.1 125.7 126.0 130.4 
Japan 154.7 156.9 159.4 155.2 160.1 163.4 161.5 162.0 167.9 171.0 169.6 166.9 171.3 144.0 151.3 159.7 
Korea 138.5 145.4 157.3 144.3 154.2 160.5 164.8 172.3 175.3 180.0 184.6 186.5 195.2 160.5 196.5 213.4 
Mexico 56.4 57.7 58.9 61.5 61.2 63.4 62.4 61.8 62.6 61.7 63.7 68.5 70.1 65.0 63.1 65.2 
Netherlands 241.1 250.4 247.7 244.9 242.6 248.1 255.2 254.0 257.6 262.9 267.0 259.8 272.7 219.4 251.7 262.2 
Pakistan 11.2 11.7 11.5 11.4 11.9 12.0 11.1 10.9 11.1 11.3 12.0 13.2 13.7 13.5 13.4 13.4 
Peru 17.0 17.8 16.8 17.1 17.0 16.9 16.6 16.6 16.7 17.8 18.8 20.3 20.4 23.7 22.3 25.4 
Poland 100.7 112.6 111.0 104.5 108.0 98.4 93.7 93.7 97.2 101.9 99.9 104.8 106.4 103.1 102.7 110.1 
Portugal 81.4 80.2 84.9 90.7 99.0 100.3 99.2 102.7 100.2 103.3 106.8 99.6 101.7 86.3 94.1 93.9 
Romania 88.4 90.2 87.2 73.5 67.0 67.8 73.9 72.3 71.1 72.9 70.8 72.1 71.6 70.7 58.7 58.2 
Russia 184.8 171.3 160.6 160.2 167.5 173.2 170.1 178.3 184.8 190.7 190.0 189.0 196.9 207.9 191.4 204.6 
South Africa 100.7 100.5 108.5 101.9 103.6 105.0 105.6 101.6 108.4 114.7 111.7 114.5 116.3 122.7 119.0 118.0 
Spain 100.6 99.7 108.2 113.1 120.6 127.4 129.6 131.7 133.7 137.6 140.3 137.3 141.2 119.4 121.6 119.8 
Switzerland 121.8 123.7 121.4 125.5 127.3 125.0 126.4 122.5 124.1 127.3 125.3 124.3 122.3 122.1 119.7 117.3 
Taiwan 127.7 135.7 141.9 149.3 156.6 167.7 169.4 178.9 186.2 191.8 192.6 197.9 198.9 194.5 192.4 207.1 
Thailand 37.0 42.3 44.5 41.5 42.3 42.9 44.5 48.0 52.2 55.7 58.8 59.0 60.7 56.4 63.6 67.6 
Turkey 38.2 41.3 43.7 43.8 42.5 46.3 42.1 44.3 46.0 47.3 50.5 54.2 59.6 54.4 55.7 56.1 
UK 156.0 165.6 159.2 158.0 158.9 158.8 159.8 160.5 161.9 164.3 159.7 157.4 155.3 147.6 139.5 142.1 
U.S.A. 321.6 328.3 328.0 326.2 327.2 332.0 321.1 321.9 320.3 324.4 321.7 315.7 318.3 303.7 288.3 296.0 
Venezuela 103.7 106.0 107.4 114.3 102.1 105.4 115.8 110.6 99.4 105.0 100.7 108.3 102.7 122.3 98.3 110.0 
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Table 73: Total Energy Consumption (EJ = 10
18
 J), 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 
Australia 4.1 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.9 5.0 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.6 5.8 5.9 6.1 5.9 6.0 6.0 
Brazil 5.7 6.1 6.5 6.7 6.8 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.0 7.4 7.7 8.0 8.4 8.5 8.8 9.6 
Canada 9.7 9.9 10.2 10.1 10.6 10.9 10.5 10.7 11.2 11.8 11.7 11.3 11.5 10.5 10.6 10.6 
Chile 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 
China 33.6 35.5 38.9 40.2 39.5 41.5 42.8 47.7 53.6 60.0 68.6 75.0 80.0 84.7 94.9 100.9 
Colombia 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
France 7.4 7.9 7.7 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.5 7.7 8.1 8.2 
Germany 13.9 13.9 13.8 13.8 13.5 13.8 14.1 13.8 14.1 14.1 13.8 14.0 13.6 12.6 12.8 13.2 
Greece 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 
India 11.5 10.9 11.5 12.0 12.9 13.4 13.9 13.8 14.2 15.4 16.3 17.6 18.8 20.2 21.6 22.0 
Indonesia 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.6 4.8 5.3 5.5 5.6 6.0 6.2 
Italy 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.7 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.2 7.3 7.3 7.6 
Japan 19.4 19.7 20.1 19.6 20.3 20.7 20.5 20.6 21.4 21.8 21.6 21.3 21.8 18.3 19.2 20.3 
Korea 6.2 6.6 7.2 6.7 7.2 7.5 7.8 8.2 8.4 8.6 8.9 9.0 9.4 7.8 9.5 10.4 
Mexico 5.2 5.4 5.6 6.0 6.0 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.5 6.5 6.8 7.4 7.6 7.1 7.0 7.3 
Netherlands 3.7 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.5 3.7 4.2 4.4 
Pakistan 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 
Peru 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 
Poland 3.9 4.4 4.3 4.0 4.2 3.8 3.6 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.2 
Portugal 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
Romania 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 
Russia 27.4 25.4 23.8 23.7 24.7 25.4 24.8 25.9 26.7 27.4 27.1 26.9 27.8 29.2 26.8 28.5 
South Africa 4.3 4.3 4.7 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.6 6.0 5.8 5.8 
Spain 4.0 4.0 4.3 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 5.9 6.1 6.1 6.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 
Switzerland 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Taiwan 2.7 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.8 
Thailand 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.2 4.5 
Turkey 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.0 4.5 4.1 4.3 4.4 
UK 9.1 9.7 9.4 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.9 9.7 9.6 9.6 9.1 8.7 8.9 
U.S.A. 85.6 88.4 89.4 90.0 91.3 93.7 91.5 92.6 93.0 95.1 95.1 94.3 96.0 92.5 88.5 91.8 
Venezuela 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.4 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 3.2 2.6 3.0 
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Table 74: GDP Per Capita (thousands of 2005 international dollars), 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 8.3 8.6 9.2 9.4 9.1 8.9 8.6 7.9 8.4 9.0 9.7 10.3 11.0 11.5 11.6 12.3 
Australia 29.5 30.4 31.5 32.8 33.8 34.1 34.9 35.8 37.0 37.7 38.4 39.3 40.3 40.4 40.8 41.1 
Brazil 6.6 6.7 6.8 6.7 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.8 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.8 8.1 8.0 8.3 
Canada 28.5 28.6 29.8 30.7 32.2 33.6 33.8 34.5 34.9 35.8 36.7 37.4 37.9 37.7 36.2 37.1 
Chile 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.3 9.6 9.7 9.9 10.5 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.4 11.8 12.5 
China 1.9 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.9 4.3 4.9 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.1 
Colombia 6.2 6.1 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.1 6.3 6.5 6.8 7.2 7.4 7.4 7.5 
France 26.5 26.6 27.0 27.9 28.7 29.7 30.0 30.1 30.2 30.8 31.2 31.8 32.4 32.2 31.0 31.3 
Germany 28.5 28.6 29.0 29.6 30.1 31.0 31.4 31.2 31.1 31.4 31.7 32.9 34.1 34.6 32.7 34.1 
Greece 17.9 18.3 18.9 19.6 20.2 21.0 21.9 22.5 24.0 24.9 25.3 26.8 27.6 27.4 26.2 25.2 
India 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.9 2.9 3.2 3.5 
Indonesia 2.9 3.1 3.2 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.0 
Italy 26.2 26.4 26.9 27.2 27.7 28.7 29.1 29.2 29.1 29.5 29.6 30.2 30.5 29.9 28.0 28.4 
Japan 29.0 29.6 30.0 29.2 29.0 29.8 29.7 29.6 30.0 30.8 31.4 32.0 32.8 32.4 30.1 31.4 
Korea 15.9 16.9 17.4 15.5 17.3 18.7 19.3 20.6 21.0 21.8 22.6 23.7 24.8 25.3 24.9 26.6 
Mexico 9.1 9.5 10.1 10.5 10.8 11.4 11.2 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.6 12.1 12.4 12.4 11.4 11.9 
Netherlands 29.5 30.4 31.6 32.7 34.1 35.2 35.6 35.4 35.3 35.8 36.4 37.5 38.8 39.3 37.6 38.2 
Pakistan 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.3 
Peru 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.9 6.4 6.9 6.9 7.4 
Poland 8.8 9.3 9.9 10.4 10.8 11.3 11.5 11.7 12.1 12.8 13.2 14.1 15.0 15.8 16.1 16.7 
Portugal 16.3 16.9 17.6 18.5 19.2 19.8 20.1 20.1 19.7 19.9 19.9 20.2 20.6 20.5 19.6 19.8 
Romania 5.6 5.8 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.8 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.7 8.1 8.9 9.4 10.2 9.6 9.4 
Russia 8.1 7.8 7.9 7.4 7.7 8.5 9.1 9.6 10.4 11.4 12.2 13.2 14.4 15.1 14.5 15.1 
South Africa 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.4 7.6 7.3 7.5 
Spain 21.5 22.0 22.8 23.9 25.0 26.0 26.7 27.0 27.4 27.8 28.3 28.9 29.4 29.1 27.7 27.3 
Switzerland 33.0 33.0 33.6 34.6 34.7 35.8 36.0 35.9 35.5 36.2 37.0 38.2 39.4 40.0 39.1 40.0 
Taiwan 18.5 19.4 20.3 20.9 21.9 23.1 22.3 23.3 24.1 25.6 26.7 28.0 29.6 29.6 28.8 32.1 
Thailand 6.1 6.3 6.1 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.4 6.7 7.0 7.3 7.6 7.7 7.6 8.1 
Turkey 7.1 7.6 8.1 8.1 7.8 8.2 7.6 7.9 8.3 8.9 9.5 10.0 10.4 10.3 9.7 10.4 
UK 24.7 25.4 27.0 28.1 29.0 30.2 31.0 31.7 32.7 33.5 34.0 34.7 35.7 35.0 33.2 34.3 
U.S.A. 33.6 34.5 35.8 37.0 38.5 39.7 39.5 39.8 40.4 41.5 42.5 43.2 43.5 42.7 40.4 41.4 
Venezuela 8.9 8.7 9.2 9.2 8.4 8.7 8.7 7.9 7.2 8.3 8.9 9.5 10.0 10.2 9.5 9.1 
3
2
6
 
327 
 
Table 75: PRIMARY, percentage of Total Energy, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 5.6 4.7 5.5 5.0 4.1 5.0 6.5 6.6 6.0 5.3 5.3 5.8 4.5 4.4 5.0 4.7 
Australia 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 
Brazil 16.6 16.4 16.3 16.5 16.3 16.5 15.1 15.9 17.2 17.0 17.1 17.2 17.5 17.2 17.5 17.0 
Canada 15.9 16.0 15.1 14.3 14.1 14.2 14.0 14.3 13.3 13.2 14.0 14.3 14.4 16.0 15.6 15.2 
Chile 11.6 9.9 8.6 7.1 5.5 8.0 8.8 9.1 8.3 7.9 8.8 9.3 9.5 7.7 9.1 7.0 
China 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.8 2.7 3.0 
Colombia 12.7 12.9 10.8 10.3 12.2 11.5 11.6 12.5 12.9 14.3 13.5 14.0 14.4 15.0 12.9 12.2 
France 20.3 19.7 20.0 18.9 19.6 19.8 20.4 20.6 20.6 20.3 20.2 20.3 20.2 22.4 20.2 21.1 
Germany 4.6 4.8 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.6 5.7 6.0 6.0 6.7 6.4 6.6 
Greece 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.1 0.8 0.9 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.1 1.5 2.1 2.9 
India 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.5 
Indonesia 1.1 1.1 0.8 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 
Italy 2.1 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.2 3.0 3.5 3.8 
Japan 6.9 7.0 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.1 7.1 6.7 5.8 6.4 6.6 6.8 5.8 6.9 7.0 6.9 
Korea 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.8 5.1 5.2 5.1 5.1 5.5 5.4 5.8 5.8 5.4 6.9 5.5 5.1 
Mexico 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.9 2.4 2.6 
Netherlands 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.4 
Pakistan 5.6 4.7 4.9 4.9 3.9 3.4 4.3 4.9 5.7 5.2 5.9 5.4 4.6 4.4 4.5 4.9 
Peru 11.4 11.1 11.4 11.5 12.0 13.2 14.4 14.5 14.7 12.8 12.5 12.4 12.1 10.1 10.9 9.7 
Poland 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Portugal 4.1 7.0 6.0 5.4 3.1 4.5 5.5 3.4 6.2 4.2 2.8 5.5 5.6 6.0 6.7 10.3 
Romania 3.0 2.9 4.1 5.1 5.5 4.7 4.3 4.6 4.0 4.8 5.8 5.2 5.2 6.3 7.4 8.8 
Russia 3.5 3.6 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.1 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.2 
South Africa 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Spain 7.0 8.6 7.5 7.4 6.2 6.7 7.5 6.2 7.3 6.7 5.7 6.5 6.2 7.7 7.9 10.1 
Switzerland 23.8 21.5 23.7 22.9 24.6 24.3 25.4 24.4 24.1 23.0 21.6 23.0 24.5 24.8 25.0 25.4 
Taiwan 5.2 5.2 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.7 
Thailand 1.1 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 
Turkey 5.4 5.6 5.1 5.3 4.4 3.6 3.0 4.0 3.9 4.9 3.9 4.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 4.6 
UK 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.0 3.9 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.1 2.9 3.8 3.4 
U.S.A. 4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.5 4.4 4.6 5.0 4.8 
Venezuela 8.2 8.2 8.5 7.9 9.1 9.0 7.8 7.9 8.8 9.5 10.8 10.5 11.1 9.6 11.6 9.1 
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Table 76: OIL percentage of Total Energy, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 44.2 44.8 44.6 44.5 44.6 43.1 42.2 40.6 38.9 37.7 37.7 38.2 39.5 40.3 39.9 41.1 
Australia 41.0 40.4 38.0 37.8 37.1 36.8 35.4 35.3 35.3 36.6 33.5 33.2 35.6 33.0 33.6 33.7 
Brazil 69.2 69.2 69.5 69.5 69.3 67.5 68.7 66.5 64.8 63.2 63.1 63.1 61.7 58.9 61.7 59.8 
Canada 38.6 38.9 39.7 40.2 39.6 41.0 40.7 40.4 41.1 43.3 41.5 40.9 43.8 39.1 41.5 43.2 
Chile 63.4 62.9 57.0 59.3 55.7 54.7 53.0 52.7 50.3 48.2 48.7 50.2 55.2 64.3 61.6 55.7 
China 22.0 22.2 22.0 22.2 24.0 25.0 25.0 23.5 22.6 23.1 21.1 20.9 20.2 19.7 19.5 20.0 
Colombia 57.8 58.6 56.3 56.1 58.5 58.2 57.7 56.2 55.6 56.0 53.7 52.9 53.7 51.9 47.6 48.0 
France 54.3 53.8 53.9 54.1 53.5 53.0 52.8 51.4 51.6 51.7 50.1 49.9 51.0 44.9 49.8 48.6 
Germany 45.0 45.7 45.9 46.0 45.6 45.0 44.5 44.0 42.2 42.0 41.9 41.9 39.6 36.2 41.5 41.2 
Greece 68.3 70.0 67.6 66.4 65.3 64.4 64.4 64.8 64.9 64.2 64.6 66.0 64.8 61.6 63.1 61.3 
India 30.1 33.6 33.7 34.1 34.4 34.6 34.2 36.1 35.9 33.9 33.1 33.3 32.1 31.8 31.2 31.8 
Indonesia 53.3 51.7 55.2 55.3 53.1 57.2 58.6 58.8 59.2 58.7 58.1 51.8 48.3 49.6 46.8 47.3 
Italy 61.2 60.7 60.0 58.5 56.0 54.5 53.7 54.4 52.1 50.7 47.9 48.1 48.3 41.9 46.9 44.7 
Japan 63.1 62.7 60.9 60.2 59.6 57.1 56.3 55.1 56.7 54.6 55.0 52.2 51.5 43.4 48.5 46.8 
Korea 70.9 70.2 69.0 63.1 63.6 62.3 60.0 58.7 58.1 56.0 55.2 54.2 53.1 38.4 49.6 46.9 
Mexico 69.4 68.3 68.8 68.8 68.6 67.9 67.1 64.7 63.1 64.9 64.8 59.2 63.6 60.4 60.3 57.7 
Netherlands 45.7 43.7 45.6 46.3 48.4 48.7 49.1 49.2 49.8 50.1 52.8 53.0 55.7 43.6 51.5 49.4 
Pakistan 45.4 46.6 46.8 48.2 47.8 46.0 47.1 46.7 41.8 39.0 37.3 35.3 35.9 36.3 36.4 36.0 
Peru 77.2 77.7 82.5 80.8 80.8 78.1 77.1 74.6 74.1 72.5 65.7 68.0 59.9 60.3 60.5 53.1 
Poland 17.6 17.9 19.5 21.4 21.7 23.1 23.7 23.7 24.0 25.6 25.5 25.9 28.2 25.8 28.8 28.4 
Portugal 77.5 75.3 75.4 76.5 72.0 70.3 70.7 70.4 68.2 67.4 68.1 63.7 65.2 59.3 60.4 60.4 
Romania 27.4 28.4 31.1 33.9 31.8 32.8 30.6 31.6 30.4 30.4 30.5 29.3 30.4 32.8 33.2 32.5 
Russia 24.0 22.9 23.8 23.2 22.6 22.3 22.7 22.1 21.8 21.6 22.1 17.1 20.6 22.2 23.3 22.2 
South Africa 21.4 21.4 20.0 21.6 21.9 20.9 20.6 22.0 21.0 20.1 21.8 21.7 21.6 19.7 19.7 20.5 
Spain 65.3 66.2 64.1 65.9 63.5 62.2 62.8 60.9 60.2 58.7 57.9 57.5 56.2 51.2 57.5 56.9 
Switzerland 64.0 65.5 64.0 64.9 63.1 63.0 61.7 62.4 62.2 63.2 63.6 62.8 61.7 60.5 60.8 58.3 
Taiwan 60.5 59.5 56.3 55.0 54.9 51.8 51.6 49.1 48.9 47.9 47.0 46.6 44.4 44.7 45.7 44.8 
Thailand 68.8 65.4 64.1 63.8 61.7 59.0 54.2 54.3 54.6 55.6 54.7 53.0 51.0 43.8 49.3 46.4 
Turkey 55.5 52.8 48.5 47.2 47.6 45.4 45.9 45.9 42.6 41.7 38.0 36.2 34.5 31.0 34.9 31.4 
UK 42.6 41.0 41.5 41.1 41.1 40.1 39.1 40.5 40.4 40.4 40.1 40.1 41.0 38.4 40.4 39.0 
U.S.A. 42.5 42.6 42.7 43.2 43.8 43.1 44.1 43.6 44.0 44.7 44.8 44.8 43.8 41.4 42.3 41.4 
Venezuela 41.8 39.7 39.4 36.8 40.5 42.0 41.1 44.9 46.7 44.1 48.3 47.9 54.2 59.7 53.9 50.4 
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Table 77: GAS percentage of Total Energy, 1995-2010 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 48.3 48.7 48.0 48.8 50.1 50.7 50.2 51.5 54.2 55.9 56.1 54.9 54.4 53.5 53.3 52.3 
Australia 18.8 18.1 16.8 17.5 17.3 18.0 18.4 19.1 19.6 19.7 21.5 21.6 20.5 21.7 21.7 22.6 
Brazil 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.8 5.3 6.3 7.5 8.0 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.5 11.1 8.5 10.5 
Canada 31.6 31.4 30.3 29.7 31.4 29.3 31.8 31.8 32.5 30.6 31.4 31.6 29.0 30.8 31.1 29.7 
Chile 10.6 9.6 12.7 14.6 19.1 22.2 26.6 26.6 30.7 29.7 29.1 25.1 17.9 8.5 10.9 16.7 
China 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.7 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.6 4.1 
Colombia 17.1 16.5 19.4 20.0 17.9 19.6 21.2 21.7 20.8 21.2 21.6 22.6 23.5 23.2 26.0 26.3 
France 17.5 18.3 18.5 18.3 19.2 19.7 20.6 21.3 20.7 21.4 22.9 23.3 21.8 25.0 23.1 23.3 
Germany 23.2 23.2 22.4 23.3 24.0 23.3 23.8 24.2 26.4 26.1 26.3 26.2 26.1 28.6 27.0 26.1 
Greece 0.2 0.2 0.6 2.6 4.4 5.7 5.6 6.0 6.4 7.1 7.5 8.5 10.0 11.6 9.7 11.3 
India 6.6 7.0 6.8 6.9 6.4 6.5 6.7 7.3 7.5 7.7 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.2 9.5 11.3 
Indonesia 36.5 35.9 34.4 31.4 32.5 27.7 20.7 21.8 21.9 17.0 17.3 21.7 23.6 24.7 25.8 25.9 
Italy 29.7 30.7 31.1 32.6 35.0 36.1 36.2 35.6 37.8 38.0 41.1 40.6 40.5 45.1 41.5 42.7 
Japan 13.8 14.3 14.4 15.2 15.5 15.7 15.8 16.8 16.1 16.0 16.0 18.0 19.1 22.3 21.2 21.2 
Korea 6.2 7.7 8.6 8.7 9.8 10.5 10.9 11.9 12.1 13.9 14.3 15.1 15.6 19.2 15.1 17.3 
Mexico 23.4 23.8 23.5 24.1 23.4 24.5 24.8 26.8 27.9 27.5 26.5 32.7 28.8 32.0 32.3 34.2 
Netherlands 43.5 45.9 43.5 43.5 42.7 42.0 41.4 41.3 40.6 40.4 38.1 37.9 34.8 45.0 39.0 41.7 
Pakistan 42.5 42.7 42.3 42.4 43.8 46.3 43.7 42.7 45.1 47.1 49.1 51.2 49.4 51.1 51.3 51.8 
Peru 7.9 7.7 2.0 3.3 3.2 2.7 2.9 3.4 4.0 7.8 13.5 13.8 20.4 23.7 23.6 32.4 
Poland 10.4 10.5 10.6 11.2 10.3 12.1 13.0 12.8 13.5 13.8 14.6 14.0 13.9 14.5 14.2 14.2 
Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.5 8.8 9.1 10.1 11.9 11.8 14.5 15.8 16.3 16.7 21.5 19.4 20.9 
Romania 47.4 46.3 44.3 41.3 43.3 41.4 44.0 41.6 41.9 41.0 39.5 39.7 37.0 34.7 34.0 34.4 
Russia 56.1 54.7 54.9 56.5 54.2 54.6 55.2 55.7 56.6 57.6 57.1 61.2 59.1 57.4 54.4 56.7 
South Africa 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.6 
Spain 9.0 10.1 12.2 12.0 12.8 13.0 13.6 15.1 16.6 18.4 20.9 22.5 23.1 29.4 25.6 25.9 
Switzerland 11.3 12.3 11.8 11.8 11.8 12.1 12.2 12.5 13.1 13.2 14.1 13.5 13.1 14.0 13.6 15.6 
Taiwan 5.9 6.2 7.1 7.8 7.4 7.6 7.4 8.3 8.2 9.5 9.8 9.7 10.3 10.8 11.3 13.1 
Thailand 17.8 17.5 20.7 23.2 24.9 27.2 30.9 31.4 31.7 30.5 31.3 31.6 32.4 36.4 33.7 36.4 
Turkey 11.4 12.5 13.9 14.4 17.3 18.6 21.7 22.3 25.4 25.7 28.9 30.2 31.7 34.2 31.4 33.4 
UK 33.0 36.7 36.3 37.1 39.4 40.5 39.6 39.8 38.9 39.9 39.3 37.8 38.2 41.4 40.6 42.3 
U.S.A. 28.0 27.6 27.4 26.8 26.5 26.9 26.3 26.8 25.9 25.5 25.0 24.9 26.0 27.2 28.0 28.3 
Venezuela 50.0 51.8 52.0 53.7 50.3 48.7 51.0 47.1 44.3 46.1 40.8 41.5 34.5 30.5 34.0 40.1 
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Table 78: Constant (2005) International Dollars per Current Exchange-Rate Dollar, 1995-2010 
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Argentina 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.15 1.18 1.17 1.20 2.95 2.51 2.27 2.07 1.91 1.68 1.42 1.54 1.38 
Australia 1.34 1.26 1.32 1.56 1.49 1.58 1.72 1.60 1.30 1.11 1.02 0.98 0.84 0.81 0.86 0.70 
Brazil 1.41 1.32 1.32 1.36 1.96 1.87 2.20 2.46 2.27 2.00 1.55 1.31 1.11 0.96 1.00 0.80 
Canada 1.43 1.40 1.41 1.52 1.50 1.44 1.48 1.48 1.29 1.16 1.05 0.96 0.88 0.83 0.91 0.79 
Chile 1.56 1.60 1.57 1.69 1.83 1.87 2.13 2.22 2.11 1.74 1.50 1.26 1.19 1.20 1.22 1.03 
China 3.10 2.89 2.86 2.91 2.99 2.99 2.94 2.89 2.79 2.60 2.46 2.27 2.07 1.75 1.71 1.63 
Colombia 1.95 1.89 1.77 1.92 2.12 2.26 2.33 2.40 2.58 2.20 1.84 1.77 1.48 1.30 1.37 1.16 
France 1.01 1.01 1.15 1.15 1.20 1.37 1.38 1.28 1.05 0.94 0.92 0.89 0.80 0.73 0.76 0.79 
Germany 0.92 0.96 1.10 1.11 1.16 1.35 1.37 1.28 1.06 0.95 0.94 0.93 0.84 0.78 0.81 0.85 
Greece 1.42 1.38 1.47 1.51 1.52 1.76 1.78 1.63 1.32 1.16 1.12 1.09 0.97 0.86 0.87 0.90 
India 3.95 4.04 3.88 4.07 4.11 4.15 4.20 4.24 3.87 3.45 3.22 3.10 2.69 2.63 2.74 2.36 
Indonesia 2.39 2.30 2.52 5.24 3.69 3.53 3.77 3.15 2.64 2.61 2.54 2.06 1.84 1.72 1.66 1.37 
Italy 1.32 1.20 1.29 1.28 1.32 1.50 1.50 1.39 1.12 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.86 0.78 0.80 0.84 
Japan 0.69 0.80 0.89 0.96 0.84 0.81 0.92 0.96 0.90 0.85 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.84 0.76 0.73 
Korea 1.35 1.34 1.50 2.00 1.74 1.64 1.80 1.69 1.56 1.45 1.28 1.20 1.14 1.31 1.45 1.28 
Mexico 2.71 2.46 2.19 2.20 2.00 1.77 1.66 1.60 1.64 1.58 1.46 1.37 1.30 1.25 1.45 1.30 
Netherlands 1.09 1.13 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.45 1.42 1.30 1.06 0.96 0.94 0.91 0.82 0.75 0.79 0.82 
Pakistan 3.18 3.35 3.37 3.47 3.61 3.80 4.05 3.82 3.51 3.30 3.14 2.89 2.69 2.71 2.62 2.43 
Peru 2.02 1.99 2.02 2.09 2.32 2.31 2.29 2.29 2.21 2.05 1.92 1.78 1.66 1.52 1.51 1.36 
Poland 2.44 2.29 2.44 2.32 2.50 2.55 2.33 2.27 2.16 1.95 1.68 1.59 1.36 1.15 1.44 1.37 
Portugal 1.41 1.41 1.55 1.54 1.56 1.75 1.74 1.58 1.27 1.13 1.10 1.06 0.94 0.87 0.90 0.93 
Romania 3.39 3.58 3.57 3.03 3.50 3.51 3.44 3.20 2.62 2.27 1.82 1.60 1.22 1.10 1.29 1.27 
Russia 3.82 2.94 2.86 4.11 5.78 4.80 4.28 4.05 3.47 2.74 2.27 1.90 1.58 1.26 1.63 1.38 
S. Africa 1.50 1.62 1.61 1.81 1.88 1.99 2.30 2.54 1.72 1.39 1.30 1.30 1.26 1.35 1.26 1.02 
Spain 1.43 1.41 1.59 1.59 1.63 1.82 1.80 1.64 1.31 1.15 1.10 1.04 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.90 
Switzerland 0.75 0.78 0.91 0.91 0.94 1.04 1.03 0.95 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.69 0.60 0.60 0.58 
Taiwan 1.44 1.44 1.47 1.66 1.61 1.57 1.69 1.74 1.75 1.70 1.66 1.70 1.72 1.70 1.75 1.72 
Thailand 2.17 2.08 2.44 2.87 2.77 2.88 3.17 3.03 2.86 2.66 2.55 2.29 1.99 1.86 1.89 1.68 
Turkey 1.93 2.04 2.07 1.97 2.07 2.06 2.65 2.37 1.93 1.63 1.43 1.39 1.20 1.07 1.22 1.11 
UK 1.24 1.21 1.16 1.13 1.14 1.21 1.25 1.17 1.05 0.92 0.90 0.86 0.78 0.82 0.95 0.94 
U.S.A. 1.21 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.15 1.13 1.10 1.08 1.06 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.89 
Venezuela 2.59 2.82 2.41 2.29 1.99 1.74 1.69 2.06 2.11 1.83 1.55 1.32 1.13 0.86 0.78 0.63 
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Additional Sources of Energy Price Data 
Energy Prices and Taxes (IEA 1997-2012) provides most of the energy price series used 
in this analysis.  The following years did not have industrial electricity prices in Energy 
Prices and Taxes: 
 Australia 2005-2010, Greece 2006-2007, South Korea 2010, and Spain 2010 were 
missing both industrial and residential price values.  Approximate values could be 
derived from the retail price index series in IEA Energy Prices and Taxes. 
 Netherlands 2002-2006 had residential rates but not industrial rates.  The latter 
were estimated using the annual residential values with the assumption that 
industrial prices rose linearly from 40.5% of residential prices in 2001 to 42.8% 
2007 (both end points are known).   
 Argentina 1995 was derived from Ferreira (2002) [254].  Argentina 2008-2010 
was assumed constant based on numerous sources noting a multi-year rate freeze 
in that country. 
 Brazil 2001 is a linear interpolation from 2000 and 2002, consistent with de 
Oliveira et al. (2005) [255]. 
 Chile 1995 is derived from Pollitt (2005) [256], finding the 1995 values for the 
SIC region to be about 15% higher than 1996 values. 
 China 2001-2010 is from the Price Monitoring Center of China’s National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).  Numerous data series exist for 
the period 1997-2000, but these are wholesale power (as in the IEA series), “ex-
factory” prices (also wholesale) and producer price indices.  These do not agree 
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with the known trend of industrial retail prices, suggesting significant changes in 
non-wholesale adjustments (taxes, subsidies, fees, or transmission and distribution 
charges).  The years 1997-2000 are a linear interpolation. 
 Colombia 1995 is assumed identical to 1996 as per Larsen et al. (2004) [257]. 
 India 2001-2006 is from Rao et al. (2009) [258].  India 2007-2010 is from Power 
Finance Corporation Limited (2011) [259]. 
 Pakistan 1995-2008 is from Chaudry (2010) [260].  Pakistan 2009-2010 is from 
Malik (2012) [261]. 
 Peru 1995 is derived from Center for Energy Economics (2006) [262]. 
 Peru 2009-2010 is derived from an Osinergmen press release (March 18, 2009) 
specifying a 6.5% increase in the industrial electricity tariff. 
 Romania 2006-2007 is from Eurostat (2013b) [263]. 
 South Africa 2007 is a 6% increase from 2006, based on van Heerden et al. 
(2008) [264]. 
 South Africa 2008 is a 20% increase from 2007, commensurate with the 
residential increase found by Schussler (2009) [265]. 
 South Africa 2009 is from AECOM (2011) [266]. 
 South Africa 2010 is a 24.8% increase over 2009, reflecting the rate increase 
taking effect April 1 of that year (multiple sources). 
 Venezuela 2007-2010 is held at 2006 levels, as many sources indicate that 
Venezuela did not increase electricity tariffs even when facing serious shortages. 
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